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The first chapter introduces the methodology of logical quantitative 
models and its applications to political sciences. The second chapter 
explains the conversion of votes to seats. I use the law of minority 
attrition, expanding its form into a final model which is applicable from 
single member district to several electoral systems. The third chapter 
introduces the estimation of party seats from the previous elections using 
a weighted regression with independent variables jointly: 1) the product 
of the assembly size and the district magnitude, 2) the past values of the 
biggest party shares, and 3) the number of Effective parties and simply 
considered. Chapter four develops a probability density function with 
five inflection points which describes any party system. It better catches 
the asymmetries among the party seats distribution at nationwide level. 
Chapter five implements the Downsian (or positional) competition 
model that describes the left-right space occupied by each party through 
Beta functions that I have tested on the Italian elections from 1992 to 2018. 
Chapter six presents an in-depth qualitative analysis of the hypothesis 
that the more proportional an electoral system, the more the parties tend 
to centripetal competition, thus connecting ideological terms, effective 
number of parties and electoral system. In chapter seven, I suggest an 
alternative logical method to aggregate electoral flows, which resolves 
Goodman’s problematics and provides a simpler solution than that of G. 
King. Chapter eight provides tools to more accurately calculate the 
optimal value of S (Taagepera and Shugart, 1989, p. 175), and 
unprecedently, the optimal value of other institutional variables such as: 
the district magnitude, the Gallagher’s index of dis-representation, and 
the dis-representation index attributable to an electoral system (𝐷$), 
originally developed in this thesis. Chapter nine wants to determine an 
equilibrium between parties’ and voters’ “electoral utility”, which is the 
quantity of dis-representation which benefits a group of parties and 
voters in the system, producing disutility for the others; this chapter 
enriches the law of minority attrition including thresholds and majority 
premiums (MJPs) and strategic vote, using a primary game theory 
approach and the "Maximin" Rawlsian theory (1971) as a benchmark for 
equality. Chapter ten provides an overview of links among the new tools 
and knowledge developed in this thesis, with the final aim of the 
normative building of an optimal electoral system, which can warrant 
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In recent years, political science, as well as other related social sciences, 
have seen an intensification of empirical works where quantitative 
methods are approached as a benchmark for publication. Statistical 
significance tends to be considered the main parameter of reliability to 
corroborate theoretical frameworks (Leahey, 2005), even though 
sometimes it produces biases used to pick certain hypothesis and reject 
others (Gerber - Malhotra, 2008). In particular, some social scientists 
select data that support their theories with little step-back to see what else 
the data might tell them, and what are the characteristics of the variables 
- therefore of the problems - taken into consideration, what are their 
logical – and then mathematical - limits.  
 
In order to solve all of those intricate social science problems, the 
powerful methodologies and tools that I use extensively in the thesis are 
the Logical Quantitative Models (LQMs). These models employ the reading 
of reality throughout the logical thinking, configuring a “two leg science” 
(Taagepera R. , 2017, p. 7-11) which foresees that the scientific theories 
must consider two sides: 1) how things are, and 2) how these should be. 
The application of this perspective to the social and - in particular to - the 
political science problems, is both a methodological approach as the main 
core and the innovation offered by this dissertation. 
 
LQMs are related to the fact that we cannot just use an inductivist 
approach to problem-solving, because the “science does not start from 
the observation and the induction does not exist” (Antiseri, 2007, p. 5-19), 
otherwise, this would mean applying a methodology without any 
control, in a mechanical way. Moreover, the epistemology Kuhn has 
referred to “normal science” when all the axioms used to solve a problem 
are not problematized; even though this can work to solve some well-
codified exercises, it is only a mechanical way of doing science, without 
any kind of innovation. It is when we have an unsolved problem, or we 
want to try to enlarge the scope of the science that we really make the 
scientific revolution. (id. (p. 255-258)). 
 
My thesis aims at linking political scientists’ analysis with logics, 
mathematics, physics, economics, econometrics and statistics. I agree on 
the Popperian ideal that says: «There are not disciplines, neither roots of 
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the knowledge, or rather, of investigation: there are only problems and 
the necessity to solve them, a science like botany or chemistry (or let's say 
physical chemistry or electrochemistry) is, in my opinion, only an 
administrative unit»1 (Popper K. (., 1994, vol. I , p. 35). 
 
Logical models are also quantitative because it is possible to provide not 
only a merely directional relation but «we get much more out of a 
quantitative model […] because a quantitative model has vastly more 
predictive power» (Taagepera R. , 2015, p. 39). 
 
 
Figure 1 Science walks on two legs (Taagepera R. , 2017, p. 8). 
Taagepera’s approach in building LQMs applies the graphical analysis of 
the variables (two at a time), showing what kind of relation occurs 
between them, more from a perspective of the meaning of the obtained 
function’s shape, rather than from the perspective of the statistical 
regression in itself as often, in social sciences, the correlation functions 
have a complex nature. Concerning the field of existence, sometimes we 
need to think inside the box (Taagepera R. , 2015, p. 66-77). Visually, this 
is defined by the closed part of the plane in which a relation function 
exists that links independent and dependent variables, such as for the 
model which links seats and votes shown in figure 2. Nevertheless it 
could also exist as a partly open box, like in the correlation between the 
volatility and the effective number of parties (id. (p. 96-102)), where the 
field of existence is unlimited – or, better, infinite – for such correlation 
 
1 My translation. 
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function. In any case, it is important to know whether some quadrants 
are forbidden by the possible field of existence of the function, and then 
being able to define them (id. (p. 118-25)). 
 
Moreover, multiplicative relations exist over the additive ones, since the 
variables are frequently interlocked like in physics (Taagepera R. , 2008a, 
p. 52-70), in which each variable could be potentially non linearly 
correlated to each other, assuming a potential exponential bundle of 
correlation functions, also not included inside defined boundaries (id. (p. 
97-106)); hence, in general, in order to build formal models, the anchor 
points must be considered, as well as forbidden areas (id. (p. 107-110)), 
and the expected shape of the correlation. 
 
A prototypical example of LQMs, that can be useful to better understand 
the thesis’ motivations, is given by the link between the votes and seats 
in a parliamentary assembly, that will be the subject of section 1.2.2, and 
more in-depth in chapters two and three. It concerns the strategic analysis 
of the alliances before – and not only ex-post - the political parties - also 
locally - thus producing a fragmentation (or not) of the political system. 
This, considered jointly with the type of electoral system used, goes to 
produce opposite outputs concerning the majority of seats in favor of one 
block or another. 
 
This problem was first raised by Raimondo Lullo (1232-1316) and it is still 
present nowadays. For example, looking at the UK national election of 
December 2019, the sum of the forces favorable to “Remain in EU” 
received more votes than the “pro Brexit” forces, but because of the lack 
of alliances of the first block, the strategic (or swing) vote adopted by the 
Brexit Party in favor of Conservatives (which is a kind of alliance), and 
the territorial distribution of votes, gave the Conservatives 43,6% of votes 
but with 56,2% of seats.  
Generally, elections in mature democracies present a higher probability 
of winning for a handful of votes and/or losing despite gaining the 
majority of votes. For example, in the US the Democrats lost the elections 
in 1876, 1888 and, most recently, in 2000 and 2016, notwithstanding 
receiving the majority of votes. 
  
To transform seats into votes, Taagepera uses the function that assumes 
the shape of a sigmoid and is called law of minority attrition. 
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Figure 2 Distribution of Seats from Votes in FPTP (Taagepera R. , 2007a, p. 208). 
The curves in Figure 2 show seats expressed as a function of votes (on a 
nationwide basis). This dynamic is observed in the electoral system 
plurality called "first past the post" (FPTP), firstly adopted in the United 
Kingdom (and subsequently in other countries) and still in use.  
Fisichella explained: «The majority electoral system plurality in a single 
turn, has as a result, compared to other families of electoral systems, to 
maximize the percentage deviation between votes and the seats of the 
parties in contention» (2009, p. 283). It happens that, a party collecting 
little more than one-third of the votes in a district wins the seat of the 
district, which corresponds to 100% of the representation’s share for that 
territory. Operatively in the FPTP, the winner (even though they do not 
get the absolute majority of seats) is the party able to catch the many 
numbers of districts and not that one taking the majority of the number 
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of votes (on a nationwide basis). This creates the inflection point in the 
function describing the relation between votes and seats: the party with 
most votes statistically gets proportionally more seats than the votes 
gained, whereas the party(ies) getting fewer votes will gain 
proportionally fewer seats than the votes gained.  
To complete the directional and quantitative shape of the curve 
describing the law of minority attrition, one needs to consider the "anchor 
points", which are the points where the function is obliged to pass, in 
order to fulfill some desiderata based on logical foundations as follows 
(Cfr. (Taagepera R. , 2008a, p. 107-111)). There are three such points in the 
function: 1) in (0,0) where zero seats correspond to zero votes for any 
party, 2) in (100,100) namely 100% of the seats correspond to 100% of 
votes for a party, 3) in (50,50), which is valid, assuming only two parties 
are competing (in the function shown in figure 2 this is named "one 
opponent"), in which case 50% of the votes gained correspond to 50% of 
seats assigned.  
We can intuitively understand this function if we think that if two parties 
have exactly half of the votes, under conditions of equal territorial 
distribution among districts, then they win respectively 50% of the 
plurality seats apiece. 
The factors which can empirically determine this disproportionality are: 
1) The number of districts: the more they are, the less disproportional is 
the system. This is because theoretically, with only one single district, 
and with any relative majority, one party gets 100% of the representation; 
even with only two parties to compete for the district, the seat in question 
will reach the limit of 49,9M% of dis-representation (in case the most voted 
party obtains 50% + 1 vote). This value of dis-representation will tend to 
100% as the number of parties increase.  
2) How districts are drawn on the territory and what is the territorial 
distribution of the votes for each respective party: the more evenly 
diffused the parties are on the territory, the more they benefit from the 
FPTP system in case they obtain the relative majority. This view is 
supported by the Gerrymandering principle (Fisichella, 2009, p. 276-
277), which says it is possible for a party to win the relative majority of 
seats without gaining the relative majority of votes, thanks to the 
dimensional "cropping" of the (territorial) districts, even with equal 
dimension (number of voters). In practice, the phenomenon occurs when 
one party wins marginally in most of the districts (even getting the 
relative majority) and the same party loses strongly in the remaining 
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districts, thus avoiding dispersing votes. 
The last methodological point to note is the logical consequence of the 
earlier theoretical definitions: the existence of some forbidden areas, 
shown in figure 3.  
 
Figure 3 Forbidden regions in the law of minority attrition (Taagepera R., 2008, 
p.108). 
These correspond to the region of plane: 1) under the curve, from the 
abscissa in correspondence of the inflection point to 1; 2) over the curve, 
from the abscissa in correspondence of the inflection point to 0. Also, 
two other sectors of plane are forbidden: 3) below the abscissa in 
correspondence of the inflection point’s abscissa to 0 such that s>v; 4) 
over the abscissa in correspondence of the inflection point to 1, such that 
s<v. (Cfr. (Taagepera R. , 2008a)). 
 
Figure 3 also shows that LQMs can be very similar to physics, because 
we can have some constants beyond the variables (seats and votes) in the 
formal model obtained; in this case, the constant of the model is k, which 
determines the – marginal - degree of dis-representation, here defined 
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from 1 to infinite. The Y discards of the function, in relation to the dashed 
straight-line s=v, are directly proportional to the degree of 
disproportionality k. 
 
The empirical valence of the Taageperian model has a relatively low 
error: only 1.2% (Taagepera R. , 2007b, p. 232) obtained from the 
correlation between the data estimated through the LQM (law of 
minority attrition) and the empirical ones collected for the Caribbean 
islands (Nohlen, 1993), also reported in figure 2. The function tells us that 
the more parties compete at a nationwide level, the more the dis-
representation will increase. 
 
Even though the law of minority attrition has its own non-generalizable 
peculiarities, like any other complex function with inflection points, in 
absence of any inflection point, we can produce a generalization of 
LQMs. In fact, figure 4 below shows a bundle of exponential functions 
that pass across point (1,1) respecting the function: 𝑦 = 𝑥N, ∈ ∀	𝑥 >
1	and	𝑘 ∈ RT, however this could be easily translated, if needed, in a 
generalized function as follows: 𝑦 = 𝐴𝑥N + 𝑐. 
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Figure 4 Bundle of exponential functions that pass across point (1,1) respecting the 
function: 𝑦 = 𝑥!	and	𝑥 > 1. (Taagepera R. , 2008a, p. 98 (fig. 8.1)). 
 
In case there are more than just one independent variable, such as: 
 
𝑌X = 	𝛽Z𝑥Z +⋯+ 𝛽\𝑥]𝑥 + 𝛽T𝑥T + 𝜀X 
 
and in addition, in presence of one or more of the following non-linear 
relations with the dependent variable, as it happens frequently in social 
sciences phenomena, I can apply the following notation: 
 
𝑌 = 𝑓Z(?⃗?) + ⋯+ 𝑓T(?⃗?) + 𝜀`	; 			 
?⃗? ∈ RT	; 		𝑓c(𝑥Z, … , 𝑥T; 𝑘ceeee⃗ ) = 𝛽c𝑥c 
 
For Example: f
𝛽Z𝑥Z = 𝑓Zg?⃗?; 𝑘Zeeee⃗ h




Then a generalization for 𝑓] can be: 
𝑓ig𝐴ieeee⃗ ; 𝑥ieeee⃗ ; 𝑘ieeee⃗ h = 𝐴Z𝑥Z
N! ∗ …∗ 𝑥T
N" 
 
In LQMs A will be the constant determined by anchor points, like in  
physics formulations, and it will result in a unique number although it is 
effectively a vector because of the multiple constraints (the anchor points 
in fact). The parameter k will be estimated in function of the data 
graphing, for each variable 𝑥] individually considered. 
 
Below I report a series of most important physics equations (Crease, 
2004) which could be an exemplum of how it could be possible to 
articulate the previous function 𝑓ig𝐴ieeee⃗ ; 𝑥ieeee⃗ ; 𝑘ieeee⃗ h. 
 
Table 1 The 20 equations voted the most important for physics (Crease, 2004), by rank 
(quoted by (Taagepera R. , 2008a, p. 53 (fig. 5.1))). 
 
 
An application done by Taagepera of this physics inspiration, is provided 
for the cabinet duration (see section 1.3.2). 
 
With the law of minority attrition, Taagepera drew worldwide attention 
to LQMs, but this approach was already largely known thanks to his 
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steady effort. His study on the Effective number of parties Nj or simply 
Nk (the nominal number of parties) (Laakso-Taagepera, 1979), stands as 
an archetype of this approach and nowadays used and known by most 
political scientists. This has represented a simple but strong innovation 
to answer the question of how to count the parties that really have a 
specific weight in the party system.  
 
As the model and formalization of the law of minority attrition 
demonstrates, LQMs are very helpful in explaining the connections that 
could happen between – multiple independent and dependent - 
variables (Taagepera R. , 2015, p. ch. 10) on a mathematical, logical, 
statistical or physical basis.  
 
The index N is the inverse of the sum of all the squares of the party’s 
shares: by definition, N can be at least equal to one, when the party 
system tends toward a single party of 100% and all the others tend to 0%; 
N tends to infinite when the party system tends to have infinitive number 
of parties (having the same percentage).  
 
Laakso and Taagepera suggested N as a variable expressing the count of 
parties and no other indexes, on the basis of comparative studies done 
about those (Taagepera - Lee Ray, 1977); (Taagepera R. , 1979 b). For 
example, another index, used in politics before N, has been F, made by 
Rae and Taylor, used to indicate the fractionalization (or fragmentation) 
of a party system (Rae - Taylor, 1970); (Rae, 1971). The F index is 
calculated as the complement to one, of the sum of the squares of the 
parties’ shares. This index has the limitation of assuming values only 
from 0 to 1: Laakso and Taagepera have pointed out how F did not change 
appreciably for very low values, thus offering limited understanding of 
how many parties really have an impact on a given system. 
 
The critical role played by parties and their `fundamental’ number N in 
politics is well exemplified by the law of minority attrition itself. In figure 
2, we see that the function can be transposed horizontally to the right and 
to the left of the anchor point (50,50). This is possible only in consideration 
of some aggregated index of the party system, which takes into account 
the different allocation of each party shares, thus capturing the point in 
which the second derivative changes (having an inflection point for 𝑣 =
	𝑣]).  
 
The function goes to over-represent the votes gained by a party for v> 𝑣], 
or under-represent them for v<𝑣]. In particular, the function has the 
respectively possible transpositions: 1) when N<2 the function is 
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translated to the right; 2) for N>2, the function is translated to the left. 
This happens because, for exactly two parties, just one vote more from 
50% could determine a big win for the party, or conversely a big defeat. 
When the number of parties is higher, the inflection point for which this 
happens is exactly equal to 1/N. This will be formalized here 
unprecedently, integrating the current literature.  
 
There have been several other applications of N in political sciences. One 
of the most meaningful is in relation to the problem of how to measure 
the cabinet duration: when N goes up, the share of the cabinet’s life goes 
down more than proportionally, also considering the specific – “political” 
- system’s constant (Taagepera - Sikk, 2007). This will be shown in section 
1.3.2. This thesis could be propaedeutic to refine this cabinet’s life by 
adding another variable, related to the statistical distribution of the party 
shares, with the aim of enhancing the explicative and therefore the 
predictive power of the current model (Taagepera R. , 2010).  
 
A blend of two approaches on a cabinet’s duration could be proposed: 
 
1) “duration of government II” that considers the government 
terminated after an election, a change of prime minister or a 
change of the format of the government (majority enlargement, 
minority government, or minority coalition) (Lijphart, 1999, p. 
132-3);  
2) “Average Cabinet Life I” (Lijphart, 1999, p. 132-3), proposed by 
Dodd (1976), which is the average duration of the executive 
considered even if the Prime Minister is not the same; if the 
parties that support him are the same, the government will be 
considered the same. 
 
This thesis could be propaedeutic also to obtaining a simpler cabinet 
duration’s model – starting from the Taagepera and Shugart formulation 
– that can be applied to both duration approaches, the government II and 
the Average Cabinet Life I. This is an important problem to investigate 
because it is related to the stability and the quality of democracy, which 
also implies, for example in political economics, that if the government’s 
life is brief, it cannot look to make investments, but rather propend for a 
public expenditure finalized to a quick capitalization of electors’ 
consensus in a brief period. 
 
The N index has also found applications in explaining the individual 
level of volatility in a nationwide election in India 1998-1999 (Heath, 
2005), or in explaining the interest group pluralism (Lijphart, Patterns of 
Democracy: Government Forms and Performance in Thirty-Six 
Countries, 1999, p. 183). Generally speaking, LQMs in politics have been 
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greatly useful to estimate the biggest party in a party system, which is 
known only by the assembly size and the district magnitude (see section 
1.2.3 and chapters two and three). 
 
In conclusion, it is possible to define LQMs more simply as: 
 
The methods that allow to obtain a model made of a single regressor, 
formed by one or many independent(s) variables - and eventually 
constants – jointly multiplicated. The objective of LQMs is to obtain a 
model much closer than and as parsimonious as possible to reality, 
obtained from logical assumptions and observing the empirical data 
plotted two by two among the variables considered. 
 
It is testable with OLS (Ordinary Least Squares) with the aim of 
confirming – in the best of cases – a straight line of correlation, between 
the real and the predicted values obtained from the model itself. If the 
form of the regressor is simple, but it is suspected to be not linearly 
correlated, it can also be tested applying the simple logarithmic of itself, 
with the respective coefficient equal to the optimal exponent of 
correlation (Taagepera R. , 2015, p. 121-125) applicable to the whole 
model.  
 
This is the reason why the foundation of this thesis starts from 
Taagepera’s works (et al.), who uses LQMs (R. Taagepera 2005, 2008a, 
2015); (Shugart - Taagepera, 2017) to make social sciences more scientific 
(Taagepera R. , 2008a). I start from these references, elevating the 
potential of this approach further. Some other researchers, such as 
Grofman, De Sio and Colomer, have already employed these 
methodologies and/or approaches, which will be shown later in detail. I 
am also going to explain why I follow this approach compared to others, 
embracing a programmatic view (not ideological and/or of academic 
belonging), such that: every time we modify a theory or replace it with 
another theory, this innovation is a step forward if and only if the 
modified or new theory is more efficient in solving problems than the 
previous doctrine (Laudan, 1979).  
 
My thesis uses LQMs and adds some more “hard sciences” tools that 
Taagepera – and, more in general, the current literature – does not use, 
such as:  
 
1) the differential calculus for more than two independent 
variables; I have unprecedently leveraged this tool to more 
precisely estimate the optimal assembly size considering N (with 




2) Following from the previous point, and defining 𝐷$	as the dis-
representation index attributable to an electoral system, the 
higher Nm and/or M*S* product, the more 𝐷$∗ tends to 0; 
conversely, the lower Nm and/or M*S* product – both tending to 
1 -, the more 𝐷$∗ tends to 1, describing the correlations between 
Nm and 𝐷$∗ and between M*S* and 𝐷$∗ as branches of the 
hyperbola. 
 
3) Adding the time series approach and the probability for 
independent events (also calculated for more than two ones) to 
the earlier LQMs by connecting political and institutional 
variables.  
 
4) Improving the impact of electoral rules on dis-representation, 
furthermore calculating the features of the best electoral system 
for a specific party system, through optimizations, formalizing 
the institutional approach with the principles of game theory and 
specific statistical functions (such as the Eulerian’s Beta for the 
calculus of majority premiums).  
 
5) Taking advantage of the statistical (and logical) approach to 
refine all the previous formal models used. The result obtained 
will be a function of five inflection points using the variables: 
 
1) s, which is the independent variable represented by 
all possible percentages of seats that can be allotted 
(defined from 0 to 1 (100%)); 
 
2) f, which is the dependent variable, indicating how 
frequent that allotment is for the respective s; 
 
3) the constant k, which will be substituted in function 
of N and 𝑁k (the nominal number of parties, with just 
one seat). 
 
For example, if there are three parties getting the same 
percentage of seats allotted at national level, this means that each 
party has 33,3M% of seats, then this function must have: f equal to 
0 for 0<s< 33,3M% and f equal to 1 for 33,3M%<s<1, f=0.5 in s= 33,3M%. 
 
In brief, the research questions I am going to answer are: can we perform 
quantitative forecasts in political sciences about votes and seats of the 
parties, having some political and institutional variables? Can we 
14 
measure how electoral systems impact on the party Downsian 
competition? How can we optimize institutional variables such as: the 
assembly size, the district magnitude, the dis-representation due to the 
electoral system (or not)? Can we derive an electoral system that satisfies 
certain desiderata?  
 
1.2.  Four Pillars  
 
I first introduce the basic tools presented in the current literature 
indispensable to formulate and implement LQMs for politics. These can 
be summarized in four pillars, which represent the foundations of all the 
work. The first pillar is the Effective Number of Parties (N), which can 
calculate the number of parties that effectively count in any political 
system, in a simple and efficient way. The second pillar, the law of minority 
attrition, is a function at the base of the allotment of seats from votes (for 
the single-member district). The third pillar is represented by a simple 
but strong relation connecting the political variable N with the institutional 
variables: assembly size S and district magnitude M, through the geometric 
mean. The fourth pillar is represented by the minimization of the conflict 
channels to find the optimal value of S; this methodology is fundamental 
to improve the optimization of S and of the other institutional variables. 
 
1.2.1. The effective number of parties (N) 
 
The 𝑁j or simply N index was published by Laakso and Taagepera (1979), 








𝑝] represents the i-th party share that exists in the interval from 0 to 100%; 
𝑁k is the nominal number of parties, which is the number of parties with 
at least one seat in the assembly. Both 𝑁k and 𝑁j can be calculated 
substituting 𝑝] to votes v or seats s respectively for each i-th party 
(becoming 𝑠]	𝑜𝑟	𝑣]), which will form the base of the object of analysis. N’s 
subscript can be equal to v or s, in case I refer to votes or seats. N can be 
expressed in form of concentration by the index Herfindahl-Hirschman 
𝐻𝐻 = 𝟏
p$
, which represents a sort of weighted average of the party shares 
present in each party system, with each 𝑝] weighted respectively for itself, 
so that 𝐻𝐻 = 	∑ 𝑝]jT]qZ . This index represents – readapting Weber (1972) - 
the ideal-typical party share of the party system. It is possible to also 
calculate the “degree of fractionalization” F of the party system, such that 
F= 1-HH (Rae - Taylor, 1970). Another concentration index over HH is 
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the Gini index g,2 generally used in economics to measure the income or 
tax distribution (Ardanaz - Scartascini, 2013) (Galiani - Torre - Torrens, 
2016, p. 137-9). I use the Gini index here to measure how fair the 
distribution of the party shares is in the system, or if a single party share 
gets 100% (of votes or seats), this is useful to identify the asymmetries in 
the party distribution. 
 
1.2.2. The law of minority attrition  
 
The first part of the thesis is focused on how to better express the relation 
of seats and votes deriving from electoral systems - introduced in the 
overview - which Taagepera generalized in the law of minority attrition 
(Taagepera R. , 2007, p. 207); (2005, p. 206-211) to quantify the relationship 
between the seats (s), and the percentage of votes (v) – both relating to a 
given party -, capitalizing on the “cube law” previously applied by 
Kendal and Stuart to the Anglo-Saxon elections (1950). 
Below is Taagepera’s equation for the allocation of seats on a nationwide 
basis in the FPTP for one opponent (two parties which compete in the 




𝑣T + (1 − 𝑣)T 
 
For two equal opponents (three parties competing in the election tending 
to the same size) the function becomes: 𝑠 = 	 c
"
c"tj!%"(Zuc)"
 (2007b, p. 207-
209), and it is the point from which I start to interlock other variables, thus 
implementing the model. 
 
The degree of disproportionality n in the formula is equal to 𝑛 =	 vwx y
vwx z
 
(2013, p. 205) in the first formulation, with V equal to the sum of all votes 
expressed on a nationwide basis and S equal to the seats constituting the 
assembly. Knowing that E is equal to the number of districts, 𝐸 = z
{
 , for 
the FPTP is valid the equation: 𝑛 = |vwxy
vwx $





& (Ibid. (p. 213)).  
 
2 Given N", g requires to order shares 𝑝# such that 𝑝# < 𝑝#$%, finally given 𝑓# =
	i/N" indicating the maximum share for positional lag, we get: 𝑔 =







Following the graphical representation showed in figure 2, the value of 
3.75 has been attributed to n for each party - using the data of the 
Caribbean islands (Nohlen, 1993) - because of the very small S. Here, 
theorized as n would be equal to 3 for the ideal-typic FPTP (1969)3. Then, 
the greater n, the greater the difference between the allocation of votes 
and seats, the higher the dis-representation. 
 
1.2.3. The connection of political and institutional variables using the 
geometric mean.  
 
Another simple but strong tool to interconnect political and institutional 
variables using LQMs is the geometric mean, which allows to obtain 
models of greater predictive power, mainly in a case where we do not 
have reliable and/or available data. It is used when the support 
(existence interval of the variables to the right side of an equation) of a 
relation function has equiprobable positive numbers, the median 
assumes major importance in respect to the mean, and therefore in 
absence of other information, it is reasonable to apply the geometric 
mean between the maximum and the minimum of its support, to find 
the expected value of the support (Taagepera R. , 2008a, p. 120-129).  
 
The first application of geometric mean applied to political science came 
from Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1762) who suggested determining the 
number of members of a government by applying the geometric mean 
of the population. Nevertheless, the results obtained are unreasonable 
and leave several questions unanswered (Taagepera R. , 2015, p. 41). The 
first functioning political application, which connects the simple or 
nominal number of parties 𝑁k (a party sitting in the national assembly at 
least having one seat)	4, national assembly size S, and the district 
magnitude M (the number of seats allocated within the minimal 
territorial area), was proposed by Taagepera and Shugart (1993). 
 
 
3 For countries with small assemblies as it is the case for small islands, the index 
of disproportionality n is higher than average (n = 3) and is between 3.5 and 4, 
the values for the Caribbean were analyzed in detail by Nohlen (1993), who 
reconfirms this. 
4 Taagepera in his early publications uses the notation “n” for the nominal 
number of parties 𝑁" (Taagepera R. , 1999). 
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Another advance is the link between the political variables – Nk and Nj 
– with the independent "institutional" variables5, based on logical-
statistical assumptions incardinated by Taagepera6. The first step is given 
by the relation (𝑀 ∗ 𝑆)N = Nk,7 where the number of parties -considered 
in various ways – is determined by the concomitant presence of S and M 
because of the Colomer’s micromega rule, for which: 
 
«Large assemblies, large electoral district magnitudes, and List PR 
allocation formulas with a large quota or large gaps between successive 
divisors—all these enhance openings for small parties. Conversely, it 
would seem to be in the interest of large parties to keep the competition 
out by having small assemblies, small district magnitudes, and small 
quotas or small gaps between divisors. While such knowledge has 
diffusely been around for some time, Colomer (2004, p. 3) compresses it 
in a felicitous “micromega rule”: The small prefer the large, and the large 
prefer the small.»8 
 
Taagepera has introduced the geometric mean in politics starting from 
the concrete problem of the Netherland assembly, composed of 100 seats 
- from 1918 to 1952 – allocated in a single nationwide district, using a 
proportional method of election (PR). How to estimate the number of 
parties with a presence in parliament also for just one seat? In this 
specific case, the result is simply equal to Nk = √1 ∗ 𝑆 = 	√𝑆, because the 
arena in which the competition happens is just that of the assembly.  
 
Nevertheless, generalizing the concept, if the district was not national, 
there would be a double arena, one in the districts and another in the 
assembly. Hence, the minimum value of the geometric mean is 
represented by both the district and the assembly dynamics (as before). 
Then the values of the geometric mean used to estimate Nk could vary 
from 1 to its maximum value S, and from 1 to its minimum value M, thus 
obtaining two geometric means Nk = √1 ∗ 𝑀 (for districts) and Nk =
	√1 ∗ 𝑆 (for assembly); finally the geometric mean must be reapplied as 
follows: Nk = √𝑀 ∗ √𝑆 , hence generalizing: 
 
5 So called by Taagepera (2007b). 
6 Idib. 
7 Cf. (Taagepera - Shugart R. e., 1993). 
8 Quoted by Taagepera (2007b, p. 84). 
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This formula has also been positively empirically tested (Taagepera R. , 
1998; 2002); (Shugart - Taagepera, 2017, p. 101-13). 
 
A successive advancement suggested by Taagepera is represented by the 
resolution of the problem of how to estimate the most populated State 
in USA, knowing only the whole USA population and the number of 
states. Mirroring the same logic, in politics this can translate into: how 
to estimate the biggest party in a party system knowing only the 
assembly size and the district magnitude? The problem can be solved by 
applying the geometric mean between 1) the minimum possible value 
that the biggest country/party share can assume, which is at least equal 
to the arithmetic average, and 2) the whole value of the system. 
(Taagepera - Shugart R. -M., 1993); (Taagepera R. , 1998); (Taagepera R. 
, 1999). 
 
Taagepera obtains the largest share sZ =
Z
p##.(
 (Taagepera R. , 2015, p. 36-
8), implying by definition that N cannot be logically less than Z
!
 which is 
defined equal to N, because it corresponds to the maximum 
ponderation of the biggest party share sZin an imaginary weighted mean 
of s ,9 resulting in N < Nj < Nk. He then obtains N in function of the 
MS product, substituting the last inequality by the MS product and 
obtaining: Nk = (𝑀 ∗ 𝑆)
!
) and	N = (𝑀 ∗ 𝑆)
!
*, and applying the geometric 
mean between N	and	Nk, it results that Nj = (𝑀 ∗ 𝑆)
+
!, ≅	(𝑀 ∗ 𝑆)
!
,, the 
exponent is rounded for simplicity, but also because it is reasonable in 
consideration of the empirical test results obtained10.  
Hence finally, consolidating all concepts expressed so far, Taagepera 
formulated the following “mother” relation:  
N = Nj = 	Nkj = (𝑀 ∗ 𝑆)
!
$  11 
 
9 Being the generation function of the effective number of parties equal to N3 =
[∑(s4)3]
%/(%,3) (Laakso-Taagepera, 1979, p. 6-7) , its maximum occurs for 
𝑎	tending to ∞.  
10 (Taagepera R. , 2007b, p. 153) tested on 25 country data by Liparth. 
11 For a wide discussion see (Taagepera R. , 2007b, p. 97;154-156;226). 
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1.2.4. The minimization of conflict channels 
 
The last pillar is the optimization method that Taagepera uses, based on 
the differential calculus, to find the optimal S -	𝑆∗- in function of the 
population P. The result 𝑆∗ will be the desirable number to be applied by 
the legislator to self-redefine the assembly size of any country having a 
population P.  
 
The methodology preamble is that: 
 
Any social group of individuals that interact with each 
other – n - go to create communication or conflict channels 
– c - between them, even though these may only be 
potential; moreover «individuals who dispose of more 
communication channels toward others tend to have more 
influence and power.» (Taagepera R. , 2008a, p. 140). 
 
To better understand this concept, I can provide a concrete basic 
application, assuming an equal contractual power for each member of a 
certain group. For August 15th, Clara wants to organize a lunch; if she was 
alone no conflict channels would be logically possible (unless she was in 
conflict with herself (sic!)), however, with a family reunion in mind,  
unfortunately some potential conflicts could arise. If the only family 
members are Clara and her brother, the potential conflict channel is just 
1, however if there is also one parent, that number arises to 3, and if a 
family friend joins in, the four components go to determine 6 conflict 
channels, and so on. Table 2 below summarizes these values: 
 



























Switching this reasoning to politics, and in particular to the assembly size 
determination’s problem, we must start with the idea that there are two 
conflict dimensions - of communication channels - to minimize 
(Taagepera R. , 2007b, p. 189-191): 
 
1) External costs. These are represented by the sum of the 
communication channels - c - of each member of parliament with 
the voters of their own district. 
 
2) Internal costs. These are the sum of the communication channels 
- c - of the assembly members in position of collective reciprocal 
listening (during the work of the assembly). 
 
Hence, to find a break-even point between these two costs is necessary to 
minimize their sum. 
 
The formalization of these two costs is given by13:  
 
1) How many citizens each member of parliament (MP) represents 
is equal to 𝑐Z,X =

z
− 1; nevertheless the MP is in position of 
“reciprocal interaction”, which means that the MP needs to reach 
for electors and electors need to reach for their own MP, therefore 











2) The communication channels of the assembly members in 
position of collective reciprocal listening is given by the 
combinatorial formula 𝑐j =
z(zuZ)
j
. This is because each assembly 
member S should reach relations with the rest of the assembly S-
1, but the simple multiplication would go to double count the 
communication channels, hence the product is divided by 2. 







In both points reference is done to limits for large numbers to obtain 
meaningful simplifications, which is why Taagepera has established 
P>1000 as the minimum thresold above which this is applicable 
 
13 (Taagepera R. , 2008a, p. 140; 2007, p. 198-99). 
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(Taagepera R. , 2007b, p. 198-9), where S will implicitly follow a good 
consistency being logically positively correlated to P. At this point it is 
possible to write the comprehensive formula of the conflict channels to 






; this function is drawn in figure 5 
below. On the right side of the equation, the first monomial sees S at the 
denominator, whereas the second one has it at the numerator; this 
implies that: the higher S, the more the right branch of the paraboloid is 
determined by the communication channels among the assembly 
members; conversely, the lower S, the more the left branch of the 
paraboloid is determined by the communication channels of the 
members of parliament in their reciprocal interactions with their 
respective voters. 
 
Figure 5 The burden of communication channels on one representative (Taagepera R. , 
2015, p. 171 (fig.19.3)). 
 
 
This function can be differentiated by S and it is imposed equal to 0 







2  = 0 
 
In fact, its resolution identifies the point (𝑆w\, 𝑐]T) for which the 
paraboloid in figure 5 intersects the orizontal straight line 𝑐 = 𝑐]T. 
Hence, the result of this differential calculus, will be the optimal S, that I 
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call 𝑆∗, equal to 𝑆∗ = √2𝑃+ .14 Taagepera finalizes this calculus assuming 
that the active population corresponds more or less to P/2, 15 hence the 





1.3.  Political applications of LQMs developed in the thesis 
 
The second part of the thesis is focused on applications also explored in 
Taagepera’s works “Predicting Party Sizes” (2007), “Making Social 
Science More Scientific” (2008a) and in “Logical Models and Basic 
Numeracy in Social Sciences” (2015), taking an as comprehensive 
approach as possible regarding logical quantitative applications in 
political sciences, also covering positional party competition and 
electoral flows, in addition to cabinet duration.  
 
1.3.1. Seats and Votes 
 
Chapter two aims at implementing the law of minority attrition that 
converts votes in seats. My aim is to develop a general model obtained 
through an in-depth analysis of the Italian elections, chosen for the 
peculiar complexity of this country over time, considering: thresholds, 
majority premiums, the simultaneous proportional and the district’s 
single winner or first-past-the-post system - FPTP16 - and other fuzzy 
compensative mechanism of seats allotment. It potentially could allow to 
build a generalized model that can be applied on a cross country basis 
(excluding alternative vote, single transferable/non-transferable vote 
and their derivatives). 17  
 
The law of minority attrition works well for simple scenarios which are 
representative of FPTP, and when there is a bipartite system like that of 
the Caribbean Islands, but less if: 1) N is high; 2) M and/or S are low; 3) 
the electoral laws are complex, such as in mixed electoral systems, like in 
Italy, Spain, Japan and others. At which point, my hypothesis is that: if 
the political and institutional variables are interlocked before the law of 
minority attrition is introduced, I can apply the final model that works 
with any electoral system and functioning even better in the pure FPTP.  
 
 
14 Cfr. (Taagepera R. , 2015, p. 170-2). 
15 Cfr. (Taagepera R. , 2007b, p. 199). 
16 It is the electoral system in which M=1, like in the UK. 
17 PBV, AV, STV, SNTV, MNTV, MMM, MMP, see Shugart and Taagepera for 
this classification (2017, 31-60). 
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It is indispensable to have a powerful model which interconnects votes, 
seats and other possible political variables, in order to study what in 
economics is called comparative statics18 (Hicks, 1939); (Samuelson, 1947). 
In this case the final equilibrium is the product, not of exogenous 
variables, but of a multivariate interlocked system of causality, which 
better allows to analyze and project all possible scenarios, for example in 
making more efficient exit polls, electoral engineering and political 
strategies. Actual knowledge about these tools among the political 
scientists, besides Taagepera, is limited to the simple directional relations, 
and not quantitative ones (Fisichella, 2009, p. 263-288) (Grofman, 2004) 
(Sartori, 2003; 1987) (Colomer J. , 2004; 2005). 
 
To test this scenario, I enriched the law of minority attrition, starting from 
Taagepera’s generalization of this for opponents 1 and 2 (Taagepera R. , 
p. 207-9)), and introducing N at the denominator in substitution of the 
numeric constant. Knowing that the parameter n is defined in [1,∞], 
following the graphical representation of seats in function of votes, 
applied to each party considered in several countries, the value of 3.75 is 
attributed to n, using the data of the Caribbean islands (Nohlen, 1993) 
because of the really small S as used by Theil (1969), although he states 
that the plurality (FPTP) voting systems will give an average value of n 
equal to 319. To guarantee this wider application, I propose to adopt a 
substitution of the index n, obtaining 𝑛Z, by means of the other 
institutional variables P, S, M, N, E. I consider the ideal-typical value that 
n must assume for the FPTP, which is 3, and build the following logical-
deductive assumptions:  
1) where a sub-representation exists such that 𝑃 > 𝑆, then the dis-
representation index n will increase; inversely, for 𝑃 < 𝑆  I expect a 
decrease of n down to 1 (for 𝑆 → ∞, 𝑎𝑛𝑑	𝑃 ≪ 𝑆); 
 
2) the higher the average territorial concentration of the parties on the 
territory 𝐺, the lower n (for 𝐺 = 1 ⟹ 𝑛 = 1 ); 
 
 
18 In which two different equilibrium’s states are caused by a variation of an 
exogenous variable. Unprecedently graphically shown by Fleeming Jenkin 
(1870). 
19 For countries with small assemblies as is the case of small islands, the index of 
disproportionality n is higher than average (n = 3) and is between 3.5 and 4, the 
values for the Caribbean were analyzed in detail by Nohlen (1993), reconfirms 
this. 
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3) considering the limit case in which N2 tended to the anchor point 
1, even the remaining party shares on the territory, although 
concentrated, would see a reduced probability of being able to win 
even one district because the presence of the bigger party would 
vandalize it, then 𝑛 → ∞. On the other side, if N2 tended to infinity, 
the competitive numeric advantage for every party would be null 
even in the case of uninominal districts. The nullification happens 
because the winning probability in each district is almost identical for 
each party, as the victory will be determined for someone randomly 
thanks to a handful of votes for each district, then 𝑛 → 1; 
 
4) The first member of the exponent, 𝑆−𝑀
𝑆𝑀−1
 , aims at assessing the 
dimension of districts M, thus allowing the application of the model 
to several values of M coexisting in the same electoral system, and 
their relationship with S. Through a logical study of the limit cases, it 
is possible to deduce that for S = M there is a single nationwide 
district, in which the dis-proportional effect given by the mechanism 
of the districts would be null. On the opposite extreme, for M = 1 in 
presence of a pure plurality, the dynamics of the districts would fully 
exert their effect. 
 
5) Defining the relation E = 𝑆
:
 , knowing that 1 < 𝐸 < 𝑃, and knowing 
that higher E implies small districts, the higher E, the lower n, then 
the smaller the districts, the more n tends to 1. Hence, I have defined 
the square root of P, applying the geometric mean of the previous 
domain [1, P];  
 
Then, this formula capitalizes on the impact of the institutional variables 
determining a new n, on a logical quantitative base. 
 
If there is a national threshold of representation T [0,1], it must be taken 
into consideration20 through some further manipulation of nZ, obtaining 
a final n, equal to nj, such that the higher T, the more n tends to ∞; 
conversely, the lower T, the more nj tends to nZ. 
 
 
20 For its maximum value between that provided by the electoral law and due to 
M and S (Taagepera R. , 2007b, p. 248-9). 
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This general model 𝑛j is further modified in case the specific electoral 
laws in mixed electoral systems present other complications, such as the 
majority premium and/or as happened in Italy in relation to scorporo – a 
corrective variable used from 1994 to 2001 - which consists in subtracting 
votes to the winning parties in the FPTP seats allotment (equal to 3/4 of 
S) to benefit the other lists for the proportional section (equal to 1/4 of S). 
 
The final model obtained allows the evaluation of the impact of each 
political and institutional variable on disproportionality between votes 
and seats, aggregating their impact on representation exactly, identifying 
if the overall electoral mechanic is mostly proportional or majoritarian, 
simplifying then the effect of complex and specific electoral legislations. 
All these considerations represent the added value of the new 
disproportional index 𝑛j, which goes to complement 𝑛.21  
 
Concerning the conversion of votes in seats for the in-depth analysis of 
the Italian case, the elections happened from 1992 to 2018 are taken into 
consideration, in a postdictive analysis, configuring four different mixed 
electoral systems22, and obtaining a dataset of 354 cases (data of the 
Interior ministry). The dataset used for the cross-country analysis is that 
of Struthers - Li - Shugart (2018), also used in Taagepera and Shugart 
(2017) on a nationwide basis - concerning countries –, composed of 974 
elections, after cleaning it23. The same dataset is used to test almost all 
parts of the thesis, if not indicated differently.  
The results of the model tested for Italian elections has achieved an 
Rjadj=97.5% between the actual and estimated seats from votes. 
 
Chapter three introduces the prediction of party seats from the previous 
elections, specularly to sZ. The current literature provides purely 
postdictive tools given by the rules sZ = 	Nju/ = 	NkuZ/j = (𝑀𝑆)uZ/ 
obtainable from the four pillars24, but here I suggest not to consider only 
a simple geometric mean between the previous formulations to obtain a 
prediction, for two reasons: 
 
1) the presence of double (but complementary) 
heteroskedasticity – this means that plotting the 
abovementioned variables, I can observe that: the higher 
 
21 Cfr. diffusely (Taagepera R. , 2007b, p. 204-223). 
22 Covering the PR, MMM and MMP types (having the FPTP, the uses of T, s and 
the MJP). 
23 Respecting the law before introduced N& ≤ N", because of 10 cases found for 
which this does not occur, it is likely given by the different sources of data 
collecting, as hypothesized by Taagepera in private correspondence (2019). 
24 See also (Shugart - Taagepera, 2017, p. 106-7). 
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the past value of sZ - which is sZ,uZ - for forecast sZ, the 
higher its error; inversely, the lower the MS product, the 
higher the forecast precision of sZ in correspondence of 
higher values of sZ; 
 
2) to warrant the stability of the variables over time.  
 
I have therefore built a hybrid institutional model, in which N is expressed 
in function of M and S, and the biggest party in terms of seats and votes 
sZ and vZ, in an interlocked model which weights the degree of 
heteroskedasticity of each one. Moreover, I have leveraged the classic 
tools of time series (Lutkepohl H. Kratzig M., 2004), using the past values 
of sZ and vZ to predict the current ones, because this methodology allows 
the application of a specific solution for politics to the problem of 
heteroskedasticity, in a simpler and asymptotically more efficient way 
compared to other methods generally used in econometrics (Arellano - 
Bond, 1991); moreover this allows to “institutionalize” political variables 
such as sZ, creating much stabler variables that are able to increase their 
explicative (and predictive) power.  
 
The cross country analysis, 𝑠Z, 𝑁mk	𝑎𝑛𝑑	𝑁mj in t-1 with the MS product, 
predicts 𝑠Z in t with 𝑅jadj=73.3%, producing an improvement of the 
𝑅jadj by 29.3 percentage points, if the purely postdictive 𝑠Z expressed in 
function of 𝑁mk	𝑎𝑛𝑑	𝑁mj is considered respect 𝑠Z obtained from 𝑁mk	𝑎𝑛𝑑	𝑁mj 
in (t-1). Thus, the powerful result is that the predictive values are stronger 
than the simpler postdictive models available. As introduced in the 
previous paragraph, this allows to test the effectiveness of much stabler 
political variables from the past time. 
I then move to the second part of the thesis, to expand the connections 
between political and institutional variables, beyond the simple problem 
of votes and seats, to explore other improvable political matters.  
 
1.3.2. Cabinet duration 
 
The answer to the question introduced in the overview regarding the 
cabinet duration’s formalization is given by the differential calculus, 
applied by Taagepera, translating the reasoning done by Kochen and 
Deutsch (1969) to find the optimal warehouses for a firm that serves a 
region. Unprecedently in politics, this logic allows to obtain an optimal 
value of P in function of S, considering the minimization of the conflict 
channels inside the assembly, and those of each representative with their 
electors (Taagepera and Shugart, 1989, p. 175). Using the previous 
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calculus of the conflict channels inside a party system, which can be 
rounded to the square of the (effective) actors of that system, Taagepera 
obtained 𝑁j (Taagepera R. , 2015, p. 49-55). Applying a physics 
approach, he interlocks this entity inversely proportionally to the cabinet 
duration, taking into consideration the “political” system’s constant k, 
retracing the structure of the universal law of gravitation of the planets 
(Taagepera R. , 2008a, p. 54). 
 
The first approach to estimating cabinet life duration comes from Taylor 
and Herman in 1971, followed by that of Strom in 1985. This approach is 
realized “through variables or attributes” that the government exhibits 
at the time of its formation (Laver M. - Shepsle K., Jan. 1998, p. 30). In 
1984, Browne et al. identified the concept of Hazard Rate as the 
percentage risk of a government crisis, independently from those 
attributes before-mentioned, as they are measured at the beginning of 
the legislation; thus, as Laver hypothesized, «the opportunity costs of 
losing power positions decrease as legislation proceeds»25. This factor 
accounts for 20-30% of the variations of government or coalitions 
duration (Browne et al. (1986, p. 630)).  
 
The hazard rate approach has been adopted in different ways by King et 
al. (1994 , p. 190-200; 1990 (Aug), p. 848-856, 860), Warwick and Easton 
(1992, p. 130-140); (Warwick, 1994, p. 94-114) proposing the “cubic 
hazard rate”. Box-Steffensmeier and Jones (March 2004), proposed a 
unified model through the optimization of a generalized Gamma 
distribution (p.41). Finally Bernhard and Leblang (2006, p. 111-4) 
proposed a discreet hazard model with a probit specification.  
 
All these approaches are referred to in the definition of "duration of 
government II" (introduced above).  
 
Taagepera and Shugart (1989, p. 99-101) have instead introduced the 
approach linked to the definition established by Dodd (1976), and which 
Lijphart calls "Average Cabinet Life I" (1999, p. 132-3) (before described). 
This represents a great innovation, because it simplifies the model and 
increases the R-squared between the cabinet duration and the right-hand 
side of the correlation function, even though this creates a loss of 
information about the peculiarities of each country’s political system for 
a specific legislature. 
 
 
25 Laver (2003, 36), this derives from claiming that there is a formal stochastic 
reason and a formal intuition (Idib.). 
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Taagepera’s actual cabinet life duration formula is C =  
¡-$
	, with k 
empirically determined k=42 (Taagepera R. a., 2007, p. 168-9); it presents 
a good Rj = 0.77 (Id. (2007, p. 168-70)); (Taagepera - Sikk, 2007). 
 
The cabinet duration is an interesting example of application of a logical 
quantitative methodology to political sciences. In fact, as introduced in 
section 1.1 - in table 1 – and as introduced by Taagepera (Taagepera - 
Shugart R.-M. , 1989, p. 99-101), the cabinet duration formula is inspired 
by the formula of planet gravitation 𝐺 = 𝑘 ∗ !∗$
£$
, where in this case, the 




, and where the gravitational law is 





An enormous potential arising from the application of LQMs, could be 
to obtain a model which blends cabinet life I and II. As Laver claims 
(2003), cabinet life duration is a problem that still maintains strong 
academic relevance (Id., p.38).  
 
1.3.3. Spatial Electoral Competition 
 
In consideration of the informative value of the self-collocation of electors 
in the ideological continuum left-right, each party will be assigned 
indexes of ideological positioning, placed on a left-right ideological 
continuum.  
 
Chapter five introduces a revised Downsian competition, better 
quantifying and simplifying the ideological left-right space, in which the 
positional competition among parties happens. The operative tools used 
are Beta functions, here unparallely introduced, which are going to 
improve the most recent approaches (Adams - Merrill III - Grofman J. -
S.-B., 2001, p. 15-51) 26. Thanks to the post-electoral survey data from 
1994-2013 recorded in the ITANES database (data request, 2018), I used 
the self-collocation of electors to identify the positional party 
competition and grouping the values for each elector per party, thus 
making it possible to draw the probability density function for each 
party concerning its left-right continuum location. The positional party 
competition is represented unprecedently by a Beta function, or 
 
26 mainly concerning an equilibrium model of party competition. 
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equivalently and if preferred, it can be shown in the form of cumulative 
functions capitalizing the logic of the first order stochasticity (Mas-Colell 
- Whinston - Green, 1995, p. 194-197). The data for 1992 and 2018 are 
obtained thanks to a new logical method exhibited in chapter seven.  
 
Chapter six presents an in-depth qualitative analysis of the reflection 
done by Bernard Grofman in the article “Downs and two-Party 
convergence” (2004), in which the original assumptions of the Downsian 
theory (Downs, 1957) of parties’ ideological convergence have been more 
precisely defined with regards to concrete political and institutional 
scenarios. For this purpose, I want to blend the following studies: 1) how 
the Downsian convergence would vary in function of electoral systems 
(Grofman, 2004, p. 26, 31), 2) the number of parties which compete in the 
election Ib. (p. 26-8), 3) consider the issues concerning the positional, 
non-positional and majoritarian competition (De Sio, 2011), which 
unparallelly I will apply to each party.  
 
The resulting innovative logical-qualitative model links institutional 
variables to the parties and positional ones: modifying one will change 
all the others. 
 
The aim is to use this model in comparative statics – as introduced before 
– where the final equilibrium is the product of the interlocked 
multivariate system of causality, allowing to: 1) correlate how a specific 
electoral system can modify the party ideological positioning on the left-
right continuum, 2) know how many parties would be in the political 
space, and their location, with no disproportionality due to electoral 
systems, 3) correlate the countervailing effect of the electoral system in 
charge, introduced only theoretically by Sartori (2003, p. 61-2). 
 
As introduced before, in presence of an "Ideal-typical”27 plurality or 
proportional system28, my theory can overcome the limits of the pure 
FPTP and proportional electoral systems, as it is able to also catch the 
shades amongst them. A pillar theory underlying my model is that the 
more proportional an electoral system, the more the parties tend to a 
centripetal competition (Sartori, 2003, p. 60-3), implying that minor 
parties tend to assume extreme ideological positions to be more visible.  
This can also be transferred into ideological terms, since the growth-
survival of some parties find a fertile environment in a purely 
 
27 referring to the Weberian concept of the ideal-types (Weber, 1972). 
28 as well explained by Sartori with regards to electoral mechanics in "pure" 
plurality systems (2003, p. 57-64), the degree of disproportionality n (Taagepera 
R. , 2007b, p. 204-207) is quantitatively different, even though formally all 
districts present the same electoral system with a single winner. 
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proportional electoral system (as there are fewer barriers to entry) 
therefore parties should logically occupy all the ideological vacuums 
available, probabilistically smoothly spreading on the left-right 
positional continuum; conversely, a robust majoritarian electoral system 
will tend to produce a bipolar competition. The pillars of political science 
supporting these mechanics are: the laws of Duverger (1951; 1954, pp. 
pp. 247, 269; 1955, p. p. 113), the party competition of Downs (1957), and 
relative upgrades offered by Rae (1971, p. 95), Riker (1982, p. 760) and 
Sartori (2003). 
 
To verify the relation between the final disproportionality 𝑛j – as 
introduced above - and party competition dynamics, I have collated the 
data from the in-depth qualitative analysis in the period analyzed for 
Italy's seats from votes (from 1992 to 2018) and the positional party 
location from the previous chapter in the same period. As mentioned, I 
will obtain the data for 1992 and 2018 using a new logical method 
exhibited in chapter seven. 
The final qualitative models suggest a tri-dimensional relation between 
n, the average weighted positional distance px, and N; and a correlation 
between px and the Effective number of parties (weighted on the 
electoral system). A certain change of 𝑛j would have an impact of: 
mainly due to positional party competition (conditional to the non-
positional one), secondly from the degree of bi-polarization of the party 
system, and lastly from the weighted ideological distance px. 
 
In chapter seven, I suggest an alternative method to aggregate electoral 
flows.  
 
Goodman (1953) was the first to formalize a method to estimate the 
“swing votes”, which is the number of voters moving from one election 
to another from one party to another, using territorial sub-units. 
Unfortunately, this method can produce either some negative 
coefficients or an unreasonable sum (greater than 1), or both, because the 
votes received by each party are at least 0 and at most equal to 1 (100%). 
Other methods (King, 1997; King - Rosen - Tanner, 1999, 1); (De Sio, 
2009,1), may solve this problem, however they are very complex to use 
and need complex macros to work. For these reasons, I am suggesting a 
new method called "of mixture", which overcomes Goodman's 
problematics and it is much simpler than all existing methods. 
 
Practically, in presence of matrices of multiple columns or rows (or both), 
representing the votes for each party from an election to another, this 
new method doubles the relative compatible ones and replicates these in 
proportion of the votes of the electoral results. In order to do this, it is 
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necessary to operate on rows or columns, transforming their values in 
base 100. 
 
The new logical method "of mixture" obtains a standard error of 0.62%, 
calculated on the sum of the squares of the differences between the 
values of the estimated (TC) and effective (TT) row values, divided by 
the number of rows; this is higher than King and others’ at 0.37%, but 
lower than Goodman's at 0.93%29. This result of 0.62% is acceptable both: 
1) because its equivalent absolute error 8.06%30, calculated for the 2018 
elections, is lower than the acceptability threshold of 15% set by Corbetta 
Parisi and Schadee (Corbetta, 1988)31, 2) in terms of trade-offs of the 
criteria exposed by De Sio (2008, p. 84-90) - extremely easy to calculate, 
replicability and having an acceptable and contained error -, 3) since the 
manipulation of the matrices has an accuracy of 99.4%, according to their 
mathematical properties (Abadir - Magnus, 2005). 
Thanks to the proposed models it was possible to link the previous 
ideological positions of an election to another election through flow 
matrixes. With regards to the relation between electoral flows and the 
weighted ideological party distance, the model obtains an 𝑅j𝑎𝑑𝑗 =
87.2%. This also allowed to reproduce the positional party competition 
of the years 1992 and 2018, creating a dataset, using as primary sources 
the ITANES  archive (1948 - 2013) and others (Diamanti - Mannheimer, 
1994, p. 114), (D'Alimonte R. - Chiaramonte A., 2010) (Bartolini - 
Chiaramonte - D'alimonte, 2002) (Carrieri, 2018) (De Sio - Paparo, 2014) 
(SWG, 2018) (IPSOS, 2018) (De Sio - Paparo, 2014). 
 
1.3.4. Normative analysis of the main political variables  
 
The third and last part of the thesis capitalizes on some previous links 
found in order to generate an optimization of the previous variables, and 
to use a game theory equilibrium between the strategies of party and 
elector interests.  
 
In particular from 2013 in Italy the debate of how to determine the 
number of S has become more significant. In order to propose a solution, 
I hypothesize that the more demand for political representation without 
matching the political offer (by the parties presented at the election), the 
 
29 Calculation resulting from my analysis on an application of the model reported 
by De Sio (2009.1, p. 25). 
30 The value is calculated as 0.62% (standard error per line) * 13 (number of rows) 
31 They introduce the Vr indicator, which counts all the "impossible" coefficients 
because of the negative ones present in Goodman's flow matrix, placing the 
comprehensive tolerance threshold at 15%. 
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more illegitimacy of parties represented in the assembly, thus analyzing 
and also proposing tools of electoral engineering. 
 
Chapter eight calculates the optimal value of S more accurately than the 
simple relation P=𝑆 established by Taagepera (2007b, p. 199), and 
unprecedently it also formalizes the optimal value of M. Moreover, I 
introduce the original index 𝐷$, which represents the dis-representation 
attributable to an electoral law and to the institutional shapes M and S 
(independent from N).  
 
In order to minimize conflict channels – reported in the four pillars -, I 
propose two different methodologies, depending on the optimal variable 
I want to obtain. In the first methodology, I obtain the optimal values for 
S and M using differential calculus that minimizes the conflict channels 
produced by P, S and M, but also taking into consideration N merged 
with S, net of some parameters - as never done before -. In the second 
methodology, I obtain the optimal values for 𝐷j and 𝐷$ using 
maximization calculus between the cabinet duration and a new 
comprehensive representation index RE, which is equal to the 
complement of Gallagher’s index of dis-representation 𝐷j =
©0.5∑ 〖(𝑠] − 𝑣])j]
p#
]qZ 〗k.® (1991), such that 𝑅𝐸 = 1 − 𝐷j, which includes 𝐷$ 
and is standardized for the cabinet life (C) maximum duration. 
 
The only genuinely exogenous variable is P, whereas the other variables 
(M, S, 𝐷j and 𝐷$) are endogenous; N is to be considered a hybrid variable. 
All conflict channel formulas are derived for endogenous variables; the 
formulas are not derived for P or N, given their exogenous or hybrid 
nature. However, theoretically, it is possible to find the optimal value of 
N at the end of all optimization passages.  
 
As for the first methodology, in supporting the introduction of N into the 
grafting of the assembly size (S) optimization, I considering that parties 
have the function of grouping people with a relatively common political 
view, and represent the base of cleavage formation (Heath, 2005) (Lipset 
and Rokkan, 1967) (Rae - Taylor, 1970) and of politics issues (Taagepera 
and Grofman, 1985), reducing de facto these said issues, and 
consequentially the conflict channels, versus simply considering S.  
 
This reasoning is also applicable outside the chamber of representatives: 
vote behavior can also affected by common opinions among 
representatives on a program or ideology towards ideals and identity 
(Budge - Robertson - Hearl, 1987) (De Sio, 2011, p. 57-8), hence the parties. 
This implies that not all MPs effectively represent an active part in the 
determination of a conflict channel, therefore the Effective S will be 
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defined between S and N, hence requiring the application of the weighted 
geometric mean of these. 
 
Operatively, this means setting the following expression: 𝑁(¯) ∗ 𝑆(Zu¯), 
with exponents e in [0, 1] and 1-e as weights, calculated in function of their 
respective average values N and S. In detail, the parameter e is a 
theoretical parameter calculable by substituting the empirical values P, S, 
N, in the formula of 𝑆∗, for as many countries as possible, considering the 
most recent values available, and finally applying the geometric mean to 
the numeric values of e obtained for all countries. Following the same 
methodology, it is possible to obtain 𝑀∗ by substitution of 𝑆∗. 
 
Moving to the second methodology of maximization of the cabinet 
duration and R, I start by noting the relation between Dj and the 





 (Shugart - 
Taagepera, 2017, p. 145-6). I can then substitute Nj in the function C =
 
¡-$
 with the geometric mean between: 1) Nj; 2) √M∗S∗
+ ;  3)  1/2D³ (by 
definition). In such a way, I have nested M∗ and S∗ inside the previous 
calculations. I proceed to calculate the RE index, simply applying the 
basics of the probability for independent events, standardized for C. 
Finally, I obtain Dj∗	probabilistically from D³∗. 
 
Chapter nine casts into system the optimal values of 𝐷j, 𝐷$v, 𝑆	𝑎𝑛𝑑	𝑀, 
using some others already available (R. Taagepera 2007b) (Shugart - 
Taagepera 2017) and some other formulas that I have founded here and 
the strategic vote, to determine n in function of these optimal values, and 
consequentially also the party and elector equilibrium’s strategies. This is 
useful because: 1) from 𝐷$v, the impact can be evaluated of each political 
and institutional variable, like: M, S, legal thresholds of representation, 
majority premiums, proportional rules of allotment (quotient and 
divisors), and the other complicate electoral rules, also capitalizing the 
current literature (Taagepera R. , 2007) (Shugart - Taagepera, 2017), and 
then making electoral engineering; 2) it is possible to simulate and project 
electoral systems, evaluation of the seats’ allotment in a particular 
country in case of changing of the electoral rules (threshold, majority 
premiums, proportional rules, etc.…), in function of the optimal values 
or not; 3) to find the optimal average of the ideological distance between 
parties, then knowing not only how the party shares’ its configuration 
but also how the parties’ ideologies are displayed on average.  
 
Chapter nine wants to determine an equilibrium between parties’ and 
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voters’ “electoral utility”, which is the quantity of dis-representation 
which benefits a group of parties and voters in the system, producing 
disutility for the others. This chapter enriches the law of minority 
attrition including thresholds and majority premiums (MJPs) and 
strategic vote, using a primary game theory approach and the "Maximin" 
Rawlsian theory (1971) as a benchmark for equality. 
 
This chapter provides: 1) a set of tools to determine party and elector 
equilibrium strategies; 2) a simulation and design of electoral systems, 
evaluating how seats’ allotment varies with a change in electoral rules 
and then strategic votes in relation to threshold, majority premiums, but 
also any other corrective and proportional rule characteristic; 3) electoral 
projections through survey data, creating forecasts to understand, for 
example, if the mix of a specific electoral system with a specific political 
system goes to generate a majority in the assembly on not. 
 
Chapter ten provides an overview of links among the new tools and 
knowledge developed in this thesis, with the final aim of the normative 
building of an optimal electoral system, which can warrant both logical 
coherence and social equity as categorized by Arrow (1951). I use the 
methodology “connection among connection”, able to minimize the 
error  (Taagepera R. , 2015, p. 89-95; 215-219). 
 
For each given political system, optimizations can be performed by 
embracing the so-called “gradualistic engineering” approach, as a trial-
by-error process that must follow the democracy, as  it happens in a pure 
science (Antiseri, 2007, p. 520-1). The electoral system should be 
adaptive, therefore politics follow a trial-by-error process trying to find 
their stabilization, as a one-shot solution does not exist that is always 
valid, also according to Hayek's principle of exploration of the unknown 
and error correction (1982). The parallelism is similar to Dahl's reasoning 
- given by the homonymous "Dahl's box" - regarding the transition of 
political regimes, which must be gradual for a durable democratic 
transaction (1971). 
 
All the tools introduced in this thesis can form a broad and 
interdisciplinary platform of contents and methodologies that can 
expand the knowledge in political science and generally in social 
sciences. For example, a vital but underestimated powerful tool in 
political and social sciences is given by the application of LQMs to 
political economy estimates (Taagepera R. , 2015, p. 224-8) and in 
particular by time series, even though, for instance, Bernhard and 
Leblang (2006) have offered a hybrid approach between politics, finance 
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and the use of time series. Lastly, unfortunately in political sciences the 
differential calculus (Taagepera R. , 2015, p. 167-79) used, in this 
dissertation, in a comprehensive multivariate model (chapter eight) is 
less diffused, even if it is widely diffused in physics and economics. 
 
1.4. Organization of the thesis 
 
The thesis is organized as follows.  
 
This first chapter has introduced the methodology of logical quantitative 
models and its applications to political sciences.  
 
The second chapter explains the conversion of votes to seats. I use the law 
of minority attrition, expanding its form into a final model which is 
applicable from single member district to any electoral system in the 
analyzed period, yielding more accurate results also in the pure FPTP. I 
test it empirically for an in-depth analysis of Italian elections from 1992 
to 2018, because of the peculiar complexity of this country over time. The 
resulting interlocked model uses both political and institutional 
variables, such as: the assembly size, population size, district magnitude, 
effective number of parties, threshold of representation. The model tested 
for Italian elections (354 cases) achieved an 𝑅 squared adjusted equal to 
97.5% between the actual and the estimated seats from votes, which 
makes it applicable to almost any electoral system. 
  
The third chapter introduces the estimation of party seats from the 
previous elections using a weighted regression with independent 
variables jointly: 1) the product of the assembly size and the district 
magnitude, 2) the past values of the biggest party shares, and 3) the 
number of Effective parties and simply considered. 
The second part of the thesis looks to widen the connections among the 
disproportionality index, positional party competition, electoral flows, 
and cabinet duration.  
 
Chapter four develops a probability density function with five inflection 
points which describes any party system. It better catches the 
asymmetries among the party seats distribution at nationwide level. This 
function is developed starting from the law of minority attrition already 
introduced for the correlation between seats and votes, but in this case 
the exponent is expressed as a function itself, determining a change in its 
intended use. A concrete application can be the evaluation of the block 
threshold impact on the (seats) party system. A potential application of 
this function could be for a more accurate cabinet prediction as well as 
for the estimation of the seats allotted to each party in each district. 
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Chapter five implements the Downsian (or positional) competition 
model that describes the left-right space occupied by each party through 
Beta functions that I have tested on the Italian elections from 1992 to 
2018.  
 
Chapter six presents an in-depth qualitative analysis of the hypothesis 
that the more proportional an electoral system, the more the parties tend 
to centripetal competition, thus connecting ideological terms, effective 
number of parties and electoral system. The methodology used is the 
comparative statics (Hicks, 1939); (Samuelson, 1947), which here considers 
all equilibriums among the abovementioned variables, not considered as 
exogenous or endogenous, but as a multivariate interlocked system of 
causality. This allows to: 1) correlate how a specific electoral system can 
modify the party ideological positioning on the left-right continuum, 2) 
know how many parties would be in the political space, and their 
location, with no disproportionality due to electoral systems, 3) better 
analyze the countervailing effect of the electoral system in charge, 
introduced only qualitatively by Sartori (2003, p. 61-2). The correlation 
of the previous interlocked relation connects the positional distance and 
the effective number of parties (weighted on the electoral system). 
 
In chapter seven, I suggest an alternative logical method to aggregate 
electoral flows, which resolves Goodman’s problematics and provides a 
simpler solution than that of G. King. The empirical results obtained are 
acceptable, based on the criteria established by De Sio, Corbetta Parisi 
and Schadee. Capitalizing on this method, I proposed an extensive 
application allowing to link the previous ideological positions of an 
election to another election through flow matrixes. With regards to the 
relation between electoral flows and the weighted ideological party 
distance, the model obtains an 𝑅j𝑎𝑑𝑗 = 87.2%. This also allowed to 
reproduce the positional party competition of the years 1992 and 2018. 
In the last part, the third one, I capitalize on some previous links found, 
optimizing the previous variables using physics, mathematical and game 
theory tools.  
 
Chapter eight provides tools to more accurately calculate the optimal 
value of S (Taagepera and Shugart, 1989, p. 175), and unprecedently, the 
optimal value of other institutional variables such as: the district 
magnitude, the Gallagher’s index of dis-representation, and the dis-
representation index attributable to an electoral system (𝐷$), originally 
developed in this thesis. An innovative finding presented in this chapter 
is that the higher 𝑁m and/or M*S* product, the more 𝐷$∗ tends to 0; 
conversely, the lower 𝑁m and/or M*S* product – both tending to 1 -, the 
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more 𝐷$∗ tends to 1, describing the correlations between 𝑁m and 𝐷$∗ and 
between M*S* and 𝐷$∗ as branches of the hyperbola. 
Chapter nine wants to determine an equilibrium between parties’ and 
voters’ “electoral utility”, which is the quantity of dis-representation 
which benefits a group of parties and voters in the system, producing 
disutility for the others. This chapter enriches the law of minority 
attrition including thresholds and majority premiums (MJPs) and 
strategic vote, using a primary game theory approach and the "Maximin" 
Rawlsian theory (1971) as a benchmark for equality. This chapter 
provides: 1) a set of tools to determine party and elector equilibrium 
strategies; 2) a simulation and design of electoral systems, evaluating 
how seats’ allotment varies with a change in electoral rules and then 
strategic votes in relation to threshold, majority premiums, but also any 
other corrective and proportional rule characteristic; 3) electoral 
projections through survey data, creating forecasts to understand, for 
example, if the mix of a specific electoral system with a specific political 
system goes to generate a majority in the assembly on not. 
 
Chapter ten provides an overview of links among the new tools and 
knowledge developed in this thesis, with the final aim of the normative 
building of an optimal electoral system, which can warrant both logical 
coherence and social equity as categorized by Arrow (1951). I use the 
methodology “connection among connection”, able to minimize the 
error  (Taagepera R. , 2015, p. 89-95; 215-219). For each given political 
system, optimizations can be performed by embracing the so-called 
“gradualistic engineering” approach, as a trial-by-error process that 
must follow the democracy, as  it happens in a pure science 
(Antiseri, 2007, p. 520-1). The electoral system should be adaptive, 
therefore politics follow a trial-by-error process trying to find their 
stabilization, as a one-shot solution does not exist that is always valid, 
also according to Hayek's principle of exploration of the unknown and 
error correction (1982). All the tools introduced in this thesis can form a 
broad and interdisciplinary platform of contents and methodologies that 
can expand the knowledge in political science and generally in social 
sciences. Lastly, unfortunately in political sciences the differential 
calculus (Id. (p.167-79)) used, in this dissertation, in a comprehensive 
multivariate model (chapter eight) is less diffused, even if it is widely 

















Chapter  2 
 
Implementing the seats from votes relation: the 
Italian case 1992-2018 
 
2.1 Introduction  
 
Notwithstanding intuition could logically induce to think that votes 
obtained in an election are a good indicator of the seats representing the 
final political representation, this is not always correct. As introduced 
before, nowadays, even in excellent and mature democracies, minority 
parties or coalitions (in terms of votes) could be able to win elections: the 
more majoritarian the electoral system, the more the wider alliance of 
parties is strategic to determine the success of those. How is this possible? 
The answer is that aside a pure proportional system which tends to a non-
strategic competition (even though also proportional formulas are never 
impartial in the seat allotment), on the other hand, majoritarian electoral 
systems go to improve some parties’ particular interest against others, 
and generally it goes to increase governability, counting and grouping 
votes in some particular way, in order to increase their final seats in the 
assembly. These could be the results of intended or unintended 
consequences of the electoral reforms approved by parties in parliament. 
It is like the sentence "private vices, public benefits", the subtitle of 
Mandeville’s  “The Fable of the Bees” (1714), but in this case, I propose 
the respect of the following logical asserts: the more the N, the less the 
cabinet stability; a wider seats-votes gap produced by the electoral 
system in favor of the relative majority party/coalition (in term of seats) 
increases the cabinet stability under the condition that the sum of the gaps 
among all parties is the least  possible. Thus, this chapter finds a unified 
model able to synthesize electoral systems through linking votes and 
seats, and the next chapter will go to solve that axiom quantitatively. 
 
Hence, here I show the implementation of the sigmoid law of minority 
attrition, which interlocks the political and institutional variables; this 
will allow us to apply the final model to any electoral system and 
functioning even better in the pure FPTP as used until now by Taagepera 
(2007b, p. 232). Using this "comparative statics", the final equilibrium is 
then obtained thanks to a multivariate interlocked causality system rather 
than using exogenous variables. It will analyze and project all possible 
scenarios, such as making more efficient exit polls, electoral engineering 
and political strategies. Actual knowledge about these tools among the 
political scientists - besides Taagepera - is stopped to the simple 
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directional relations, and not quantitative ones (Fisichella, 2009, p. 263-
288) (Grofman, 2004) (Sartori, 2003; 1987) (Colomer J. , 2004; 2005). 
 
The aim is to develop a general model of conversion, obtained through 
an in-depth analysis of the Italian elections. I have chosen the Italian 
context because of the peculiar complexity of this country over time, 
presenting: thresholds, majority premiums, the simultaneous 
proportional and the district's single winner (FPTP) and other fuzzy 
compensative mechanisms of seat allotment. All these peculiarities allow 
to build a generalized model that is applicable at a cross country level 
(excluding alternative vote, single transferable/non-transferable vote, 
and their derivates)32. 
 
The law of minority attrition works well for simple scenarios represented 
by FPTP, and when there is a bipartite system like in the Caribbean 
Islands, but less if: 1) N is high; 2) M and-or S are low; 3) the electoral 
laws are complex, when for example the electoral system is mixed, like 
in Italy, Spain, Japan and others. Then the aim is to system: 
 
1) N in substitution of the number of the opponents competing for 
the specific election (one or two (Taagepera R. , p. 207-9));  
 
2) other political and institutional variables interlocked to the law 
of minority attrition, modifying the degree of dis-
proportionality - the exponent n - between seats and votes, 
allowing to apply the final model to any electoral system, and 
functioning even better in the pure FPTP.  
 
I start from Taagepera's generalization of the law of minority attrition, 
which foresees only 1 and 2 opponents in the election; to implement it, I 
introduce 𝑁𝑣 at the denominator in substitution of the numeric constant 
representing the opponents. The other important part of the original law 
of minority attrition formula is the parameter n, defined in the interval 
[1, ∞]; to guarantee such more comprehensive application, I propose to 
adopt implementation of the index n, which will become 𝑛1  by means of 
the other institutional and political variables P, S, M, N, E, and a new 
index G (soon explained). The 𝑛1 will be adjusted, obtaining a new and 
final 𝑛1, following the same logical-quantitative methodology base. 
Being n=3 the ideal-typical value that n must assume for the FPTP, in the 
presence of some specificities of the electoral law, 𝑛1 could be furtherly 
 
32 PBV, AV, STV, SNTV, MNTV, MMM, MMP, see Shugart and Taagepera for 
this classification (2017, 31-60) 
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and integrally transformed in the final 𝑛2, especially when n can logically 
(potentially) degenerate in 1 or ∞. These cases happen in the presence of: 
1) block threshold impact - T - (degenerating in ∞); 2) correctives used in 
the mixed electoral system, such as the proportionality effect of the 
"scorporo" s (soon explained) or a compensative mechanism of 
proportionality (both degenerating in 1), to the majority premium 
(degenerating in ∞). 
 
Unprecedently in literature, I propose the new concentration index G, 
indicating the Effective Gini Index, aiming to measure the parties' vote 
concentrations within a country. It quantifies the party system's degree 
of structuring based on each party's concentration within the territory on 
a district basis. G is a logical mix of three indicators: 𝑁0, 	𝑁2, and the 
classical Gini index g. The aims are to neutralize the impact of small 
parties over the effective ones (𝑁0 − 𝑁2) conditional to 𝑁2 and depurated 
of the impact of 𝑁0. 𝐺𝑑's final result consists of calculating the latter three 
variables referring to each party's votes distribution within the districts; 
finally, the weighted average of the G for the parties' share will be 
calculated, indicating the parties' average territorial concentration. 
 
Hence all the previous variables will be mixed on the following logical-
deductive assumptions:   
 
1) Considering the discrepancies existing in the electoral systems 
from the equality relation P=𝑆3 (seen before), the higher P respect 
𝑆3, the higher n, and vice versa.  
 
2) The more N2, the less the other parties’ marginal power to win a 
seat (among the districts), the lower n because of the parties’ 
coordination problems. 
 
3) The higher 𝐺𝑑, the lower n, because other parties’ probability to 
win a seat (among the districts) is higher due to the specific 
territorial golden shares of party (or parties).    
 
4) A corrective based on M conditional to S. The more M tends to S, 
the more the electoral system tends to be proportional – getting n 
lower – on the opposite, for M=1 the electoral system tends to be 
a pure plurality, thus getting n higher. 
 
5) A corrective based on E conditional to P. The more E tends to P, 
the less is n, because the territorial distribution can less impact 
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the dis-proportionality. Conversely, the more E tends to 1, the 
higher n. 
 
6) Considering the national block threshold of representation T or 
majority premium, these can nullify any proportionality of the 
electoral system, thus intervening at the end on the whole n1, 
transforming – increasing it – in the final n2. The more T tends to 
1, and the more n2 tends to ∞. On the opposite, the less is T, and 
the more n2 tends to n1. The scorporo follows the opposite 
dynamic.  
 
It is useful to introduce the complex proportional mechanism, the 
scorporo – a corrective variable used in Italy from 1994 to 2001 – which 
consists of subtracting votes from the winning parties in the FPTP seats’ 
allotment (equal to ¾ of S) to benefit the other lists for the proportional 
section (equal to ¼ of S). 
 
Hence, concerning the conversion of votes to seats for the in-depth 
analysis of the Italian case, the elections that happened from 1992 to 2018 
are taken into consideration in a postdictive analysis because these 
configure four different mixed electoral systems33 representing a 
considerable dynamism of the party system both genetically,  
numerically and in terms of mechanic competition, useful to codify these 
complex schemes and reapply to generalize these to other countries. 
Then I used 354 cases obtained by data from the Interior's ministry.   
 
The model tested for Italian elections has achieved an R2adj=97.5% 
between the actual and estimated seats from votes. It has produced an 
error inferior to 0.601 percentage points compared to the simple law of 
minority attrition, and less than 27.8 % in absolute terms. 
 
2.2  Logical Models and their implementations 
 
Another concentration index that will be used here, with different 
characteristics from HH, is one derived by Gini (g). This index maintains 
the domain [0,1], where 0 indicates the fair distribution of all party 
shares in the system, and 1 indicates the maximum concentration, where 
one party holds 100%. Being g a concentration index, it must presuppose 
a Nk not higher than 1 as it is given by definition, but at least equal to 2 
 
33 covering the PR, MMM, and MMP types (having the FPTP, the uses of T, s and 
the MJP). 
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to measure the inequality in a meaningful way, otherwise if Nk was 
equal to 1, the g value would degenerate in 1. Moreover, to calculate g, 




indicating the maximum quota for positional lag, I get: 
 
𝑔 =






The g index only considers the equal party shares' distribution among 
the actors in a system, while the HH index considers the magnitude of 
the ideal-typical party share or "median" party, representing the entire 
system. Exemplifying: if we had five parties in a system, and each of 
them obtained 20% of votes, the g index would be equal to 0, so it would 
not capture the value of the share held by each actor; whereas, the HH 
index in the same scenario would be equal to 0.2.  
 
2.2.1 For a New Index of Concentration and Territorial Distribution: 
The Effective Gini Index 
Due to the different properties of the g and HH indexes, the need to 
build a new index arises that can system these and overcome the limits 
of g, when considered on its own. These limits are: 
 
1. sensitivity to outliers (N0 − N2); 
2. impact of 𝑁2 not capitalized ceteris paribus for the (N0 − N2); 
3. sensitivity to N0. 
 
With regards to the first limit, let me consider the following example 
with three quotas: 25%, 35% and 40%, which have a Gini index of 0.15. 
If another party is introduced, holding a quota of 1.2%, and rearranging 
the distribution, for instance getting the following set: 38.8%, 35%, 25%, 
1.2%, the Gini index will be equal to 0.409. Therefore,  Nk is the main 
responsible for this substantial variation that I want to mitigate, 
considering the gap  Nk – Nj (inserted at the denominator); to warrant 
the 𝐺j’s domain in [0,1], and avoiding the division by 0, in addition I 
introduce at the denominator the element +1 since theoretically Nk – Nj 
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could be equal to 0. Now I set 𝐺j as follows: 
𝐺2 =
𝑔
N0 − N2 + 1
 
𝐺2 represents the “Efficacious Gini Index”, which indicates the effective 
concentration in a system net of the non-effective number of parties (N0-
N2). Using the information in the previous example, 𝐺2  is equal to 0.203, 
which is higher than 0.15, due to the introduction of the additional party, 
and lower than 0.409, due to the additional party holding a lower quota 
than the others. In the figure 6 below, I have reported the behavior of 𝐺2 
conditional to the non-actual number of parties. 
 
Figure 6 The new ”Efficacious” 𝐺& , calculated from the Gini index g, net of the non-
effective number of parties ( 𝑁" −𝑁&). 
The “Efficacious Gini Index” defined above overcomes the first limit of 















g=0,2 g=0,4 g=0,6 g=0,8
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another step aimed at making the impact of the non-effective quotas less 
drastic, placing N2 as benchmark. The previous considerations 
regarding the division by 0 and the domain apply, adding the element 
+1, because the object ¡#u¡$
¡$
 for Nk − Nj equal to 0, would be equal to 0 








In the figure 7 below, I have reported the behavior of 𝐺Z calculated from 
the Gini index g, net of the non-effective number of parties (Nk − Nj) and 
the non-effective quotas. The curves represented in this graph are 
smoother and flatter than in the previous graph for equal values of g. 
 
 
Figure 7 The 𝐺%, calculated from the Gini index g, net of the non-effective number of 
parties ( 𝑁" −𝑁&) and the non-effective quotas. 
With regards to the last limit of g, I am looking to avoid that an actual 
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context. To do so, the number of nominal dimensions N0 that make the 
context up need to be considered jointly with N2, to produce the most 
stable and attenuated formulation of Gini. The previous considerations 
regarding the division by 0 and the domain apply, adding the element 





 for Nk − Nj equal to 0, would be equal 











The figure 8 below shows that the new G Index is fully independent from  
Nk and Nj. 
 
 
Figure 8 The Effective Gini index 𝐺, calculated from the Gini index g, net of the non-
effective number of parties ( 𝑁" −𝑁&), the context (𝑁"), and the non-effective quotas. 
The G-index will find application to assess the impact of the electoral 
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concentrated on the national territory 𝐺𝑑. The minimum unit on which 
to calculate the variables g, 𝑁0, and 𝑁2, is the regional percentage 
obtained from each party. To obtain the 𝐺𝑑 overall result, a 𝐺𝑑,𝑝 is 
calculated for each party 𝑝𝑖, and subsequently their weighted average is 
applied. This allows to catch the effective local concentration of the 
parties net of symbolic candidatures, in which the party’s impact is 
marginal in the system. 
 
2.3. Converting Votes in Seats: from the Law of minority 
attrition to a new model 
I now turn to the heart of the problem, which is how to calculate a 
mathematical function that can be valid to convert the votes to seats in 
any electoral system. I use the logical-quantitative model proposed by 
Taagepera as a starting point and I propose additional grafts, 
adjustments and implementation to predict the various specificities of a 
mixed or straightforward electoral system, thus generalizing it as much 
as possible to allow application in other contexts. 




v½ + (N − 1)Zu½(1 − v)½
 
 
Although this model is an excellent starting point, it does not take into 
consideration other variants of voting systems such as the barrage 
thresholds or the territorial concentration of parties, as said in the first 
paragraph34. As I will show in more details later on, even though 
Taagepera (et al.) formalized these variants, they are not blended in the 
formula above. Moreover, the Italian case allows me to introduce 
additional elements, for example: the effect of the "scorporo" (which I 
will define later), plurinominal districts35, and the peculiarity of mixed 
electoral systems, which have two sides of seats allotment. Specifying 
 
34 (Sartori, 1987, p. 58-61) (Rae, 1971, p. 95) (Riker, 1982, p. 760) 
35 which however generate dynamic plurality if exceedingly small. 
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this last point, the majority of electoral laws in force in Italy in the 
reference period, is characterized by a proportion of the seats' quota 
allotted proportionally to votes and another by plurality. 
Starting to modify the law of minority attrition, I consider the "optimum" 
value that n must take in a pure plurality, which is 3, and rearrange the 
law as follows: 
𝑛 = ¾1 +
2
0,5	 ¿1 − 𝑃 − 𝑆













This can happen on the basis of the following logical-deductive 
assumptions:  
 
1) where a sub-representation exists such that 𝑃 > 𝑆, then the dis-
representation index n will increase; inversely, for 𝑃 < 𝑆  I 






 is defined in [0,	∞] because by definition 
𝑃 ≥ S. 
 
2) the higher the average territorial concentration of the parties on 
territory 𝐺, the lower n (for 𝐺 = 1 ⟹ 𝑛 = 1 ). For example, in 
a system of two districts, both with 100 voters, party A gets 70 
votes in the first district and 30 in the second, party B gets 30 
votes in the first and 40 in the second, and party C gets only 30 
votes in the second; ceteris paribus, party A will win only one 
seat, being more concentrated than if it had had 60 votes in the 
first district and 40 in the second, where it would win both 
districts. 
 
3) Capitalize Nj. Considering the limit case in which Nj tended 
to the anchor point 1 - but never reached it, because Nj = 1 
configures a dictatorship - even the remaining party shares on 
the territory, although concentrated, would see a reduced 
probability of being able to win even one district because the 
presence of the bigger party would vandalize it, then 𝑛 → ∞. On 
the other side, if Nj tended to infinity, the competitive numeric 
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advantage for every party would be null even in the case of 
uninominal districts. The nullification happens because the 
winning probability in each district is almost identical for each 
party, as the victory will be determined for someone randomly 
thanks to a handful of votes for each district, then 𝑛 → 1. 
 
4) The first member of the exponent, zu{
z{uZ
 , aims at assessing the 
dimension of districts M, thus allowing the application of the 
model to several values of M coexisting in the same electoral 
system, and their relationship with S. Through a logical study of 
the limit cases, it is possible to deduce that for S = M there is a 
single nationwide district, in which the dis-proportional effect 
given by the mechanism of the districts would be null. On the 
opposite extreme, for M = 1 in presence of a pure plurality, the 
dynamics of the districts would fully exert their effect. 
 
 
5) The second member of the exponent, 1 − $
√
 , takes the 
population size into consideration for the first time. I have used 
E instead of S considering the relationship E = z
±
 , which indicates 
the population’s share represented by an MP. Knowing that 1 <
𝐸 < 𝑃, and knowing that a high E implies small districts, the 
higher E, the lower n, then the smaller the districts, the more n 
tends to 1. Hence, I have defined the square root of P, applying 





} = 0.  
 
 
2.4. A comprehensive model: the Italian case 1992-2018 
 
Having enunciated the general model theoretically, I can now apply it to 
concrete cases, in particular Italy from 1992 to 2018 – with further 
correctives and integrations – to test it empirically. 
 
When an electoral system foresees a joint proportional and majoritarian 
allotment, it is necessary to articulate the variable 𝑁j into 𝑁\ and 𝑁Çv, both 
calculated on the basis of votes. The first simply reflects the effective 
number of parties, while the latter reflects the coalitions formed by the 
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same parties. These two variables will be applied to each allotment of the 
electoral system respectively (𝑁\ for the proportional and 𝑁Çv for the 
majoritarian representation).  
 
Similarly, the M dimension is articulated into 𝑀𝑐, referring to 
constituencies and 𝑀𝑑, referring to districts. This is a helpful distinction 
in the joint use of both variables in mixed electoral systems. 
In the 1992 election, the Italian electoral system was proportional for both 
the chamber and the senate. Therefore, 𝑁2 needs to be articulated into 𝑁𝑝 
and 𝑁𝑐𝑙, and M into 𝑀𝑐 and 𝑀𝑑. 
 
In 1994, 1996, and 2001, the electoral system was plurality for about 3/4 
(74.52%) and proportional for 1/4 (25.48%). 
 
The elections from 2006 to 2013 used a mixed electoral system with a 
proportional base or repartition, majority premium and block 
thresholds. The country's constituencies allotted 618 seats 
proportionally, whereas 12 were attributed to four foreign 
constituencies. 
 
In 2018 the electoral system was plurality for 37%, proportional for 61% 
and the remaining 2% was allotted to the Italian voters abroad, 
distributed into four foreign constituencies. The electoral system in 2018 
was also characterized by 𝑀 equal to 3 (seats) for the chamber and 1.5 for 
the senate. Therefore, being 𝑁𝑝 < 𝑀, I can consider 𝑁𝑐𝑙 for the foreign 
seats’ allotment, hence the party competition is majoritarian.  
 
For simplicity, it is possible to consider foreign competition assimilable 
to the district dimension, being the M dimension much nearer to the 
district rather than the constituency one. Hence, the foreign seats' 
allotment implies a simple substitution of M with 𝑀𝑑. 
 
I now rewrite the new intermediate indexes 𝑛1 for each election. 
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𝑛1,1992 = A1 +
2
0,5	 B1 − 𝑃 − 𝑆
3











𝑛1,1994−2001 = (1 − 0.2548)
∗ A1 +
2
0,5	 B1 − 𝑃 − 𝑆
3










+ 0.2548 A1 +
2
0,5	 B1 − 𝑃 − 𝑆
3











𝑛1,2006−2013 = 0.9810 A1 +
2
0,5	 B1 − 𝑃 − 𝑆
3











+ 0.1190 A1 +
2
0,5	 B1 − 𝑃 − 𝑆
3













𝑛1,2018 = 0.39 A1 +
2
0.5	 B1 − 𝑃 − 𝑆
3










+ 0.61 A1 +
2
0.5	 B1 − 𝑃 − 𝑆
3












For the election of the chamber and the senate of 1992 we can simply 
consider the final 𝑛2 equal to 𝑛1, because neither block thresholds, 
majority premium nor relevant district allocations36 occur. Therefore: 
𝑛2,1992 = 𝑛1,1992 
 
For the elections from 1994 to 2001, I must also consider the peculiar 
expediency of the "scorporo"37 that could be translated as “unbundling", 
which impacted N significantly, compared to other more marginal 
elements of that electoral law such as the repêchage38. The scorporo at the 
chamber of deputies was "partial": this consisted of allocating seats in the 
proportional share subtracting from each party the votes obtained by the 
first unelected (or runners-up) in the districts (within a given 
constituency) in which the former had won. In the senate, the votes' 
scorporo was "total": all votes obtained by an elect in the district were 
 
36 The unified electoral law of March 30th, 1957, n°361, established that where a 
party had overtaken the 65% of votes of a relative district, it would get directly 
one of the 315 seats provided for the senate. However, this hypothesis has been 
concretely very marginal in the history of the republic; in 1992, just two seats 
were attributed in this way, therefore producing a disproportionality index n 
equal to 𝑛	 = 	 [1/(1 − 2 ∗ 0,35/315)] = 1,002 at most, which is absolutely 
marginal, and that I do not consider for simplicity. However, if another electoral 
system diminished the threshold of winning the district ballot, or the 𝐺8 had been 
much higher, the probability of winning the district would be higher for small 
parties. 
37 "Mattarella Law" of August 4th, 1993, N° 276 (N° 277 for the chamber of 
deputies).  
38 Which established the direct election in a proportional quote of a limited 
representatives' number (3 or 4, depending on the circumscription's extent); the 
rest is elected by the repêchage in the uninominal districts - among the "best 
losers" candidates – by implementing the value of n, but in a residual way. 
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subtracted from the same list in the proportional dimension (of the 
constituency).  
 
All these will result in an s index representing the impact of the scorporo 
in the interval [0,1], which will be inversely proportional to n, as s plays 
a proportionality role. As the first and the second party are expressly 
envisaged by the electoral law, I propose probabilistic tools to estimate 
them. 









   (Taagepera R. , 2007b, p. 
148-155). However, in this case, the exponent is fixed and found 
empirically without a genuine logical construction. This offers an 
opportunity to parametrize the exponent of N, in this case 𝑁𝑐𝑙, as it is the 
coalitions that compete in the districts and not the individual parties 
(although there are parties that do not cooperate). We can hypothesize 
that the greater the actual concentration of quotas, here considered at the 
national level and no longer on a territorial-regional basis, the greater the 
first party 𝑝Z; 𝑝Z exists for each value of G defined in [0,1], therefore the 







At this point, I replace 𝑝1 in the following formula, already found by 









At this point, I apply 𝑛2 to the chamber and the senate to distinguish the 
two different "scorpori", “𝑠𝑐” for the chamber and “𝑠𝑠” for the senate, both 
having domain [0,1] (producing a proportionality effect): 
 
54 
1) for the chamber of deputy, I consider only the weight of the 
second party and those of the other parties (grouped by 
approximation, excluding the first and second); 
 
2) for the senate I consider the first, the second and the 
remaining others (by approximation, as done above).  
 
For both the chamber and the senate, the dimensions are squared 
because it has the meaning of a weighted average where the weights are 
equal to the same quotas. Both scorpori will be multiplied by 0.25 as this 
represents the electoral system’s quota affected. 
 
So, we will have that: 
 
𝑠𝑠 = 0.25 ∗ R	𝑝1
2 + 𝑝2
2 + D1 −	𝑝1 − 𝑝2E
2S 
𝑠𝑐 = 0.25 ∗ R𝑝2
2 + D1 −	𝑝1 − 𝑝2E
2S 
 
I also need to consider the block threshold 𝑇𝑖, which excludes parties that 
receive a number of votes below a specific value 𝑇. This threshold has an 
impact on the final coefficient of disproportionality 𝑛2: the bigger the 
threshold T, the higher 𝑛j; vice versa for T equal to zero, 𝑛j will equal 𝑛Z 
ceteris paribus. The block threshold 𝑇𝑖 impacts 𝑛2 proportionally to the 
euclidean distance39 that elapses between the ideal-typical party share 
HH (equal to the reciprocal of N calculated by the coalition quotas) and 
the ideal-typical party share which considers the entire proportional 
party system, knowing by definition that 𝑁𝑐𝑙−1 > 𝑁𝑝−1, hence obtaining 
a block threshold impact equal to the object R1 − D𝑁𝑐𝑙−1 − 𝑁𝑝−1ES
2
 in 
the domain [0,1].  
 
The objective is to formalize the strategic element of the list's 
composition into the districts. My model captures the quantitative 
elements of the party system. However, the political system includes 
human aleatory variables, such as party alliances, which are challenging 
 
39 (Abadir - Magnus, 2005, p. 1-3) 
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to formalize in a quantitative model. For example, some small parties 
would have no chance of either conquering the district or reaching the 
threshold in proportional alone, but they can ally with the main 
coalition's party(ies), thus managing to get their candidates elected.  
I finalize the formula to calculate 𝑛2 for the chamber and the senate in 
relation to s, 𝑛1 and 𝑇𝑖 as follows: 
 
𝑛2,1994−2001 =
𝑛1,2018(1 − 𝑠) + 𝑠
1 − 𝑇𝑖 R1 − D𝑁𝑐𝑙−1 − 𝑁𝑝−1ES
2 
 
The numerator has been built thinking at the limit case for which the 
maximum s is 1; this is possible in absolute terms, but not in this concrete 
case where it might only reach 0.25. 
 
I can now formalise the impact of T, as a proxy of disproportionality 𝑛2,  
with the 𝑇𝑖 formula in domain [0,1], using the index 𝐺𝑝 - the Effective 
Gini index applied to parties on a regional basis – applicable to all 
elections: 








With regards to the first component of the denominator, 𝑇𝑁\ZuÍ;, when 
T equals 0, the impact on disproportionality will also be zero. On the 
opposite extreme, when T equals 1, there are two limit cases:  
 
1) for 𝑁𝑝 equal to 1 and 𝐺𝑝 equal to 1, the impact would be equal to 
0.5. In fact, this scenario could represent a party regime tending 
to a single-party, where an opponent could theoretically get at 
most 50% so not to put the biggest party at risk of losing the 
election. In other words, using a game theory reasoning, 0.5 is 
precisely the point where the pay-off to the larger party would 
maximize its electoral profit. This extreme scenario could be 
concretized by a situation where the biggest party also holds 
legislative powers.  
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2) for 𝑁𝑝 tending to infinity and subsequently 𝐺𝑝 logically tending 
to 0, the impact would be equal to 1. In fact, in this scenario, a 
hypothetical block threshold of 1 would have an impact that 
inevitably would involve all parties, therefore 𝑇𝑖 = 	1.  
 
With regards to the second component, 1−𝐺𝑑
Q 𝑆𝑀𝑐
, this aims at putting to 
system the impact of the territorial “diffusion” (1 − 𝐺), as complement 
to the concentration index 𝐺𝑑, which is inversely proportional to T as the 
more concentrated the parties' votes, the more ineffective the threshold, 




For the chamber of deputies, E will be equal to 1, since	𝑀Ç = 𝑆, 
considering that the threshold is set on a national basis. On the contrary, 
as the senate is elected on a regional basis, the territorial parties' votes 
diffusion (1 − 𝐺) diminishes, thus resulting in a reduction of the T effect; 
this happens because the probability for a party to reach the threshold in 
at least one region increases with E. Being this a random probability that 
ranges from 1 to E, then I can calculate the geometric mean between 





For the elections of 2006, 2008 and 2013, I must introduce an additional 
corrective 𝑀𝑗𝑝 defined in [0,1] based on the Majority Premium. 
Following the first law40 of Duverger (1951; 1954), I can assume a 
simplified scenario in which on average, a majoritarian competition 
tends to two coalitions that compete for the Premium. 
 
In the case of the chamber of deputies, the Majority Premium is granted 
to the most voted list or coalition that does not reach 55% of votes at the 
national level, which gets 340 seats. The net gain for the first party-
 
40 called in this way by Riker (1982). 
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coalition D0,5397 − 𝑝1E41 could be a suitable corrective 𝑀𝑗𝑝Ç for the 
chamber. 
 
The same rule applies to the senate but on the regional level. The 
corrective 𝑀𝑗𝑝𝑠 needs to measure how much the probabilistic gain is for 
the party-coalition beneficiary, reflecting the average Majority Premium 
granted at regional level in just one formula. For this reason, I need to 
include the territorial distribution's impact of this competition, which I 




This exponent is applied to the first party-coalition’s competitive 
advantage D𝑝1 − 𝑝2E to win the regional Majority Premia on average. In 
fact, for a perfect equal territorial distribution, the exponent tends to 
zero, implying that the average regional Premium is equal to the 
difference between each regional Premium (0.5397) and the biggest 
party-coalition’s share D𝑝1E, since there is no variance among each 
regional vote distribution. I have used (𝑝Z − 𝑝j) to measure the 
exclusivity of 𝑀𝑗𝑝 in each region, which would otherwise be nullified in 
case the biggest party-coalition received a number of votes very close to 
the runner-up. In fact, in this case, the increase of the territorial party 
concentration would offer the runner-up the opportunity to win regional 
Premia from a tie, thus increasing the variance at the national level. 
When the variance of the regional vote scenarios increases, these 
scenarios will tend to the national vote distribution and the competition 
dynamic will align to the national one, thus nullifying the 𝑀𝑗𝑝𝑠.  
 
Therefore, the formulas for the corrective 𝑀𝑗𝑝 are as follows: 
𝑀𝑗𝑝𝑠 = D0,5397 − 𝑝1E ∗ D𝑝1 − 𝑝2E
𝐺𝑑
Q 𝑆𝑀𝑐  
𝑀𝑗𝑝𝑐 = D0,5397 − 𝑝1E 
 
 
41 The constant is 0.5397 because of the 2% of seats distributed among the foreign 
constituencies. 
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I now move to calculate 𝑛2,2006−2013, applicable to both the chamber and 
the senate, in the same way as done for 𝑛2,1994−2001with two differences: 
I exclude the scorporo which was not present in the electoral system of 
those years, and I add the conditional probability for independent events 
(Espa - Micciolo, 2008, p. 51), which considers the threshold impact and 





1 − B𝑇𝑖 ∗ R1 − D𝑁<=,% −𝑁-,%ES
&





For 2018, I exclude the corrective Mjp since Majority Premium was not 




1 − 𝑇𝑖 R1 − D𝑁𝑐𝑙−1 − 𝑁𝑝−1ES
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2.5. The empirical test on the aggregated disproportional 
index 𝐧𝟐 
 
After this detailed construction of the model, we can finally test it by 
comparing the estimated seats from votes with the real ones. I have taken 
the chamber’s and senate's results of all parties from all elections in the 
period 1992 - 2018, obtaining a sample of 354 data points. All the variable 
that we need to substitute into the previous formulas are listed in the 
tables 3 and 4 below: 
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1992 Senate 7.04 7.04 0.34 0.131 33 15.75 315 
1994 Chamber 5.42 2.81 0.30 0.171 19 23.75 630 
1994 Senate 5.42 3.13 0.38 0.171 19 11.60 315 
1996 Chamber 4.10 2.86 0.36 0.145 37 23.75 630 
1996 Senate 4.10 3.11 0.42 0.145 40 11.60 315 
2001 Chamber 3.47 2.52 0.35 0.126 33 23.75 630 
2001 Senate 3.47 2.64 0.42 0.126 40 11.60 315 
2006 Chamber 5.50 2.02 0.37 0.128 37 22.85 630 
2006 Senate 7.64 2.03 0.37 0.128 52 15.45 315 
2008 Chamber 3.79 2.74 0.39 0.160 30 22.85 630 
2008 Senate 3.67 2.68 0.39 0.160 29 15.45 315 
2013 Chamber 5.33 4.01 0.39 0.129 47 22.89 630 
2013 Senate 5.16 3.85 0.41 0.129 58 15.75 315 
2018 Chamber 5.10 3.36 0.36 0.176 28 9.08 630 






































1992 Senate 56.80 0 0.150 0.202 - 1,03 1,03 
1994 Chamber 56.84 0.04 0.241 0.170 0.069 2,25 2,31 
1994 Senate 56.84 0 0.495 0.237 0.094 2,16 2,05 
1996 Chamber 56.86 0.04 0.285 0.168 0.046 2,07 2,13 
1996 Senate 56.86 0 0.506 0.226 0.089 2,10 1,99 
2001 Chamber 56.97 0.04 0.303 0.181 0.039 2,54 2,59 
2001 Senate 56.97 0 0.532 0.230 0.089 2,30 2,17 
2006 Chamber 58.14 0.04 0.498 - - 1,06 1,11 
2006 Senate 58.14 0.08 0.498 0.497 - 1,06 1,10 
2008 Chamber 58.83 0.04 0.468 - - 1,05 1,15 
2008 Senate 58.83 0.08 0.468 0.376 - 1,07 1,15 
2013 Chamber 60.23 0.04 0.296 - - 1,04 1,41 
2013 Senate 60.23 0.08 0.296 0.292 - 1,05 1,34 
2018 Chamber 60.60 0.03 0.337 0.204 - 1,50 1,58 
2018 Senate 60.60 0.03 0.351 0.200 - 1,55 1,57 
 
The empirical results confirm the new logical models proposed. The 
fitted regression is strong: the estimated seats' coefficient is near 1, 
significance at least at 99%, and the constant is near 0, as we would have 
expected, since its proximity to 0 makes its significance meaningless. The 
variance explained by the model is 97.63%. Using the simple law of 
minority attrition (using N to quantify the opponents) to estimate the 
real seats, the 𝑅2 is slightly lower at 96.14%, 1.49 percentage points lower 




Notwithstanding the 1.49 percentage points improvement in 𝑅2, the Root 
MSE, which is the standard deviation of the codomain, is equal to ±2.164 
percentage points. This means that the average error of the post-diction 
party seats obtained using this new proposed model is equal to 2.16 
percentage points; using the simple law of minority attrition, I obtain an 
error of ±2.765, which is 0.601 percentage points or 27.8% higher 
(0.601/2.164). Therefore, a forecast for a party's seats equal to 2.5% 
±2.164% produced by my new model would be equal to 2.5 % ± 2.765% 
produced by the law of minority attrition. Hence, the less the party’s 
share the more the relative error increase. 
 
I can also proceed to calculate the adjusted 𝑅2 (𝑅2Adj.) which allows 
assessing the impact of the massive number of the variables used. 𝑅2Adj. 
= 1 − (ZuÐ
$)∗(TuZ)
(TuNuZ)
 , where n represents the dimension of the sample and k 
the number of variables. Being 14 the "generating" variables used: 
𝑣, 𝑆, 𝑃,𝑀,𝑀Ç, 𝑇, 𝑁Çv, 𝑁\, 𝑝Z, 𝑝j, 𝑠Ç, 𝑠m, 𝐺, 𝐺,  k=14, n =354, the 𝑅2 Adj. is 
equal to 0.975, almost equal to the pure value of 0.976. Below, in figure 9, 
I show the scatter plot for the expected and real values: the blue color 
refers to the new model proposed, whilst the orange refers to the 







































Until now, all models which use political and institutional variables are 
postdictive. Even in Predicting Party Size, the "prediction" of party sizes 





	(2007b, p. 157), applies party 
shares s and 𝑁k in a specific temporal time. If one of the variables in the 
formula was substituted with one from the past (t-1), for example 𝑠Z,() =
𝐹g𝑠Z,uZ + 	ch, 𝑠] would go to fully and truly predict the party shares, 
using 𝑠Z	in t to predict the same in t+1, and then 𝑁k, 𝑁j, and other 𝑠], in 
t+1.  
 
For these reasons, I think it is helpful to study 𝑠Z expressed in new terms 
concerning: the principal past variable 𝑠Z,uZ, the political terms (𝑁j and 
𝑁k) and the institutional terms (MS), both indicated in the previous 
formula with the term c. Like a waterfall, this will imply the possibility 
to improve the electoral simulations, simply by substituting the future 
values in the law of minority attrition obtained in the previous chapter.  
Methodologically, I suggest adding another leg to the "two leg science" 
mentioned in the introduction: "how things are" and "how things should 
be" can be complemented by a third perspective of "how things have 
been". This perspective is represented by the most straightforward 
principle of autoregressive models (Lutkepohl H. Kratzig M., 2004) 
through the “memory of the system”: in this case, in order to obtain sZ, 
the same values of it are used - for each country - in the previous election, 
not only considering sZ,uZ, but also considering other independent 
variables connected to sZ in t, such as the number of parties Nk and Nj, 
applied in the past. Furthermore, the connections between the number 
of parties and sZin t have been implemented.  
 
In the current literature, there are purely postdictive tools given by the 
rules sZ = 	Nju/ = 	NkuZ/j = (𝑀𝑆)uZ/ obtainable from the four 
pillars42, in particular, making the geometric mean between Nju/ and 
 
42 See also (Shugart - Taagepera, 2017, p. 106-7). 
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NkuZ/j. I propose the possibility of obtaining 𝑠Z through a new 
exponential postdictive function of 𝑁k and 𝑁j – parametrizing them – to 
better express sZ than using the simple geometric mean previously 
mentioned, where 𝑅j=62.74 for the function derivable from Taagepera et 
al. writings, and 𝑅j=99.27 for my proposed one. 
 
Nevertheless, I want to set my approach to be much more robust than a 
postdictive one, and I therefore introduce a predictive estimation of 
party seats from the previous elections using a weighted regression with 
independent variables jointly: 1) the product of the assembly size and the 
district magnitude MS, 2) the past values of the biggest party shares 
considered sZ,uZ, and 3) the number of Effective parties and simply 
considered Nk,uZand Nj,uZ. 
 
Here are the passages done. The first step has been to adapt the previous 
improved postdictive function – the exponential one – substituting the 
independent variables 𝑁k and 𝑁j in t-1 (to obtain sZ) in the formula, and 
adjusting it with new parameters, to become predictive. The second step 
has been to include the geometric mean between the previous result and 
sZ,uZ, as higher than sZ,uZor Nk,uZand Nj,uZtaken alone. The third step 
has been to obtain an additive best model that capitalizes the previous 
steps thanks to the pieces of knowledge on the MS product. The final 
result is the embedded model that considers both an additive and 
multiplicative (interaction) of the MS product with the previous ones, 
parametrizing them. 
 
The model obtained is not just a simple time-series of 𝑠Z, because the 
several interactions of the previous political variables – 𝑁j, 𝑁k in  t-1 - 
and the institutional ones - M, S - minimize the variance of the regression 
model. This allows to "institutionalize" political variables that are 
acceptably stable over time like M and S, since they belong to past 
elections and are able to increase their explicative (and predictive) 
power. 
 
In detail, to obtain a prediction, I have suggested not to only consider a 
straightforward geometric mean between the previous variables, for two 
reasons: 
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1) the presence of double (but complementary) 
heteroskedasticity – this means that plotting the previous 
variables, I can observe that: the higher the past value of sZ 
- which is sZ,uZ - for forecast sZ, the higher its error; 
inversely, the lower the MS product, the higher the forecast 
precision of sZ in correspondence of higher values of sZ. 
This methodology provides a specific solution for politics 
to the problem of heteroskedasticity much more simply 
and asymptotically more efficient than other methods 
generally used in econometrics (Arellano - Bond, 1991); 
 
2) to warrant the stability of the variables through time. 
Having tested sZon sZ,uZ, I have noticed that the relative 
scatter plot gets a strange asymmetry in the fitting line, 
suggesting that the anchor points would be [0,0] and [1,1]. 
For this reason I suggest the application of the final model 
with the symmetric regression (Taagepera R. , 2008a, p. 
154-175). This test, reapplied to the other independent 
variable Nj,uZand Nk,uZ in a similar previous final model 
reparametrized, did not improve the final R squared, 
bringing a logical inconsistency of the parameter's values 
respect the expectations of the "number of party" side of the 
equation. For this reason, I decided not to apply the 
symmetric regression. 
 
This cross country analysis allows predicting sZ using its past value, 
Nj,uZ and Nk,uZ (referred to seats), and MS, with an 𝑅j=73.6% 
(𝑅jadj=73.3%), 19.2 percentage points better than Taagepera’s and 
Shugart’s correlation of the simple equation log	(𝑠Z) = log	(𝑀𝑆). 
Furthermore, they only consider 298 cases (Id. (p. 111-2)), making a pick-
up selection of the cases in application of the more stringent Lijphart's 
criteria (1994) in Taagepera and Shugart (2017, p. 112, note 11). Using the 
same dataset (Struthers - Li - Shugart, 2018), my analysis has used the 
whole sample, consisting of 607 cases; this allows generalizing results as 
much as possible, including any limit case and political regimes. 
 
3.2. From the basic tools to a blended model  
 
To build the new model I start from the basics set in the introduction. 
Being S=M, Nk can vary from 1 to S; Nk = √1 ∗ 𝑀 =	√1 ∗ 𝑆 hence, 
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I can now connect Nj to Nk in function of sZ. To do this, I introduce N, 
logically equal to the maximum ponderation of the biggest party share 
sZ such that N =
Z
(!)
,44 implying that N < Nj < Nk. Therefore, I can 
look for sZin function of 𝑁k: 
 





sZ is obtained from Nk through the geometric mean, knowing that the 





Putting to system all the previous passages, as done by Taagepera 




N = (𝑀 ∗ 𝑆)
!
* ⟹ 
sZ = (𝑀 ∗ 𝑆)
uZ 
 





⟹ ¿N = (𝑀 ∗ 𝑆)
Z
À < 𝑁j < ¿(𝑀 ∗ 𝑆)
Z
 = NkÀ 
 
Then, applying again the geometric mean I obtain:  
 
Nj = (𝑀 ∗ 𝑆)






43 (Taagepera R. , 2007b, p. 92,97-8,116-121)  
44 The value is obtained from the formula N3 = [∑(s4)3]
%/(%,3) (Laakso-
Taagepera, 1979, p. 6-7), with 𝑎 → 	∞. 
45 (Taagepera - Shugart R. e., 1993); (Shugart - Taagepera, 2017, p. 106) 
67 
This rounding around the statistical mode of exponents is reasonable 
also in consideration of the empirical test about it 46, finally obtaining the 
"mother" relation: 
N = Nj = 	Nkj = (𝑀 ∗ 𝑆)
!
$  47 
 
Hence if I had to express sZ in function of Nj, it would be sufficient to 
divide the exponent of the product sZ = (MS)N, in which we know k=
−Z

, by the MS product expressing Nj = (𝑀𝑆)N!; I know 𝑘Z to be equal to 
Z
Ö
, therefore the ratio N
N!
 indicates how many times Nj is multiplied to 










 	∗	Ö = Nj
u
 = sZ ⟹ sZ
u
 = Nj	48 
 
Coming back to finding the best postdiction of 𝑠Z possible from 𝑁j, 𝑁k, 
the simplest formula which I can apply is the geometric mean between 
the logical links founded by Taagepera in his publications, as follows: 
 
𝑠Z𝑇𝑎𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎|(Nk, Nj) = 	Î𝑁ju/ ∗ 𝑁kuZ/j 
 
From here I will be using the expression "y|(x)” - as in the formula 
above - to express y conditional to x or, in other words, y in function of 
x. The previous formula means 𝑠Z𝑇𝑎𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎 in function of Nk	𝑎𝑛𝑑	Nj. 
To test this and the following hypotheses introduced, I will be 
managing the same dataset used in Taagepera and Shugart (2017) on a 
nationwide basis - concerning countries - for 974 elections (Struthers - 
Li - Shugart, 2018). I noticed 10 cases for which N2≤N0; this should be 
logically impossible (because of the opposite relation introduced 
before) and I have therefore cleaned the dataset from those; it probably 
happened due to the different data collection sources.  
I obtain the following figure 10: 
 
 
46  (Taagepera R. , 2007b, p. 153) tested on 25 country dates by Liparth. 
47 For a wide discussion, see (Taagepera R. , 2007b, p. 97;154-156;226). 
48 The result is reported by Shugart and Taagepera (2017, p. 107) even though 
through a different equation. 
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⟹ 1 ≥ HH ≥ Z
¡#
, 
deriving from 𝑁k ≥ 𝑁j ≥ 1. 
 
At this point, I propose to create from scratch some other relations to 
test. I can re-start from sZ = Nj
%+
) ⟹ sZ =
Z
¡$@!
, then firstly adjust the 
parameter 

 empirically. Furthermore, the ratio ¡$
¡#
 defined in the 
interval [0,1] could impact the previous formula that expresses s1, 





. On the other hand, for ¡$
¡#
→ 0, this would mean that 
there is too much fragmentation - and then outliers - implying a 
rebalancing of the ratio Z
¡$
, aiming to obtain higher values of this 
simplest ratio; to correct this, I elevate it to the power of ¡$
¡#
.	Finally, I 
have introduced some parametrization for each variable through 𝛼Z, 𝛼j, 
and α, intending to obtain further refinement: 
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The parameters introduced until now are empirically founded through 
the maximum likelihood estimation method, just like the next ones. 
The scatter plot below, the figure 11, confirms empirically that the 
logical model just built can explain sZ in function of Nj and Nk (in a 
postdictive way (t)). 
 
Figure 11 The real 𝑠% on estimated 𝑠%, through the new function of 𝑁& and 𝑁". 
 
 
Even though the simple 𝑅j shown is equal to 99.27%, the 𝑅jadj. is lower, 
equal to 92.1%, having several parameters; it is in any case higher than 
the previous “Taageperian” geometric mean, than can be considered 















At this stage, I can cast into system all the pieces of knowledge, 
translating these from postdictive to predictive (Taagepera R. , 
Predicting Party Sizes, 2007). I can take advantage of the Taageperian 
theory of "two-leg science" (Taagepera R. , 2017, p. 7-11), not just as an 
epistemological science's foundation, but for how it can be used to build 
the model and to test it empirically. This offers proof that this approach 
is valid both for methodological, and empirical and actual applications 
of how it can work better than unidirectional approaches. 
 
Taagepera’s methodology foresees that scientific theories must consider 
two sides: 1) how things are, and 2) how these should be. This 
assumption is related to the fact that we cannot just use an inductivist 
approach to a problem’s resolution because the "science does not start 
from the observation and the induction does not exist" (Antiseri, 2007, 
p. 5-19), because this would mean applying some methodologies in a 
mechanic way without any control. As the epistemologist Kuhn (id. (p. 
255-258)) would have said, doing "normal science" excluding any 
innovation from the start, surely it can work to solve some well-codified 
science problems; however, this may represent an abstract way of doing 
science when we have an unsolved problem or try to enlarge the scope 
of the science.  
 
Moreover, when graphing data some clues could be observed such as 
some strange shapes, distribution, anchor points and forbidden areas; 
generally, this happens when we know something in advance that 
obligates the variables to exist in a specific interval and/or in a specific 
shape. Finally, the existence of specific correlation forms are widely 
under-evaluated among those variables; for instance, the simple 
multiplication of variables called covariate can be replaced by a specific 
mathematical function of correlation between the same variables.  
 
3.3.Final model: introducing past information into the 
blended model  
 
In the specific case of sZ prediction, I suggest adding another leg to “how 
things are” and “how things should be”, introducing the perspective of 
“how things have been”. This perspective concretizes the simplest 
principle of autoregressive models (Lutkepohl H. Kratzig M., 2004) to 
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check whether the previous sZvalues of the previous election	gsZ,uZh in 
the same country, if this exists, can express the current ones, as follow: 
 
sZ|sZ,uZ = sZ,uZ 
 
In the same way, we can re-propose the postdictive formula sZ|(Nj, Nk), 
applying that to the past values (Nj, Nk)uZ of Nj, Nk. This represents 
another side, showing how things should be on the logical ground 
because of the logical properties introduced constructing the sZ|(Nj, Nk) 
index.  













I now test whether the geometric mean of the formula of “how things 
have been” with “how things should be”, yields a stronger prediction 
of the simple ones considered singularly.  
 







The empirical tests below - Table 5 - show that sZ|(sZ, Nj, Nk)uZ 
effectively gets a more substantial predictive power of the simple MS 
product, as reported in Shugart and Taagepera (2017, p. 112): the former 
obtains an 𝑅j adj. of 63.6% (in model 4), whilst the latter obtains an 𝑅j 
(not adjusted) of 54.4%. Furthermore, it widens the sample to include 
all cases available in the dataset, without making a pick-up selection of 
cases (ibid., note 11) in the application of the Lijphart’s criteria (1994). 
This also allows generalizing results as much as possible, to include any 
limit case49.  
 
 
49Because of this case selection, the present 𝑅& is equal to 33.2% instead of the 
Shugart and Taagepera's 54.4% (2017, p. 112); however, the present sample is 
755 cases, respect their sample count of 298. 
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The higher strength of the methodology behind sZ|(sZ, Nj, Nk)uZ respect 
MS product, could also be explained through the Fermi's Piano Tuners 
estimation experiment (Taagepera R. , 2015, p. 215-219), which 
reasonably approximates how many piano tuners are there in the city 
of New York (id. (p. 216)) thanks to the connections among connections 
of variables, producing an interlocking relationship (id. (p. 89-95)). 
 













VARIABLES Log(s1) Log(s1) Log(s1) Log(s1) Log(s1) Log(s1) 
       
Log	(s!/s!,#$!0  0.761***   0.676***  
  (0.0220)   (0.0262)  
Log	(s!|(N%, N&)#$!)   0.257***    
   (0.00706)    
𝐿𝑜𝑔(s!|(s!, N%, N&)#$!)    0.305***  0.283*** 
    (0.00824)  (0.0102) 
Log (MS) 0.111***    0.0373*** 0.0310*** 
 (0.00577)    (0.00509) (0.00521) 
Constant 0.0356** 0.0893*** 0.0593*** 0.0567*** -0.0132 0.00797 
 (0.0168) (0.00827) (0.00871) (0.00864) (0.0125) (0.0125) 
       
Observations 755 874 785 785 681 614 





2 1 2 3 3 5 
R-squared adj. 0.330 0.578 0.628 0.636 0.662 0.711 
 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Figure 12 𝑠% in function of logged (𝑠%, 𝑁&, 𝑁")@,%. 
 
Figure 13 𝑠% in function of logged MS product. 
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The figure 13 above shows that the lower the MS product, the higher 
the precision in forecasting sZ, which corresponds to higher values of  
sZ. Inversely, the figure 14 below shows that the higher sZ,uZ, the higher 
the error in forecasting sZ:  
 
Figure 14𝑠% in function of logged 𝑠%,@,%. 
 
This highlights a problem of complementary heteroskedasticity in 
predicting sZ. Therefore, I propose a new model to overcome such 
problem, blending 𝑀𝑆 and (sZ)uZ to more accurately predict sZ in 
function of those. 
 
It is a good moment to clarify the use of logarithmic expressions and 
functions in these models. Beta coefficients used in basic regressions are 
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simple variable impact weights. When models include covariates, 
logarithms are needed to determine weights of covariate’s variables, 
preventatively calculated individually through logarithmic equations. 
For this reason, both 𝑀𝑆, (sZ)uZ, and later Nj, Nk, and all related 
covariates, will be logged when appropriate.  
 
To develop my blended model, I multiply each variable for its 
respective logical weights, defined in function of the accuracy of the 
prediction returned by the opposite variable. 
 
I start with 𝑀𝑆, (sZ)uZ only, and later expand to include (sZ, Nj, Nk)uZ 
in order to confirm the added value of the two-leg regressor 
(sZ, Nj, Nk)uZ. 
log	(sZ)|𝑀𝑆, (sZ)uZ
= 	𝛽Zlog	(𝑀𝑆)	∗ 	log	(	sZ|(sZ)uZ)
+ 𝛽jlog	(sZ|(sZ)uZ)(1 −𝑀𝑆uk.ZZZ)Z.j 
 
I also introduce a covariate of covariate variable: 
 




log	(sZ)|𝑀𝑆, (sZ)uZ = 
𝛽Z𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑀𝑆) ∗ log	(sZ|(sZ)uZ) + 𝛽j𝑙𝑜𝑔(sZ|(sZ)uZ)(1 −𝑀𝑆uk.ZZZ)Z.j
+ 𝛽𝑐𝑜𝑣𝑠 
log	(sZ)|𝑀𝑆, (sZ, Nj, Nk)uZ = 
𝛽𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑀𝑆) ∗ log	(sZ|(sZ, Nj, Nk)uZ)
+ 𝛽®𝑙𝑜𝑔(sZ|(sZ, Nj, Nk)uZ)(1 −𝑀𝑆uk.ZZZ)Z.j 
 
It is now possible to introduce another covariate variable: 
 
Covf = 𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑀𝑆) ∗ 	log	(sZ|(sZ, Nj, Nk)uZ)
∗ 𝑙𝑜𝑔(sZ|(sZ, Nj, Nk)uZ)(1 −𝑀𝑆uk.ZZZ)Z.j 
log	(sZ)|𝑀𝑆, (𝑠Z, 𝑁j, 𝑁k)uZ = 
𝛽𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑀𝑆) ∗ 	log	(𝑠Z|(sZ, Nj, Nk)uZ)
+ 𝛽®𝑙𝑜𝑔(sZ|(sZ, Nj, Nk)uZ)(1 −𝑀𝑆uk.ZZZ)Z.j + 𝛽Ö𝑐𝑜𝑣𝑓 
 
Table 6 below shows the tests of these further models.  
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Table 6 Correlation models of 𝑠% in function of MS product, 𝑠%,@,%, 𝑁&,@,%	and 𝑁",@,%, 
logged and not 
 (Model 7) (Model 8) (Model 9) (Model 10) 
VARIABLES Log(s1) Log(s1) Log(s1) Log(s1) 
     
𝐿𝑜𝑔(𝑀𝑆) ∗ 
𝑙𝑜𝑔(s%|(s%, N&, N")@,%) 
  -0.0836*** -0.0991*** 
   (0.0108) (0.0130) 
𝐿𝑜𝑔(s%|(s%, N&, N")@,%) ∗ 
(1 −𝑀𝑆,".%%%)%.& 
  1.835*** 1.973*** 
   (0.171) (0.183) 
covf    -0.00646** 
    (0.00302) 
𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑀𝑆) ∗ log	(s%|(s%)@,%) -0.0795*** -0.0773***   
 (0.0151) (0.0130)   
𝑙𝑜𝑔(s%|(s%)@,%)(1
−𝑀𝑆,".%%%)%.& 
1.818*** 1.800***   
 (0.214) (0.204)   
covs -0.00115    
 (0.00406)    
Constant -0.112*** -0.110*** -0.0849*** -0.101*** 
 (0.0104) (0.00772) (0.00802) (0.0108) 
     
Observations 672 672 607 607 
R-squared 0.689 0.689 0.734 0.736 
n° variables and 
parameters 
(excluded constants) 
5 4 6 7 
R-squared adj. 0.687 0.687 0.731 0.733 
 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
𝛽 coefficients before the asterisks 
  
I apply a counter proof to theoretically and empirically confirm the 
strength of the simple geometric mean of the two-leg regressor used to 
build the model sZ|(sZ, Nj, Nk)uZ. We can empirically test whether a 
parametrization of both (sZ|(sZ)uZ) and (sZ|(Nj, Nk)uZ) allows the 
scatters to fit the anchor points [0,0] and [1,1] respectively, and correct 
the asymmetries shown in the graph below – figure 15 - as much as 
possible. This produces a better model (number 10, considering the 
𝑅j	𝑎𝑑𝑗. ), and helps me verify whether the parametrization is consistent 
with the logical expected one. 
 
I notice an odd asymmetry in the fitting line of the sZ on sZ,uZ graph 
reported above: the logical expectation of the scatter’s fitting line would 
present the anchor points of [0,0] and [1,1], however the actual line is 
77 
rotated above the anchor point [0,0] hinged on the barycenter which I am 
introducing below.  
 
Hence I apply the tool of symmetric regression (Taagepera R. , 2008a, p. 
154-175) to the original fitting line, obtaining sZ,uZ = sZ: 
 
Figure 15 The 𝑠% symmetric regression lines 𝑠%,@,% =	𝑠%, obtained from 𝑠% on 𝑠%,@,% 
and 𝑠%,@,% on 𝑠%. 
  
 
The line resulting from this application has the property to pass across 
the intersection of sZ on sZ,uZ and sZ,uZ on sZ. Its angular coefficient is 
defined as B = ±(bbáá)j. 50 The b'' value is determined as the inverse of 
 















the angular coefficient b', belonging to the regression line of sZ,uZ on sZ, 
and the angular coefficient b, belonging to the regression line of sZ on 
sZ,uZ (which is the actual regression line). 
 
Table 7 Regression’s coefficients 𝑠% on 𝑠%,@.% and 𝑠%,@,% on 𝑠%, building the symmetric 
regression 𝑠%,@,% =	𝑠% 
 (15) Empirical  Empirical 
VARIABLES s! s!,#$! s! 
    
s!,#$!	(𝑏) 0.725***   
 (0.0228)   
s!(𝑏')  0.742***  
  (0.0233)  
s!,#$!9𝑏'' = 1 𝑏'< = 
  1
0.742< = 1.35 
    
Constant 0.123*** 0.128*** −0.128
0.742< = −0.173 
 (0.0113) (0.0114)  
    
Observations 874 874  
R-squared 0.537 0.537  
 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Hence, the angular coefficient of the symmetric regression 𝐵 = ±√𝑏𝑏áá  is 
equal to 𝐵 = ±√1.35 ∗ 0.725 = 0.989. I can calculate the ratio between B 
and 1 (here logically determined), as the logical multiplicative factor of 
discard of the model, äÇiXv
³åæçèé(êëìåíçêêî)
= 	𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑎𝑟𝑑	𝐹𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟 (Cfr. 
(Taagepera R. , 2007, p. 168, 288; 2015, p. 38-9), k.ïï
Z
	= 0.989,	implying 
that the Actual value B is off by a factor of ×÷ 1.1 percentage points 
(multiplied or divided by 1.1 percentage points). 
 
To determine the constant (A) which matches B as follows: sZ = 𝐵sZ,uZ +
𝐴, I cast into system the two specular regression lines with the aim to 
identify their intersection point and superimpose the passage across that, 
as follows:  
 
sZ = 0.725sZ,uZ + 0.123 = 1.35sZ,uZ − 0.173 ⟹ 	0.625sZ,uZ = 	0.296 ⟹ 
	sZ,uZ = 0.474 ⟹	sZ = 1.35 ∗ 0.474 − 0.173	 = 0.467	 ⟹ 
sZ = 𝐵sZ,uZ + 𝐴 ⟹ 	0.467	 = 0.989 ∗ 0.474	 + 𝐴	 ⟹ 	𝐴 = 	0.00179 ⟹ 
	sZ,m] = 0.989sZ,uZ + 0.00179 
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On the other hand, sZ on (Nj, Nk)uZ presents some exponential 
asymmetry with an expected exponent <1 (Taagepera R. , 2008a, p. 95-
102), as suggested by the graph below, the figure 16: 
 
Figure 16 𝑠% estimated in function of 𝑁&,@,% and 𝑁",@,%. 
 
Looking at (sZ|(sZ)uZ), I considered the refitting for a symmetric 
regression (Cfr. (Taagepera R. , 2008a, p. 154-175; 2015, p. 142-148)) 
obtaining a straight line, and then a (hypothetical) better fitting of the 
scatter throughout the anchor points [0,0] and [1,1], thus obtaining 
gsZò(sZ)uZ,m]h = 0.989sZ,uZ + 	0.00179.  
 
To resolve the exponential asymmetry in (sZ|(Nj, Nk)uZ), I can apply the 
simplest form of parametrisation 𝑥ó since the biggest curvature of the 
scatter is near the origin [0,0] (Taagepera (2008a, p. 97-99; 2015, p. 66-82)), 
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allowing the scatter to also fit the anchor points [0,0] and [1,1]  (blue lines 
in the previous respective graphs), thus obtaining: 











sZ|gsZ,åæ, (Nj, Nk)óhuZ = 











Nevertheless, to obtain the final formula I apply a maximization of the 
𝑅j through 𝜔 – because it is the only free parameter I can manipulate; 
gsZò(sZ)uZ,m]h has to respect the angular coefficient and the constant to 
hit the anchor points shown before.  
 
sZ|gsZ,åæ, (Nj, Nk)óhuZ = 











With surprise, the parameter 𝜔 obtained is 1.15, greater than 1, and not 
less than 1, as I was expecting from the graph, therefore logically 
inconsistent. Furthermore, the 𝑅j	𝑎𝑑𝑗. has not reported any 
improvements (-0.1 %), as shown in Table 8 below. 
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Table 8 Comparison between the best model of 𝑠% in function of MS product, 
𝑠%,@,%, 𝑁&,@,%	and 𝑁",@,% (logged and not), and the symmetric regression of the same 
 (Model 10) (Model 11) 
Symmetric 
+ parametrisation 
VARIABLES Log(s1) Log(s1) 
   
𝐿𝑜𝑔(𝑀𝑆) ∗ 
𝑙𝑜𝑔(s!|(s!, N%, N&)#$!) 
-0.0991***  
 (0.0130)  
𝐿𝑜𝑔(s!|(s!, N%, N&)#$!) ∗ 
(1 − 𝑀𝑆$&.!!!)!.% 
1.973***  
 (0.183)  
covf -0.00646**  
 (0.00302)  
𝐿𝑜𝑔(𝑀𝑆) ∗ 
𝑙𝑜𝑔 
9s!KLs!,)*+, (N%, N&),0#$!= 
 -0.0918*** 
  (0.0120) 
𝑙𝑜𝑔 
9s!KLs!,)*+, (N%, N&),0#$!=* 
(1 − 𝑀𝑆$&.!!!)!.% 
 1.824*** 
  (0.168) 
Covf (sim,	𝜔)  -0.00556** 
  (0.00256) 
Constant -0.101*** -0.0996*** 
 (0.0108) (0.0109) 
   
Observations 607 607 
R-squared 0.736 0.736 
n° variables and parameters 
(excluded constants) 
7 8 
R-squared adj. 0.733 0.732 
 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
𝛽 coefficients before the asterisks 
 
For these reasons, I choose number 10 as the best model.  
 
Below, I show the scatter plots - the figures 15 and 16 - representing: 1) 
the real on fitted values logged, 2) the real values, not logged, on fitted 
values, logged, and 3) the real and the fitted values, both not logged. 
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Figure 17 Scatter plot of the real on fitted values of logged 𝑠%, of the best model of 𝑠% in 
the function of MS product, 𝑠%,@,%, 𝑁&,@,%	and 𝑁",@,%, logged and not. 
 
Figure 18 Scatter plot of the real 𝑠% on fitted values of 𝑙𝑜𝑔	(𝑠%), of the best model of 𝑠% 




In order to obtain sZ as the dependent variable, I must apply the 
definition of logarithm, since the variable is currently expressed in 
logarithmic terms. Knowing that the logarithm is the exponent to give 
the base in order to obtain the argument, I can obtain sZ from the complex 
log model: 
 
𝑙𝑜𝑔(sZ) = 𝐹𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒𝑠(𝑚𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑙𝑥) ⟹ sZ = 10õ]¯cXvi¯m(w¯vö) 
 
As represented in the following graph, the figure 19: 
 
Figure 19 Scatter plot of the real on fitted values of 𝑠%, of the best model of 𝑠% in the 





Widening the considerations made in this chapter, a practical future 
application is a machine-learning methodology that goes to minimize the 
variance of the regression’s model, allowing to “institutionalize” 
political variables, because these are stable over time. I propose to take 
into consideration not only the past values of the variables themselves, 
but each political variable’s average considering the previous values 
belonging to at least 2-3 previous elections and/or at least 10 years from 
the value to be predicted. The specific rule to adopt is found empirically, 
such that these values have gone on to produce variations of their mean 
values lower than 5% (similarly to a confidence interval) through time. 
This chapter theorizes and formalizes the connections among 𝑠m, 𝑠m,njm, 
𝑁o,njm, 𝑁p,njm and MS, supporting a more accurate description and 
prediction of the party system at both national and district levels. 
Nevertheless, as said in the introduction, the base research provides tools 
- as in this case - which could still have unknown applications. What has 
emerged from this paper could be applied to: a simple description of a 
party system, the impact on the Gallagher dis-representation 𝐷j, the 
block Thresholds T, or the Cabinet duration C (Taagepera R. , 2007) 
(Shugart - Taagepera, 2017). These could have an impact on finding 
optimal indexes of disproportionality 𝑛j and the optimal values for M 
and S. Moreover, the learnings from this paper could be applied to make 
predictions of parties using historical data, which remains still 
unexplored for each party's share. Another suggested use could be to 
apply the function at national level to circumscriptions or district level 

























When I speak about statistical distribution in general, the mind goes to 
the gaussian shape. If we think of the party shares, the repetition of 
similar party shares in a party system configures a specific frequency, 
which is usually represented by a gaussian curve; however, this poses a 
limit since gaussians curves exist in the interval [-∞,+∞], whereas party 
shares are defined in the interval [0,1]. 
 
This would require a different distribution curve, such as the Eulerian 
Beta distribution. However, like the gaussian, this distribution over-
imposes a unimodal51 shape that could be a good approximation for how 
many parties I will come across in correspondence of a possible party 
share, but this is just a mathematical approximation. 
 
To overcome these limitations, starting from the political variables seen 
until now, it would be interesting to obtain a continuous function able to 
catch a prevailing party above the average or a group of small parties 
below it. For this purpose, I have applied a new theoretical function to 
the respective party systems of sixteen countries, revealing how the 
distributions of several countries’ party shares do not follow a unimodal 
shape. 
 
This is an advancement in the base statistical research, but it can have 
possible political applications. For example, taking districts into 
considerations, and substituting their N and 𝑁k, this new function can 
output the number of seats allotted to each party at the district's level, 
enriching the composite indicators that describe the district's dimension 
in the intraparty dimension of representation, as done until now (Cfr. 
(Shugart - Taagepera, 2017, p. 236-258)). Another application of this 
function can be to evaluate the asymmetry among the parties’ shares and 
then allow the calculus' implementation of the cabinet’s life, improving 
the current R-squared between the actual and the predicted cabinet's life. 
 
51 A function is unimodal if it is monotone (then being the second derivative 
positive or negative, the curve appears respectively bent toward the up or down), 




In practical terms, in order to obtain the proposed probability density 
function, I derive a cumulative function, obtained from the sigmoid law 
of minority attrition (introduced when formalizing the correlation 
between seats and votes), in which the exponent will be another function 
of N and 𝑁k. I have calculated a graphical barycentre E, which is the 
expected value of the average party share, which 𝑠Z and the group of 
minor parties are equidistant from, if these are distinguishable by E. I am 
introducing the Field and Grofman standard deviation (2007, p. 105), 
given N and 𝑁k, as a new tool supporting the build of the new statistical 
function. 
 
The result obtained will be a density probability function with two-to-
five inflection points, defined by the following variables: 
 
1) s, which is the independent variable represented by all possible 
percentage of seats that can be allotted (defined from 0 to 1 
(100%)); 
 
2) 𝑓¯£ (in the final aggregated formulation), which is the 
dependent variable, indicating how frequent that allotment is for 
the respective s (defined from 0 to infinite); 
 
3) the redefined constant n, which is itself a function of N and 𝑁k. 
 
For example, if three parties get the same percentage of seats allotted at 
the national level, then I have three parties each with 33,3M% of seats; 
therefore, the cumulative function of 𝑓¯£, which I call 𝑓Çi, must be: 𝑓Çi 
equal to 0 for 0<s<33,3M%, equal to 1 for 33,3M%<s<1, and equal to 0.5 for 
s= 33,3M%.  
 
4.2. Party system fragmentation: from the literature to the 
new perspective. 
 
In addition to the HH, F and N formulations above, I introduce a new 
relation by Feld and Grofman (2007, p. 105) to analytically describe the 
party system, putting a given variance σj in relation with the nominal 
number of party Nk and HH (therefore Nj).52 Their model can be 
summarized as follows:  
 
52 In the original paper, N" appears named as the variable n, and N& is introduced 
through the HH index. 
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• µ = Z
¡#		
 [0,1] 
• σj	[0,0.25] ⟹ σ	[0,0.5] 
 
Starting from this point, it is helpful to estimate the expected value E for 
the biggest party share 𝑠Z. It will be sufficient to take the formula of 𝑠Z 
expressed in function of N and Nk (both in t) from the previous chapter, 
potentially substituting the 𝑠Z prediction, when needed. 
 
I calculate a graphical barycenter E, which both the smaller parties and 
𝑠Z would be equidistant from. On average, E represents the point of the 
ideal-typical party share of a given party system; it needs to be defined 
through a more complex approach than just the reciprocal of N, since the 
standard deviation, and then, the asymmetries need to also be taken into 
account. For example, on one hand, in a system characterized by more 
numerous small parties (as small as to be not relevant) than bigger ones, 
E switches towards 𝑠Z first, then along the x-axis of the parties’ shares 
existence [0,1] towards the right. On the other hand, with an infinite 
number of parties ( Nk → ∞ ), the center of gravity E would logically tend 
to translate to the left since the more parties, the less the expected value 
of the party shares of the party system; with more parties to distribute 







I formalize the limits and noteworthy points both logically founded, with 
a unique and comprehensive function which I can be sure will satisfy 





𝐸 = 0 
2) lim
¡#qZ
𝐸 	= 	1, and any value of Nj becomes irrelevant 
3) lim
¡#qj
𝐸 	= 	0.5, and any value of Nj becomes irrelevant 
4) the higher Nk, the most E tends to 
Z
¡$
 because of the outliers' 




























I have imagined two monomers, which compose E from two limit points 
Nk and Nj, considered in their reciprocal values to produce parties’ 
shares. In addition, in compliance with point number 4 above, I have 
introduced other elements as "activation compensative weights", so that 
the higher Nk, the more E will tend to Nj; knowing that Nk is always 
greater than Nj, 
¡
¡k
exists between 0 and 1, resulting in as a simple 
reasonable weight for Z
¡k
 as possible. Its complement, 1 − ¡$
¡#
, represents 
the weight for Z
¡j
. Finally, to satisfy points number 2 and 3, the following 
exponent ¡#uj
¡#
 needs to be used. 
Moreover, the average expected value of the minority parties’ shares will 
be given by: 
 
𝐸$u	þC = 𝐸 − 	𝜎$ 
The 𝜎$, or simply 𝜎, is not a fully independent variable because it is the 
result of the previously shown inverse relation by Field and Grofman 








Therefore, the only independent variables will be Nk and Nj. 
Being 𝜎 defined in [0,0.5] in absolute terms, I can impose a further 




; this derives from the fact that 𝑁k ≥














4.3. Synthesizing the party system continuously 
 
At this point, I can start thinking about a most straightforward normal 
statistical distribution function, in which the ideal share is the most 
frequent and symmetrical: the higher the frequency and the symmetry, 
the lower the probability of having smaller or bigger parties in the 
system, given the same distance from HH. I can now introduce a new 
hypothesis: being the parties randomly distributed, they could present 
asymmetries (Doane D.P. Seward L.E., 2011). 
 
Scenarios with a sizeable standard deviation53 will make the normal 
distribution function inefficient in describing a given system. Therefore, 
I want to propose a function with more anchor points54 such that it fits 
asymmetric scenarios as best as possible. I define these anchor-points as 
two new operative terms over HH, where: 
 
a) the ideal share of small parties (ISP) exists as the average of parties 
having a dimension between 0 and a proxy of HH, 
 
b) the ideal share of the biggest party (IMP) is the average of parties 
between HH and 1 (100%). 
 
Their frequencies find interesting applications. For example, minority 
parties and bigger ones have a function of blackmailing and stabilization 
of the political system respectively; these frequencies can help identify 
the impact on these ideal points as well as determine the government 
duration (when considered jointly with the asymmetries of the function 
that we are defining), contributing to an advancement of relative studies. 
Other applications could be to more precisely calculate the effect of the 
block threshold and to solve the open problem of how to predict the 
average seat allocation in a district55.  
 
The model can be applied diachronically and synchronically to a party 
system, allowing comparison and forecasting that can help better 
understand and identify the asymmetry in the distribution, with 
unknown applications, as typical of all base researches	(Antiseri, 2007). 
Hence, I can plug three different indicators in the model:  
 
 
53 For example, a system made of numerous small parties (2-5%) and one with 
60%. 
54 (Taagepera R. , 2008a, p. 35-38, 107-110). 
55 Discussion done with R.Taagepera on December 11th, 2018. 
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1) a proxy of HH, ISP, and IMP, equal to the relevant ideal values 
of the party system, times; 
 
2) the frequency and the probability with which they occur, and 
then weighting for; 
 
3) their effective incidence on the system.  
 
I need to develop some further tools to get to a formalization of the 
model. The cumulative function (𝑓Çi) of party shares can be derived 
into a function (𝑓¯£), representing the probability density that indicates 
the frequency to have a specific share in each system. The domain of the 
density function ranges from 0 to 1 (100%); the relative codomain - the y-
axis existence - can assume any positive value (being a frequency) such 
that the summation of all of these values is equal to the probability (0 to 
1) to find those shares.  
 
The main innovation in this approach is to work in four dimensions. In 
the publications following the first work of 1979, Taagepera (2007; 2008a) 
uses 𝑁juZ to express the average percentage or ideal share that “matters” 
in a given party system, in order to predict the biggest party 𝑝Z and also 
the others, but only discretely and with a wide range of approximation. 
My density function will be able to identify how frequent a share is in 
each system, pushing the boundaries of the existing literature on the 
argument56. Feld and Grofman57 propose an average value and variance, 
finding an exact relation between Nj and Nk through σj, which I will 
leverage in the model, to find the probability of occurrence - 𝑓¯£ - of each 
party share in the system. These are the four dimensions I am working 
with. 
 
Analytically, if there are no asymmetries in the party system, I can apply 
Taagepera’s 58 law of minority attrition in a new capacity in order to 
determine the cumulative distribution function 𝑓Çi.  
 
56 For example, when N assumes value 4, the literature cannot clarify if it 
indicates four parties with the same share or six parties with shares: 35%, 30%, 
15%, 10%, 5%, and 5%.  
57 (2007, p. 105) 
58 (2007b, p. 207-209; 2008a, p. 107-110) 
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In the graph below I show the graphical feature of 𝑓¯£ – the figure 21 - 
in correspondence of  𝑓Çi – the figure 20 -. The green dashed line 
corresponds to HH. 
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Figure 20 Cumulative distribution function 𝑓<BC for: 𝑛 = 4,𝑁" = 2,𝑁& = 2. 
 
         





























Figure 21 Probability density function 𝑓8DE for parties: 𝑛 = 4,𝑁" = 2,𝑁& = 2. 
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According to the theories presented until now, the above function 𝑓Çi 
could describe the party system in any political system. The possible 
shares are on the x-axis, while the sum of the shares empirically 
predicted are on the y-axis. However, a more articulated 𝑓Çi , with five 
inflection points and only three independent variables, can better help 
visually catch the asymmetries occurring in the real scenarios.  
Starting from the proposed generalization of the law of minority 
attrition, presented in the introduction: 
s = 	
v½
v½ + (Nj − 1)Zu½(1 − v)½
 
It is possible to get 𝑓¯£ by deriving the formula above by v. All 
derivation passages are in the chapter 4 appendix at the end of the last 
chapter; the final solution is: 
𝑓¯£ 	= 	
n ∗ (Nj − 1)TtZ(−(v − 1)v)TuZ
((Nj − 1)Tv½ + (1 − v)½(Nj − 1))j
 
A crucial property of 𝑓¯£ is that ∫ 𝑓¯£ = 1
Z
k . 
I can then imagine a final probability density function as the sum of three 
𝑓¯£ built in correspondence of 𝐸m! = 𝑠Z, another in 𝐸$u	þC, and the final 
in E. 
𝑓¯£	"]TXv = 	𝑓¯£	g𝐸m!h + 𝑓¯£	(𝐸) + 𝑓¯£	g𝐸$u	þCh 
The substitution of 𝑓¯£(𝑖) by 𝑁j, is equal to 
Z
$D
, as already shown. The 
bigger the parameter n, the thinner the area (on the x-asis) of 𝑓¯£.  
I must introduce the weights w, defined in [0,1], which are equal to the 
product of E with respectively HH, ISP, and IMP. 
Therefore, I must apply the geometric means to obtain each n of 𝑓¯£ of 
the formula above, using the already introduced variables.  
The following passages lead to the final function. 
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𝑤$uþC = Î𝐸$u	þC ∗ 𝑝$uþC 
𝑤$ = 𝐸 ∗ 𝑝$ 
𝑤mZ = Î𝐸 ∗ 𝑝þE!  





































I already know that: 
𝜎$ = 𝑠Z − 𝐸	,	(𝑑𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑑	𝑖𝑛	[0,0.5]); 
𝐸m! = 𝑠Z 
I can express the standard deviation on the smaller and biggest party 
using the following geometric mean: 
𝜎mZ = 𝜎$uþC = Õ
0.5 − 𝜎$
2 ∗ ¿0.25 −
0.5 − 𝜎$
2 À 
The final weights w will be respectively calculated on the previous ones. 
 
$𝑤𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑠 = Î𝐸$u	þC ∗ 𝑝$uþC +𝐸 ∗ 𝑝$ + Î𝐸 ∗ 𝑝þE!  
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Following the law of probability of independent events, in which each 
member has domain [0,1] I can write: 
 


























































Below in Table 9 are shown the applications of this statistical function for 
each of the 16 countries which are in common across the following 
sources (Taagepera R. , Parsimonious Model for Predicting Mean 
Cabinet Duration On the Basis of Electoral System, 2010, p. 270); 




Table 9 Noteworthy political variables for 16 countries. Sources: (Taagepera R. , 2010, 
p. 270), (2007b, p. 288, 291); and my elaborations. 
country 𝑁k 𝑁j Actual 
















3.7 2.22 0.51 0.812 
NEW ZELAND 
(1890-1996) 
3.5 1.96 0.57 0.815 
CANADA 
(1878-1993) 
4.4 2.37 0.56 0.878 
USA 
(1878-1993) 
2.5 2.40 0.62 0.637 
UK 
(1922-1997) 
6.4 2.11 0.53 0.792 
LUXEMBOURG 
(1919-1999) 
5.5 3.36 0.41 0.840 
JAPAN 
(1928-1996) 
10 3.71 0.54 0.829 
NORWAY 
(1945-1997) 
6.3 3.35 0.47 0.823 
IRELAND 
(1922-1997) 
8.2 2.84 0.48 0.828 
PORTUGAL 
(1975-2002) 
6.9 3.33 0.43 0.821 
MALTA 
(1947-1987) 
3.2 1.99 0.53 0.776 
SPAIN 
(1977-2004) 
12.8 2.76 0.5 0.801 
FINLAND 
(1907-2003) 
6.8 5.03 0.27 0.869 
SWEDEN 
(1948-1994) 
5.7 3.33 0.47 0.830 
ITALY 
(1895-1994) 







































Figure 22 shows the probability density functions of 16 countries. The x-
axis represents party shares, by definition existing from 0 to 1, and the y-
axis represents the relative frequencies, always greater than or equal to 
0.  
 
At a first glance, these graphs show the relative frequencies by each party 
share, in a comprehensive way, synthesizing a given party system. 
Considering the proportions between the y-axis values, I can visually 
estimate what are the proportions between the product of the number of 
parties and any x-axis party share, occurring in a specific country’s party 
system. What does comprehensive mean? This means that the relative 
frequency shown represents the summation of the occurrence of all 
parties having the same party share in common.  
 
Being a probability density function, there is not an instant way to count 
exactly the number of parties by party share, since the infinitesimal 
frequency by party share is measured instead. This is in fact useful to 
calculate a much stable and precise measure of any range of party shares, 
and not of a single or specified party share for example for a single 
election.  
 
Why not a discrete measure? Suppose to analyze the US distribution 
(1878-1993). Table 9 reports sZ as equal to 0.62, although in figure 22 there 
is a pick around the point with abscissa 0.42. Looking with more 
attention to the graph, it is possible to recognize a homogeneous 
bending59 of the curve in the range of points with abscissa from around 
0.5 to 0.7. This means that even though a value with abscissa 0.62 exists 
on average, there is an asymmetry (skewness) such that the mode (but 
also the median value) does not overlap with the average. This happens 
in almost all cases. 
 
In case of a simple histogram, with absolute frequencies on the y-axis, 
and the party shares on the x-axis, it would be simply impossible to 
depict the average “ideal-typical” party shares in an interval of time. For 
example, it would be impossible to represent in a single histogram, with 
summation of frequencies equal to 100, the summary of results of two 
consecutive elections for the following two-party systems: A: 40%, 30%, 
20%, 10%; and B: 40%, 30%, 30%; in particular, some challenges would 
be: how to allocate a party with a 10% or a 20% share in scenario A in an 
“average” with the first or second party with a 30% share in scenario B? 
What kind of average to apply? Which procedure to use in order to 
organize these averages?  
 
 
59 having a similar second derivative. 
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A party system in a certain election could be indeed represented using a 
histogram - as before settled - however, determining how party shares 
are distributed on average would be meaningless for whatever 
probabilistic calculus, because without a probability density function it 
is by definition impossible to extend a specific scenario to the other party 
shares because it is just as an instantaneous picture. For example, with 
reference to previous scenario A, if I wanted to evaluate the probability 
of a block threshold impacting on the party system, I would need to 
know the probability that such party system would produce a share from 
0 to 10%, requiring use of this new probability density function, as 
nothing would be said by a histogram representing a specific scenario of 
that system. 
 
The last step is to determine how to practically calculate the probability 
that parties exist and how many within a certain x-axis interval. This will 
be simply done calculating the defined integral of the new probability 
function in that interval, and then dividing this integral value by the 
integral from 0 to 1 of the same new probability density function. 
Furthermore, in order to calculate the number of parties existing for this 
party share interval, I divide this last result by the average party share in 
the same interval.  
 
In addition to estimating the impact of block threshold as mentioned 
above, another application of the five inflection point model could be to 
evaluate the general asymmetry among parties’ shares, derived from this 
function, thus allowing the calculus implementation of the cabinet’s life, 
using such asymmetry as exponential corrective to the effective number 
of parties in Taagepera’s cabinet life formula. Some further 
considerations are drawn in chapter ten. 
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Chapter 5  
 





This chapter aims to answer the question: how is it possible to better 
understand - quantitatively - the left-right parties' collocations on the 
ideological continuum? The answer to this question is crucial to 
understand if there are some uncovered ideological spaces that could 
represent a potential source of votes increase. It can also help identify the 
possibility of present and future alliances among parties for election 
purposes, as well as to improve cabinet formation and duration models. 
It could also be used to evaluate the game theory maximization of the 
electoral system, not only in function of political and institutional terms 
but also in terms of ideological cleavage.  
 
This chapter introduces the Eulerian Beta curve to illustrate the 
ideological party's positioning, as never done before. Therefore, it can be 
considered a "buffer" chapter, establishing one of the propaedeutic 
indicators of the following two chapters. 
 
My aim is to find a simplified unimodal function that can identify the 
ideological influence areas for each party. It is not possible to use the 
non-monotonic function (multi-picks) shown in the previous chapter, 
since it is not unimodal: it would be misleading to have multiple picks 
of the ideological influence areas for each party without understanding 
its "core business". 
 
Here I present a revised model to quantify and simplify the ideological 
function describing the left-right space occupied by any party. The 
unparalleled operative tools used are beta functions, which will improve 
the most recent approaches (Adams - Merrill III - Grofman J. -S.-B., 2001, 
p. 15-51). This will simplify the calculus around the interaction of the 
ideological positioning with the electoral mechanics, as shown in the 
following chapters. 
 
In order to identify the party positioning, I have sourced the values of 
electors' self-positioning on the left-right continuum from the post-
electoral Italian database ITANES  (1948 - 2013) from 1994-2013. Firstly, 
I register that in the 2013's election, more than 80% of electors located 
themselves on the left-right continuum, confirming that the stability of 
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the ideological identification through time is constant at 98.8%. Secondly, 
I apply the Beta probability density function to the self-positioning 
values, grouping these by party. This results in a unique beta function 
by party (by election and chamber) through the parameters alpha and 
beta characterizing the Eulerian Beta function. 
 
5.2 The theoretical model  
  
As a first step, I want to check if there is any electors' self-positioning on 
the left-right continuum; if so, and in absence of any trends of large 
fluctuation, then I can consider the ideological positioning of the parties 
meaningful together with the positional party competition and the 
connection with electoral flows, respectively shown in the next two 
chapters.  
 
I then present the percentages of respondents who declared a placement 
in the left-right axis sourced from the surveys ITANES (1948 - 2013) in 
the period 1994 to 2013. As shown in the figure 23 below, these 
percentages have fair stability over time – equal to the complement of 
the 𝑅2 of this time series at 98.8% - other supporting elements are the 
significance of the constant, which is at least 99.99%, and the 
insignificance of the temporal independent variable, which results 
83.57% (being the complement to the probability given by the t value 
equal to -0.2212), as expected.  
 
In addition, the self-positioning of almost always more than 80% of 
electors on the left-right continuum confirms the classical theory of 
elector positioning from Downs To Grofman (Downs, 1957) (Grofman, 
2004) (Adams - Merrill III - Grofman J. -S.-B., 2001); nevertheless, some60 
critic this dimension is still valid and constant over time.  
 
Furthermore, a more stable ideological identification of electors than the 
typical party behavior61, which tends to be more independent (Inglehart 
- Klingemann, 1976), will be helpful in the analysis in the last part of 
chapter seven, related to the electoral flows' impact. 1 
 
 
60 (Giddens, 1994);(Bobbio, 1994). 




Hence, I can proceed to the graphical bi-dimensional representation of 
the party positioning on left-right x-axis, formalizing what was firstly 
proposed by Downs (1957) and followed by the foundational trick of 
approximation used by Merril III, Adams, and Grofman (2001, p. 15-
51)62, overcoming a limit of this most recent tool which unfortunately 
misses the anchor points (0,0) and (1,0)63 which the parties’ positional 
curve should cross.  
 
Like done by the latter authors, I am representing these curves in a 
simplified unimodal form, unparalleled embodied by the probability 
density function Beta, such that P(Beta)𝑖 =
𝑣𝛼−1(1−𝑣)𝛽−1
∫ 𝑣𝛼−1(1−𝑣)𝛽−1	𝑑𝑣	10
  existing in 
[0,1]. 
 
By definition, the expected value 𝐸 = Ü
Üt'
 and the mode in 𝑚 = ÜtZ
Üt'tZ
. 
This Beta function allows to cast into system the last two equations by 
substituting the values E and m for each party positioning obtained from 
the elector ideological self-positioning grouped by party.  
 
62 Mainly concerning an equilibrium model of party competition. 
63 Their proposed function is 𝑈#(𝑘) = −𝑎(𝑥# − 𝑠!)& + 𝑏𝑡#!	, i is the i-th party, a and 
b are the parameters,	𝑠! is the party-candidate position, 𝑥# is the voter position, 
and t is the non-positional political issues.	𝐼𝑏𝑖𝑑	(2001, p. 17,22,31)	 
Figure 23 Percentage of electors which position themselves on left-right dimension in 
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  such that the area subtended by the beta function of 
each party would be equal to the percentage of votes obtained by the 
same party (the non-vote can also be considered as a party), obtaining 
PE(beta)𝑖 = P(beta)𝑖 ∗ 𝑟𝑖.This results in a unique beta function by party 
(by election and chamber). 
 
5.3 The applications 
 
All the probability density distribution functions for all parties of 
chamber and senate from 1992 until 2018 are represented below, from 
figure 24 to 39.  
 
These have been built from the relative seats’ allocation proportional to 
the ordinates (y-axis) and the ITANES data introduced before. The 
integral of each curve below has been calculated on the basis of the seats 
obtained by each party respectively, in the chamber or the senate, 
alternatively to the representative organism considered in the graph, 
determining a weighting by seats. 
 
In conclusion, with these curves it will be possible to identify the 
hegemony for each party on the left-right continuum for each scenario: 
the party that achieves the highest ordinate, for a given abscissa of left-
right ideological location, will represent the leader for that particular 
ideological position. 
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Figure 24 Chamber positioning 1992 Sx(0)-Dx(1) (weighted by seats). 
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Figure 26 Chamber positioning 1994 Sx(0)-Dx(1) (weighted by seats). 
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Figure 28 Chamber positioning 1996 Sx(0)-Dx(1) (weighted by seats). 
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Figure 30 Chamber positioning 2001 Sx(0)-Dx(1) (weighted by seats). 
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Figure 32 Chamber positioning 2006 Sx(0)-Dx(1) (weighted by seats). 
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Figure 34 Chamber positioning 2008 Sx(0)-Dx(1) (weighted by seats). 
 
 














































































Figure 36 Chamber positioning 2013 Sx(0)-Dx(1) (weighted by seats). 
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Figure 38 Chamber positioning 2018 Sx(0)-Dx(1) (weighted by seats). 
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The graphs above are fairly self-explicative. For exemplificative 
purposes, I will comment on the last elections illustrated, which are the 
ones in 2018. 
 
The variance of the positional curves of the PD, M5S and Lega parties 
has increased compared to 2013, implying an increase of their respective 
permeability; instead, FI has maintained roughly the same one. 
Moreover, in 2018 M5S’ increase in variance has covered almost all of 
PD’s influence's area (left-right), which can be mainly explained by the 
raise of the imperative-valence (non-positional) issues which have 
involved the party system as well as PD's electors.  
 
Nevertheless, for the same elections, the PD has widened its influence's 
area on the left-right continuum, however without implying an increase 
of votes, mostly because of the use of positional issues more on the right, 
rather than the use of valence issues, as done by M5S; in addition, it 
should be considered that leadership credibility could also perish.  
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Chapter 6  
 





This chapter aims at integrating and qualitatively correlating solid and 
essential political sciences theories exploring and deepening the relation 
between electoral systems and party competition, which is still more 
than a theoretical puzzle.  
 
This puzzle is based on the theory that the more majoritarian the 
electoral system, the lower the number of parties, the more centripetal 
the party positional competition64. I find it of enormous interest to 
investigate the correlation and the impact that an electoral system could 
have on the positional competition in pushing a change in the number of 
parties, depending on whether it is more proportional or majoritarian 
(respectively given by a lower or higher index n, which represents the 
disproportionality (Taagepera R. , 2007b, p. 204-207)). Furthermore, I 
endeavor to measure how a change of the Effective number of parties 
(N) could impact the positional competition and calculate the different 
dis-representation effect given by the same electoral system, and finally 
how a change of one of these variables impact the other two. 
 
In detail, I proceed to quantify the reflection made by Bernard Grofman 
in the article "Downs and two-Party convergence" (2004), in which the 
Downsian theory (Downs, 1957) of parties’ ideological convergence has 
been re-read in function of how tight the initial assumptions are with 
regards to the concrete political and institutional scenarios. This chapter 
blends existing studies on: 1) how the Downsian convergence would 
vary by electoral system (Grofman, 2004, p. 26, 31), 2) the number of 
parties competing in an election (Id. (p. 26-8)), 3) the positional, non-
positional, and majoritarian competition (De Sio, 2011).  
 
I apply this innovative blended new model to the system of party 
competition in a logical-qualitative approach, as never done before. The 
resulting model will be more robust thanks to the fact that the 
 
64 The non-positional competition (Lewin, 1935); (Stokes, 1963); (De Sio, 2011, p. 
48) and majoritarian competition (Robertson, 1976); (Budge - Farlie, 1983); 
(Budge - Robertson - Hearl, 1987); (De Sio, 2011, p. 57-8) will also be taken into 
consideration. The chapter will scrutinize these elements. 
116 
institutional variables are linked to the parties and positional ones: 
modifying one will change all the others. 
 
The aim is to use this model in comparative statics – as introduced before 
– where the final equilibrium is the product of the interlocked 
multivariate system of causality, rather than of the cleavage between 
dependent and independent variables. This allows to: 1) measure how a 
specific electoral system can modify the party ideological positioning on 
the left-right continuum, 2) know how many parties would be in the 
political space, and their location, with no disproportionality due to 
electoral systems, 3) quantify the countervailing effect of the electoral 
system in charge, introduced only qualitatively by Sartori (2003, p. 61-2). 
As introduced before, in presence of an "Ideal-typical”65 plurality or 
proportional system66, as discussed by existing theories including those 
on party competition, my theory can overcome the limits of the pure 
FPTP and proportional electoral systems, as it is able to also catch the 
shades amongst them. A pillar theory underlying my model is that the 
more proportional an electoral system, the more the parties tend to a 
centripetal competition (Sartori, 2003, p. 60-3), implying that minor 
parties tend to assume extreme ideological positions to be more visible.  
 
This electoral dynamics reasoning can also be transferred into 
ideological terms, since the growth-survival of some parties find a fertile 
environment in a purely proportional electoral system (as there are fewer 
barriers to entry) therefore parties should logically occupy all the 
ideological vacuums available, probabilistically smoothly spreading on 
the left-right positional continuum; conversely, a robust majoritarian 
electoral system will tend to produce a bipolar competition. The pillars 
of political science supporting these mechanics are: the laws of Duverger 
(1951; 1954, pp. pp. 247, 269; 1955, p. p. 113), the party competition of 
Downs (1957), and relative upgrades offered by Rae (1971, p. 95), Riker 
(1982, p. 760) and Sartori (2003).  
 
The measure of disproportionality used in this chapter will be 𝑛j as 
introduced and defined in the chapter two, nevertheless in absence of 
any changes of the simple n, can be simply used the latter.  
 
To verify the relation between 𝑛j and party competition dynamics, I have 
collated the data from the in-depth qualitative analysis in the period 
 
65 referring to the Weberian concept of the ideal-types (Weber, 1972). 
66 as well explained by Sartori with regards to electoral mechanics in "pure" 
plurality systems (2003, p. 57-64), the degree of disproportionality n (Taagepera 
R. , 2007b, p. 204-207) is quantitatively different, even though formally all 
districts present the same electoral system with a single winner. 
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analyzed for Italy's seats from votes (from 1992 to 2018) and the 
positional party location from the previous chapter in the same period. 
In order to reproduce the party positioning of the years 1992 and 2018, I 
also used electoral flows, creating a dataset, using as primary sources the 
ITANES  archive (1948 - 2013) and others (Diamanti - Mannheimer, 1994, 
p. 114), (D'Alimonte R. - Chiaramonte A., 2010) (Bartolini - Chiaramonte 
- D'alimonte, 2002) (Carrieri, 2018) (De Sio - Paparo, 2014) (SWG, 2018) 
(IPSOS, 2018) (De Sio - Paparo, 2014).  
This chapter can only provide an in-depth qualitative and directional 
analysis, due to the complex calculus procedures and the heavy load of 
coherent information needed, which would have come from different 
international databases – currently not available. Hence, this chapter 
uses a logical qualitative approach, but not a quantitative nor a 
predictive one. In particular, the final qualitative models suggest a tri-
dimensional relation between n, the average weighted positional 
distance px, and N; and a correlation between px and the Effective 
number of parties (weighted on the electoral system). A certain change 
of 𝒏𝟐 would have an impact: mainly determined by positional party 
competition (conditional to the non-positional one), secondly by the 
degree of bi-polarization of the party system, and lastly by the weighted 
ideological distance px.  
 
6.2.The Puzzle  
 
I propose an integrated analysis, which puts to system the different 
pieces of knowledge from political science theories and more generally 
in social sciences, running through: the social choice (Curini, 2015) 
(Osborne, 1995-2000), electoral systems (Colomer J. , 2004; 2005) 
(Taagepera R. , 2007b) and the theories of the parties competition 
(Adams - Merrill III - Grofman J. S., 2005) (Merrill III - Adams, 2001) (De 
Sio, 2011), particularly stressing and starting on the theoretical 
interactions that occur among electoral systems and party format as a 
milestone placed by Sartori (1987; 2003, p. 43-68), readapting these in 
function of a refined model of permeability (De Sio, April 2006; February 
2008; 2011, p. 82-107,111-127). 
 
The research question is how we can recognize some relevant variables 
of party competition such that it would be influenced by the index of 
disproportionality 𝑛j seen before. Taking some recent literature, and 
suggesting some upgrades, I use a party competition model based on 
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three dimensions67: 1) positional, 2) non-positional, and 3) majoritarian. 
This model could be complementary to that of permeability produced by 
De Sio (2011), as for this specific research question the permeability is 
applied to each party and not aggregately; moreover, I propose an 
endogenic-simplified version of permeability, obtained directly from the 
probability density function of each party68. This approach presents the 
advantage of catching the party influence area and infinitesimal left-
right position, interaction, and the increase/reduction over time of non-
positional issues for each party. 
 
I explore into more details each of the three dimensions listed above.  
  
1) Positional competition was firstly introduced in the economic 
competition theory discussing the linear distance between 
companies, which would have implied the convergence towards the 
same point in this one-dimensional territorial space, as per 
Hotelling (1929). The same concept was used by Downs (1957) to 
identify a left-right continuum (bi-dimensional) arena where all 
electors would have an agreement on the positioning of political 
parties. As demonstrated in the previous chapter, I deem this 
concept valid, together with Downs’ theory of a convergence 
towards the centre between two parties in a majoritarian 
competition, as just introduced by Hotelling. This concept was 
criticized by Arrow (1951) and Grofman (2004), who set a series of 
conditions necessary for this to happen, such as empirical critiques 
observed on American elections at a local and national level. One 
for all, see Budge et al. (2001). See De Sio (2011, p. 18-39) for a larger 
disquisition about party positioning and political equilibrium. 
 
2) Non-positional competition has been introduced by Stokes (1963)69, 
borrowing the term of «valence issues» - firstly used by Kurt Lewin 
(1935) – in relation to «those that merely involve the linking of the 
parties with some condition that is positively or negatively valued 
by the electorate» (Stokes, 1963, p. 373). Some issues exist on which 
 
67 In agreement with De Sio (2011) and the recent literature presented in this 
chapter. 
68 In the complete model, De Sio puts the permeability as a function of political 
involvement (De Sio, 2011, p. 12,62-81,96-107), defined synthetically as the 
«interest for politics» and the «knowing of politics» (p. Ib., 144), in which 𝑣 = 𝑍 +
𝐻𝑖 (p. Ib., 122-3), being v the political permeability, Z a constant and H the 
parameter relative to the political involvement i. The parameters Z and H were 
estimated using data from 20 elections among the USA, France, and Italy (Ib., 
128-231). 
69 And further developed by Stokes (1992) and Clarke et al. (2004) for an 
autonomous approach.  
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all electors agree to be satisfied and then the question switches from 
what to do (about alternative policies) to who is the most capable to 
fulfil those requests (De Sio, 2011, p. 48)70. 
 
3) The term Majoritarian competition71 is used to indicate a blurry 
continuum that exists in between the previous two types of 
competition. All intermediate states of competition – issues - allow 
a majoritarian consensus to exist on these issues, even though not 
unanimously, such that: 1) probably these are used to the advantage 
of minority parties on the ideological side; 2) the parties compete to 
own certain issues.72 This happens because of the issue priority, that 
sees parties giving priority to themes which they know have a good 
reputation (Robertson, 1976) (Budge - Farlie, 1983) (Budge - 
Robertson - Hearl, 1987). «Therefore, a particular theme becomes 
naturally attributed by the electors to a certain party, which 
determines a true possession (issue ownership) » (De Sio, 2011, p. 57). 
 
Considering the results of the district elections (Ministero dell'Interno, 
2018) I will be able to quantify the degree of structuration of the party 
system on the basis of parties’ concentration over the territory - on a 
district basis - (Sartori, 1987, p. 58-61). The hypothesis is that the more 
concentrated the parties are, the least impact on the party numbers and 
then on spatial competition by a disproportional system (Rae, 1971, p. 
95) (Riker, 1982, p. 760); as Sartori says: 
 
«Rule 3. Conversely, a two-party format is impossible-
under whatever electoral system-if racial, linguistic, 
ideologically alienated, single-issue, or otherwise 
incoercible minorities (which cannot be represented by two 
major mass parties) are concentrated in above-plurality 
proportions in particular constituencies or geographical 
pockets. If so, the effect of a plurality system will only be 
reductive vis-a-vis the third parties which do not represent 
incoercible minorities.» (Sartori, 2003, p. 59) 
 
To understand the problem of positional competition, I take a 
 
70 Particularly Clarke et al. (2004) proceed to identifying three types of political 
valences: 1) economic performances, 2) dynamic analysis of the party 
identification, 3) leader characteristics. Brief review in De Sio (2011, p. 49-51). 
71 (De Sio, 2011, p. 57-8) 
72 (De Sio, 2011, p. 57) 
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probabilistic approach.  
 
I have drawn some unimodal positional curves below, in two scenarios 
A and B: in scenario A, each of the three parties occupy exactly 1/3 of 
the positional space each, implying - probabilistically – that each elector 
necessarily votes for the nearest party without any uncertainty; in 
scenario B, each party covers more than 1/3 of the continuum, implying 
that the electors which are in a, b, c, and d identify themselves in the left-
right positioning in which they could logically select to vote for another 
nearest party.  
 
I can assume that the area included between a-b and c-d – highlighted in 
green - will primarily be an uncertainty area which, divided by the 
summation of all areas occupied by the three parties, can be reconducted 
to a non-positional competition. I then proceed to measure this 
intersection area, calling it "not pos. comp." having a domain [0,1] and 
conversely its complement (1 - "not pos. comp.") will be equal to a share 
of a positional competition.  
 
With regards to the majoritarian issues, these can be identified simply 
multiplying the first two kinds of competition, as they are in the middle 
by definition. This is a «virtual» and dummy variable obtained from the 
interaction of the first two, considered independently, since they are 
randomly present in the areas under the curves between a and b, and c 
and d.  
 
In the example below it is possible to identify the positional competition 
equal to 1 in scenario A (figure 40), whereas in B (figure 41), this will 
surely be less then 1.  
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A                                                                         B 
 
 




                                                                                                     
 
 
                                                                                           a   b        c   d 
 
I use the Beta functions introduced in the previous chapter to derive a 
new simplified model of permeability, directly obtained from the data 
distribution of all electors’ positioning for each party, to identify a 
permeability for each party.  
 
I perform a qualitative in-depth analysis of the four electoral systems 
into force, using data from 16 different elections from 1992 to 2018, to 
study the relation between 𝑛j and the dynamics of party competition. 
These 16 elections are an example of a tremendous dynamism of the 
party system both genetically, numerically and for the mechanic 
competition resulting from it. For these reasons, they can be considered 
as having ingenerated 16 electoral sub-systems. 
 
The methodology used is mainly based on the logical models, here re-
adapted in a qualitative way (Taagepera R. , 2005; 2008a; 2015), in the 
style of Taagepera’s works since 1979 (Laakso-Taagepera, 1979; 
Taagepera - Shugart R.-M. , 1989; 1993; Taagepera R. , 2007b), also used 
in De Sio (April 2006, pp. 9-12; February 2008, pp. 220-7; 2011), which 
nowadays we need as an unavoidable epistemological base for the social 
sciences (Taagepera R. , 2017). These models will be tested empirically 
on the previously mentioned elections and data. 
 
6.3. Directional tests 
 
I now formalise and calculate the indicators introduced above, for each 
of the 16 elections from 1992 to 2018, by assembly. As the following 
empirical tests are founded on few cases, they are better referred to as 
“directional tests”, recalling the logical methodology discussed in the 
introduction. 
 
Figure 40 The positional 
competition equal to 1. 
Figure 41 The positional 
competition less than 1. 
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I introduce another variable measuring weighted ideological distance 
(px) between parties – defined in the interval [0,1]-, demonstrating and 
measuring the weight of the convergence hypothesis formulated by 
Downs (1957) and, indirectly, by Duverger (1951; 1954, pp. pp. 247, 269; 
1955, p. p. 113). In fact, as we will see, the lesser the weighted ideological 
distance, the lesser the N, the more majoritarian the electoral system (in 
consideration of the first law of Duverger) and the lesser the weighted 
ideological distance. Px is defined by the formula: 
 





Where 𝜇 = ∑ 𝜗]𝑠]
p#
]qZ  being 𝜗] the mean positioning of the i-th party, 𝑠] is 
the seats’ share for the i-th party, 𝜇 represents the weighted mean of all 
𝜗] values, with weighs 𝑠].  
 
As formulated in the theoretical model of the new positional competition 
above, the empirical test needs to take into account both the positional 
and the non-positional competition variables.  
 
I would like to test whether I can obtain an improved "effective" 
weighted ideological distance (px) by dividing by the weighted Effective 
number of parties N, which I will call 𝑁\w. 
 
𝑁\w is defined as the weighted average of N characterizing the different 
sections of the specific electoral system under analysis. In particular: 
with pure majoritarian or proportional electoral systems, 𝑁\w will be 
equal to the N calculated on the seats produced by those; conversely, in 
mixed electoral systems the share of seats allotted to the majoritarian 
section, the proportional one, and other types, will be calculated 
applying the weighted average of the different N to the seats allotted to 
each section and dividing by the sum of all seats. 
 
Following my approach with px, I assume that 𝑁\w stabilizes positional 
competition; in fact, as seen above, the number of parties has a 
probabilistic impact on the summation of areas under the Beta curves of 
positional competition, net of intersected areas; therefore, dividing this 
by 𝑁\w neutralizes such impact. Being non-positional competition the 
complement to the positional one, it is stabilized in the same way.  
 
In detail, 𝑁\w does not directly impact positional competition; however, 
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it increases positional competition for 1<𝑁\w<2, determining the anchor 
point 𝑁\w=1 in which the positional competition will be equal to 1, and a 
forbidden area logically defined under the line 𝑦 = −𝑥 + 2, 𝑓𝑜𝑟	1 <
𝑁\w < 2. For these reasons, the impact of positional party competition is 
logically divided by 𝑁\w. 
 
Another important variable to consider is the interaction between 
weighted ideological distance (px) and positional competition. 
Table 10 shows the indicators introduced above, calculated for each of 
the 16 elections from 1992 to 2018, by assembly. 
 















1992 Chamber 0,723 0,417 0,583 0,088 0,064 
1992 Senate 0,712 0,457 0,543 0,077 0,055 
1994 Chamber 0,529 0,684 0,316 0,078 0,041 
1994 Senate 0,511 0,559 0,441 0,141 0,072 
1996 Chamber 0,495 0,535 0,465 0,113 0,056 
1996 Senate 0,502 0,023 0,977 0,304 0,153 
2001 Chamber 0,547 0,554 0,446 0,128 0,070 
2001 Senate 0,548 0,480 0,520 0,175 0,096 
2006 Chamber 0,468 0,453 0,547 0,271 0,127 
2006 Senate 0,429 0,401 0,599 0,295 0,126 
2008 Chamber 0,597 0,210 0,790 0,288 0,172 
2008 Senate 0,583 0,240 0,760 0,284 0,165 
2013 Chamber 0,601 0,258 0,742 0,185 0,111 
2013 Senate 0,496 0,256 0,744 0,193 0,096 
2018 Chamber 0,601 0,736 0,264 0,059 0,036 
2018 Senate 0,645 0,712 0,288 0,065 0,042 
 
I now proceed with the first step towards testing the impact of the 
weighted Effective number of parties (𝑁\w) on weighted ideological 
distance (px), by assessing the relation between the two. This relation 
indicates how the weighted ideological distance is undoubtedly 
positively correlated to the weighted Effective number of parties 𝑁\w; for 
all passages see the appendix 6.1.  
 
This is an encouraging result, although the application of 𝑁\w as a control 
variable in the final model still needs to be validated. The final aim is to 
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obtain a model which has n as dependent variable and 𝑁\w as control 
variable. 
 
I move to consider an alternative measure of weighted ideological 
distance, expressing it in terms of Euclidean distance (Abadir - Magnus, 
2005, p. 1-3), also used by Adams et al. (2001, p. 17,22,31). I define this 
as pxq, which for the specific case will be equal to: 
 





I can now test all hypothesis defining weighted ideological distance (px 
and pxq) and the impact of the weighted Effective number of parties 
(𝑁\w) on weighted ideological distance, summarized in appendix 6.2 
(Table 34). I use both the F test and the 𝑅j𝑠 to compare the relative 
strength of my hypotheses. 
 
Comparing the px/𝑁\w and px models as independent variables of n  
(models 1 and 2 of the appendix 6.2), I can consider the application of 
𝑁\w as a control variable, taking n into consideration: variable n better 
explains weighted ideological distance px than it does px/𝑁-F. I can 
therefore exclude the impact of 𝑁\w on weighted ideological distance and 
I can move to compare px (Model 2) and pxq (Model 3 in the appendix 
6.2) to see which of the two is better explained by n. 
  
Model 2 shows how n influences the linear weighted positional 
competition px with a better fitting than on pxq (as shown by Model 3). 
This also implies that it is not necessary to further investigate pxq in 
function of 𝑁-F. 
 
To complement this analysis, I have produced two scatter plots to give a 
visual representation of px/𝑁}~ (Figure 42) and px expressed in terms 




Figure 42 Positional competition on weighted N (px/𝑁-F) expressed in terms of n 
 
 
Figure 43 Positional competition (px) expressed in terms of n. 
 
 
These graphs show how the intervention of 𝑁\w effectively smoothens 
the correlation with n. Moreover, px variance is smaller for higher values 
of n, and much higher for smaller values of n, confirming and expanding 
the aforementioned theory on electoral systems and party competition 
(mainly debated by Sartori), such that: electoral systems cannot 
completely create the type of party system, but they can only generate 




majoritarian electoral systems (explained by the previous demonstrated 
correlation). This suggestion will be better configured and consolidated 
later. 
 
Although I had suggested to exclude quadratic weighted ideological 
distance (pxq), as previously shown in appendix 6.2, I have now taken 
the opportunity to investigate it in more thorough models in function of 
n (as a dependent variable), for completeness. This analysis suggests that 
pxq creates less explicative models, confirming the previous hypotheses; 
see appendix 6.3 for these tests. 
 
Going back to the consideration of 𝑁\w as control variable, as done for 
pxq, I have tested the variable \ö
p;Q
 in more thorough models in function 
of n (as a dependent variable), for completeness; see appendix 6.3 for 
these tests. Also in this case, I confirm what previously shown in 
appendix 6.2, that 𝑁\w does not have a positive impact on px, but rather 
on positional competition (Pos. comp./𝑁\w). The politological 
significance of the fact that 𝑁\w does not add value to the model 
(weighted ideological distance will not be improved by dividing by  𝑁\w) 
is that weighted ideological distance already takes into account a 
measurement of parties, due to the presence of the previous weights 𝑠]. 
 
The meaning of (Pos. comp./𝑁\w) is the Effective positional competition, 
which is conditional to the non-positional one (n Pos. comp.). The latter 
is therefore equal to:   𝑛	𝑃𝑜𝑠. 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝.= 	𝑁\w ∗ 𝛽0QE.		>QR;.
S;Q
∗ (1 − 	𝑃𝑜𝑠. 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝. ). 
 
The joint model – model seven (in appendix 6.3) – can be discarded as 
well, when considering the significance of the constant and the other 
general parameters of analysis previously mentioned. 
 
The model which best explains n in function of the other variables seems 
to be Model 8 (in appendix 6.3): the significance is at least 95% for each 
variable, all the other general parameters are better than other models 
and the explicated variance is the highest.  
 
I can finally calculate the impact of each variable on n through the Beta 
correlation coefficients in base 100. Each unit variation of n is explained 
for 47% by Pos. comp./	𝑁\w, for 35% by px*Pos. comp./𝑁\w and for 18% 
by the weighted ideological distance, due to the classical joint hypothesis 
of convergence by Downs and Duverger (referring to the implications of 
his first law); appendix 6.3 shows these results in the last column. 
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The meaning of px*Pos. comp./𝑁\w is the degree of bi-polarization of the 
party system. 
 
Figure 44 below represents the scatter plot of n explained though the 
“predicted values”, applying Model 8. 
 
Since majoritarian competition is the product between positional 
competition and its complement (non-positional competition), which 
have been measured above, in order to consider the majoritarian 
competition, the final econometric model must reattribute the Beta 
coefficients in base 100, considering this new coefficient in addition to 
the others in Model 8. 
 
Figure 44 Scatter plot of the best model’s fitting of n expressed in function of: weighted 
ideological distance (px), positional party competition (pos. comp.) and the weighted 
Effective number of parties (𝑁-F). Real n on fitted values. 
 
 
Table 36 in appendix 6.4, shows positional competition in function of n, 
thus switching the independent variable with the dependent one. This 
has been made possible by grouping the three independent variables 
using the predicted values from Model 8 - turning them into the 
dependent variable predicted n - and using n as the independent one. 
 
Real n 




I can finally obtain an equation with only two independent variables 𝑁\w 
and Pos. comp., using the coefficients for the correlation between px and 
𝑁\w shown in Table 8 above, as well as the coefficients in Model 8. 
Replacing variable px with the correlation 𝑝𝑥 = 	0.04778 ∗ 𝑁\w + 0.380, I 
obtain:  
 
𝑛 = −9.008 ∗ g0.0478 ∗ 𝑁\w + 0.380h − 21.55 ∗ Pos. comp. 𝑁\w⁄ + 32.26
∗ ((0.0478 ∗ 𝑁\w + 0.380) ∗ Pos. comp. 𝑁\w⁄ )) + 7.368) 
 
I must consider the following logical constraints73: 𝑁\w > 1 by definition 
(as introduced in the first paragraph) and 0 < Pos. comp.< 1, also by 
definition, resulting in the following final simplified system: 
 
.𝑛 = 3.944 +
(1 − Pos. comp. ) 1.542 −
9.287
𝑁\w
 − 0.4304 ∗ 𝑁\w
𝑁\w > 1; 	0 < Pos. comp.< 1; 𝑛 > 1
 
 
Figure 45 below draws the contour plot of n in function of 𝑁}~ and Pos. 
comp., including the impossible values for n<1, to better understand the 
curve shape. Figure 46 draws the same relation, with n>1, N>1, listing 




















73 As defined by Taagepera and Shugart (Taagepera R. , 2008a, p. 34-50, 95-110) 
(Shugart - Taagepera, 2017, p. 11-13). 
74 See also Taagepera (2008a, p. 34-50, 95-110). 
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Figure 45 Contour plot of n in function of the weighted Effective number of parties 𝑁-F 
and the positional competition (pos. comp.). 𝑁-F > 0.
 
Figure 46 Contour plot of n in function of the weighted Effective number of parties 𝑁-F 
and the positional competition (pos. comp.). 𝑁-F > 1. 







Noteworthy and Anchor Points: 
𝑁-F = 6.02 Break-even point: Pos. comp. constant for variation of n 
𝑁-F = 6.84 Max 𝑁-F  for Pos. comp. = 0 (and n=1) 
𝑁-F = 7.57 Max 𝑁-F  for Pos. comp. = 1 (and n=1) 
𝑁-F = 2.83 Max for Pos. comp. = 1 and n = 1, for other values n =1, the 
positional competition goes decreasing. 
Pos. comp. 
= 0.32 Max value of Pos. comp. for 𝑁-F  = 1 and n = 1. 
n = 3.51 3.51 represents the maximum value of n with Pos. comp. = 0 and 
𝑁-F  = 1 
 
The anchor point n=3.51 is in line with the values included in the data 
sample, as 87.75% of them are lower than or equal to this point. An 
empirical evidence supporting this finding is represented by the ideal-
typical majoritarian electoral system - FPTP – of the Caribbeans, in which 
3.5<n<4, as analyzed in detail by Nohlen (1993). 
 
In any case, I remark how the results here shown can be considered only 
a qualitative point of view, a draft for directional relations among the 
positional, institutional and political variables. It is desirable to continue 
this research expanding the sample, aiming to obtain results that can be 
considered statistically significant and solid.  
  
131 
Chapter 7  
 




This chapter proposes a new method to understand how the electors 
change their vote preferences from one party to another and from an 
election to the next through electoral flows. In conjunction with the 
previous positional competition analysis, this method can be helpful to 
check if the intended ideological positioning of parties has produced the 
expected effects, if these have attracted electors from a competing party, 
and if they have left shares of electors belonging to the unwanted 
ideological area.  
 
I suggest an alternative method to aggregate electoral flows. Goodman 
(1953) was the first to formalize a method to estimate the “swing votes”, 
which is the number of voters moving from one election to another from 
one party to another, applying a simple regression model using 
territorial sub-units. Unfortunately, this method can produce, for 
inbound or outbound coefficients, either some negative coefficients or an 
unreasonable sum (greater than 1), or both, because the votes received 
by each party are at least 0 and at most equal to 1 (100%). Other methods 
(King, 1997; King - Rosen - Tanner, 1999, 1); (De Sio, 2009,1), may solve 
this problem, however they are very complex to use and need complex 
macros to work. For these reasons, I am suggesting a new method called 
“of mixture”, which overcomes Goodman’s problematics and it is much 
simpler than all existing methods. 
 
Practically, in presence of matrices of multiple columns or rows (or both), 
representing the votes for each party from an election to another, this 
new method doubles the relative compatible ones and replicates these in 
proportion of the votes of the electoral results. Considering the matrices 
showing the source of votes for a party (inbound votes) for a given 
election, it is necessary to operate on rows, transforming their values in 
base 100; conversely, if the votes are outbound, I operate on columns 
where their values are also expressed in base 100. 
 
The new logical method "of mixture" obtains a standard error of 0.62%, 
calculated on the sum of the squares of the differences between the 
values of the estimated (TC) and effective (TT) row values, divided by 
the number of rows; this is higher than King and others’ at 0.37%, but 
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lower than Goodman's at 0.93%75. This result of 0.62% is acceptable both: 
1) because its equivalent absolute error 8.06%76, calculated for the 2018 
elections, is lower than the acceptability threshold of 15% set by Corbetta 
Parisi and Schadee (Corbetta, 1988)77, 2) in terms of trade-offs of the 
criteria exposed by De Sio (2008, p. 84-90) - extremely easy to calculate, 
replicability and having an acceptable and contained error -, 3) since the 
manipulation of the matrices has an accuracy of 99.4%, according to their 
mathematical properties (Abadir - Magnus, 2005). 
 
I investigate whether electoral vote flows can be a proxy for ideological 
positioning movements. I re-elaborated data from the electoral vote flow 
matrices of the elections from 1994 to 2013 (Bartolini - Chiaramonte - 
D'alimonte, 2002) (Schaade - Segatti, 2003) (D'Alimonte R. - Chiaramonte 
A., 2010) (De Sio - Paparo, 2014) and I subsequently crossed these with 
the ideological positioning estimated through the post-election surveys 
offered by ITANES (1948 - 2013) in the same period. The result is 
positive, obtaining an 𝑅j𝑎𝑑𝑗. = 87.2% between the expected ideological 
positioning and the actual one.  
 
To sum up, I was able to reliably estimate the ideological party 
positioning for each party for the 2018 elections, using the existing 
ITANES party positioning data for the 2013 elections, calculating the 
relative expected values and modes to obtain the Beta functions by party 
(formalized in chapter 5), and finally interpolating these values with the 
2013-2018 final flows matrix available, obtaining the final Beta functions. 
Applying the same methodology, I was also able to estimate the 
ideological party positioning for each party for the 1992 elections, using 
electoral flow and ideological positioning data from the 1994 elections. 
  
7.2. For a new algebraic matrix of electoral flows with the 
Mixture method 
 
I intend to build the electoral flow matrices with a completely algebraic 
approach, which I will call Mixture method. Putting to system the survey 
data from SWG (SWG, 2018), Ipsos (IPSOS, 2018) and CISE pre-electoral 
data (Carrieri, 2018), I am able to obtain a final matrix with lower errors 
than all the above-mentioned sources. 
 
75 Calculation resulting from my analysis on an application of the model reported 
by De Sio (2009.1, p. 25). 
76 The value is calculated as 0.62% (standard error per line) * 13 (number of rows) 
77 They introduce the Vr indicator, which counts all the "impossible" coefficients 
because of the negative ones present in Goodman's flow matrix, placing the 
comprehensive tolerance threshold at 15%. 
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The principle is to aggregate as much information as possible, assuming 
that there are always some voting flows between one party and another, 
as also assumed in the HMD method of G. King and others (1997; G., 
1999, 1), which although is currently the most complex, it is also the most 
accurate one with the lowest percentage of error (De Sio, 2009,1)78 at 
0.37%. This compares favorably to the Goodman’s method, where the 
average percentage of error is 0.93%, calculated empirically79. 
 
In order to calculate the above-mentioned flow matrices percentage of 
error, as well as those which will follow, I consider the standard error as 
the squares’ sum of the differences between values of the estimated (TC) 
and effectives (TT) row values, divided by the number of rows.  
 
In presence of matrices of multiple columns or rows (or both), 
representing the votes for each party from an election to another, my 
proposed method consists in doubling the relative compatible ones and 
replicating these in proportion of the votes of the electoral results. 
Considering the matrices showing the source of votes for a party 
(inbound votes) for a given election, it is necessary to operate on rows, 
transforming their values in base 100; conversely, if the votes are 
outbound, I operate on columns where their values are also expressed in 
base 100. 
 
When a matrix cell, row or column are empty, it could be due to a given 
party not been measured at all, or been considered grouped with others, 
or considered in coalition, or lastly due to the negative coefficients of 
flows estimation, as we will see. 
 
Starting from the CISE matrix (Carrieri, 2018), shown in tables 11 and 12, 
with an error of 3.38%, and the SWG-Ipsos80 matrix, shown in tables 13 
and 14, with an error of 1.99%, the matrix obtained with the Mixture 
method, shown in tables 15 and 16, has an error of 0.62%, which is higher 




78 Although it is presented from the author himself as the method with the lowest 
error “between 0.01 and 0.02” (ibid., p. 28), comparing the flow matrices with the 
Eidis and HMD methods – by calculating the sum of the squares of the 
differences between the estimated (TC) and actual (TT) row values, and dividing 
by the number of rows - there is a median error per line equal to 0.364% for the 
first method and 0.37% for the second, almost equal. 
79 Calculation resulting from my analysis on an application of the model reported 
by De Sio (2009.1, p. 25). 
80 Presented in aggregate form using the method just introduced. 
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This result of 0.62% is acceptable both: 1) because its equivalent absolute 
error 8.06%81, calculated for the 2018 elections, is lower than the 
acceptability threshold of 15% set by Corbetta Parisi and Schadee 
(Corbetta, 1988)82, 2) in terms of trade-offs of the criteria exposed by De 
Sio (2008, p. 84-90) - extremely easy to calculate, replicability and having 
an acceptable and contained error -, 3) since the manipulation of the 
matrices has an accuracy of 99.4%, according to their mathematical 
properties (Abadir - Magnus, 2005). 
 
Table 11 The “inbound votes” flow matrix of the 2018 Italian general elections (made 
100 the sum of their relative parties’ votes), showing inbound votes from the 2013 
elections (expressed in terms of vote percentages), obtained from the new Mixture 




















































2018 Potere al Popolo 0.26 0.22 0.01 0.14 0.02 0.60 0.09 0.13 
 LeU 0.40 2.22 0.33 0.30 0.02 0.14 0.23 0.57 
 Pd 0.21 11.02 3.15 0.56 0.43 0.88 1.05 2.30 
 + Europa 0.08 0.89 0.15 0.14 0.03 0.46 0.16 0.52 
 Insieme 0.01 0.18 0.00 0.07 0.02 0.00 0.06 0.08 
 Civica Popolare 0.01 0.10 0.33 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.05 
 M5s 0.22 2.48 0.93 12.39 1.20 0.13 1.37 4.22 
 Noi con l’Italia -UDC 0.00 0.08 0.15 0.03 0.11 0.00 0.08 0.05 
 Fi 0.10 0.46 0.35 0.49 6.74 0.31 0.62 1.91 
 Lega 0.03 0.58 0.54 1.59 5.29 0.51 0.53 2.20 
 FdI 0.04 0.20 0.43 0.26 1.40 0.92 0.30 0.49 
 Other  0.01 0.04 0.09 0.09 0.08 1.52 0.11 0.23 




81 The value is calculated as 0.62% (standard error per line) * 13 (number of rows) 
82 They introduce the Vr indicator, which counts all the "impossible" coefficients 
because of the negative ones present in Goodman's flow matrix, placing the 
comprehensive tolerance threshold at 15%. 
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Table 12 The totals “inbound votes” by 2018 party and their discards from the real ones, 

























2018 Potere al Popolo 1.46 0.80 0.44 
 LeU 4.19 2.40 3.23 
 Pd 19.60 13.19 41.13 
 + Europa 2.43 1.80 0.40 
 Insieme 0.42 0.42 0.00 
 Civica Popolare 0.57 0.38 0.03 
 M5s 22.94 23.07 0.02 
 Noi con l’Italia -UDC 0.51 0.92 0.17 
 Fi 10.98 9.87 1.23 
 Lega 11.27 12.24 0.94 
 FdI 4.04 3.07 0.95 
 Other  2.18 2.43 0.06 
 Don't vote 19.44 29.42 99.52 




Table 13 The “inbound votes” flow matrix of the 2018 Italian general elections, showing 
inbound votes from the 2013 elections (expressed in terms of vote percentages), obtained 
from the new Mixture method; the 2013 columns exclude other parties. Data Source: 
(SWG, 2018); (IPSOS, 2018), my elaboration. 












































2018 Pd 8.64 0.86 0.38 0.05 0.37 2.30 0.08 0.04 1.00 0.67 
 + Europa 0.96 0.10 0.00 0.00 0.22 0.49 0.05 0.02 0.00 0.24 
 Insieme-Civica Popolare 0.26 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.06 0.26 0.02 0.01 0.21 0.12 
 LeU 0.99 0.50 0.00 0.00 0.09 0.16 0.22 0.06 0.32 0.18 
 Fi 0.42 0.04 6.54 0.83 0.59 0.86 0.03 0.01 1.05 0.43 
 Ln 0.53 0.04 5.79 1.49 1.10 0.63 0.12 0.06 3.01 0.61 
 FdI 0.16 0.02 1.75 0.22 0.14 0.64 0.02 0.01 0.26 0.06 
 M5s 2.65 0.27 1.33 0.19 13.96 0.79 0.25 0.16 3.93 1.58 
 Other 1.15 0.12 0.36 0.05 0.36 0.47 0.62 0.32 0.63 0.06 
 Abstained 2.73 0.27 0.35 0.04 1.04 0.81 0.17 0.09 16.19 2.13 




Table 14 The total “inbound votes” by 2018 party and their discards from the real ones, 
obtained from the flow matrix in Table 13. 
























2018 Pd 14.39 13.19 1.42 
 + Europa 2.08 1.80 0.08 
 Insieme-Civica Popolare 0.97 0.42 0.30 
 LeU 2.52 2.40 0.02 
 Fi 10.80 9.87 0.86 
 Ln 13.38 12.24 1.31 
 FdI 3.27 3.07 0.04 
 M5s 25.13 23.07 4.25 
 Other 4.13 4.53 0.16 
 Abstained 23.82 29.42 31.36 




Table 15 The “inbound votes” flow matrix of the 2018 Italian general elections, showing 
inbound votes from the 2013 elections (expressed in terms of vote percentages), obtained 
from the new Mixture method; the 2013 columns include other parties. Data Source: 
(SWG, 2018); (IPSOS, 2018), my elaboration. 






































































2018 Potere al Popolo 0.11 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.08 0.01 0.17 0.00 0.06 0.05 0.20 
 LeU 0.99 0.49 0.01 0.00 0.09 0.16 0.25 0.08 0.26 0.16 0.05 
 Pd 8.23 0.82 0.37 0.05 0.35 2.20 0.09 0.05 0.79 0.57 0.35 
 + Europa 0.64 0.06 0.02 0.00 0.14 0.32 0.04 0.02 0.24 0.14 0.15 
 Insieme 0.16 0.01 0.03 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.10 0.08 0.00 
 Civica Popolare 0.07 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.23 0.01 0.00 0.05 0.02 0.00 
 M5s 2.61 0.27 1.35 0.19 13.51 0.78 0.28 0.20 3.21 1.39 0.08 
 Noi con l’Italia-UDC 0.14 0.02 0.19 0.03 0.07 0.30 0.00 0.00 0.08 0.13 0.00 
 Fi 0.40 0.04 6.42 0.81 0.55 0.83 0.03 0.02 0.83 0.36 0.17 
 Lega 0.50 0.04 5.58 1.43 1.01 0.60 0.13 0.08 2.35 0.51 0.33 
 FdI 0.13 0.01 1.47 0.19 0.12 0.52 0.02 0.01 0.17 0.04 0.34 
 Other  0.43 0.04 0.14 0.02 0.13 0.18 0.26 0.15 0.20 0.02 0.59 
 Don't vote 3.57 0.36 0.47 0.06 1.33 1.07 0.25 0.14 17.52 2.47 0.34 




Table 16 The total “inbound votes” by 2018 party and their discards from the real ones, 
obtained from the flow matrix in Table 15. 





















2018 Potere al Popolo 0.70 0.80 0.01 
 LeU 2.53 2.40 0.02 
 Pd 13.86 13.19 0.44 
 + Europa 1.77 1.80 0.00 
 Insieme 0.43 0.42 0.00 
 Civica Popolare 0.40 0.38 0.00 
 M5s 23.87 23.07 0.65 
 Noi con l’Italia-UDC 0.97 0.92 0.00 
 Fi 10.47 9.87 0.35 
 Lega 12.56 12.24 0.10 
 FdI 3.02 3.07 0.00 
 Other  2.15 2.43 0.08 
 Don't vote 27.58 29.42 3.38 
 Total 100.29 100.00 0.62 
 
I now calculate the outbound votes for each party for the 2013 elections 
by dividing each cell by its column margin from table 15 and multiplying 




Table 17 The “outbound votes” flow matrix of the 2013 Italian general elections (in base 
100), showing outbound votes towards the 2018 election parties, obtained from the new 
Mixture method. Data Source: (SWG, 2018); (IPSOS, 2018), my elaboration. 



















































2018 Potere al Popolo 0.6 0.63 0.05 0.05 0.46 0.12 11.04 0.00 
  LeU 5.50 22.44 0.05 0.05 0.50 2.20 16.10 10.04 
 Pd 45.80 37.57 2.30 1.67 2.00 30.61 5.77 6.66 
  + Europa 3.54 2.86 0.10 0.10 0.82 4.47 2.36 2.73 
 Insieme 0.89 0.53 0.18 0.18 0.19 0.00 0.64 0.68 
  Civica Popolare 0.37 0.49 0.00 0.00 0.10 3.20 0.48 0.62 
 M5s 14.53 12.29 8.39 6.98 77.52 10.90 18.07 26.73 
  
Noi con l’Italia - 
Udc 0.78 0.77 1.20 1.19 0.38 4.14 0.00 0.00 
 Fi 2.25 1.85 40.01 29.07 3.17 11.55 2.03 2.35 
  Lega 2.76 1.76 34.81 51.32 5.82 8.29 8.71 10.05 
 FdI 0.71 0.58 9.14 6.64 0.66 7.26 1.28 1.47 
  Other  2.38 1.96 0.86 0.62 0.75 2.45 17.22 19.87 
 Don't vote 19.85 16.28 2.92 2.12 7.63 14.82 16.30 18.81 




Table 18 The “outbound votes” flow matrix (second part) of the 2013 Italian general 
elections (in base 100), showing outbound votes towards the 2018 election parties, 
obtained from the new Mixture method; the 2013 columns include other parties. Data 
Source: (SWG, 2018); (IPSOS, 2018), my elaboration. 























2018 Potere al Popolo 0.24 0.77 7.61 
  LeU 1.02 2.69 1.84 
 Pd 3.04 9.55 13.46 
  + Europa 0.92 2.39 5.68 
 Insieme 0.39 1.27 0.00 
  Civica Popolare 0.19 0.28 0.00 
 M5s 12.40 23.34 3.06 
  Noi con l’Italia - Udc 0.32 2.26 0.00 
 Fi 3.21 6.11 6.42 
  Lega 9.09 8.58 12.64 
 FdI 0.67 0.74 13.31 
  Other  0.76 0.34 22.78 
 Don't vote 67.74 41.68 13.18 
   Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 
 
How to read these matrices? Table 17 shows how the Forza Italia party 
has the most disloyal voters from the 2013 elections towards the 2018 
ones, with only 40% of reconfirmed votes, and 34.81% of votes switching 
to Lega and 9.14% to FdI. The PD party follows suite, with only 45.8% of 
reconfirmed votes. Conversely, the most loyal voters are those of the 
M5S party, with 77.52% of reconfirmed votes, and only 5.82% switching 
to Lega, and 3.17% to Forza Italia.  
 
It is difficult to draw firm considerations regarding FdI and LEU, since 
the first merged with Forza Italia in 2013 and the latter was newly 
constituted in 2018. 
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The most interesting matrix coefficients in Tables 17 and 18, from a 
politological perspective, refer to the PD party: 1) 14.53% of those who 
voted the PD coalition in 2013 switched to M5S in 2018, 2) 19.85% opted 
for the non-vote instead - the highest abstention data among all parties –
, and 3) 5.5% switched to LEU.  
 
Among the parties that no longer existed after the 2013 elections, the 
major outflows of votes have been directed towards the PD, voted in 
2018 by 37.57% of the voters of Sel in 2013 and by the 30.61% of the voters 
of Monti, also from 2013. Symmetrically, the M5S was the most voted 
party in 2018 by 26.73% of former voters of “Fare” (by Oscar Giannino) 
from 2013, by 23.34% of under-22s, by 18.07% of former voters of RC 
(Ingroia) and by 12.4% of previously abstained voters. 
 
I now calculate the inbound votes for each party for the 2018 elections by 
simply proportioning the values in Table 15 to make the row margins 
equal to 100. I obtain tables 19 and 20 below, which represents the 
composition of votes for each party in 2018, in relation to parties and 
groups from 2013.  
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Table 19 The “inbound votes” flow matrix of the 2018 Italian general elections (in base 
100), showing inbound votes from the 2013 election parties, obtained from the new 
Mixture method. Data Source: (SWG, 2018); (IPSOS, 2018), my elaboration. 
 

































2018 Potere al Popolo 16.40 1.95 1.16 0.20 11.35 1.20 
  LeU 39.09 19.37 0.33 0.06 3.47 6.26 
  Pd 59.39 5.92 2.66 0.34 2.52 15.91 
  + Europa 36.04 3.53 0.89 0.15 8.08 18.23 
  
Insieme 
37.26 2.70 6.55 1.14 7.58 0.00 
  
Civica Popolare 
16.30 2.62 0.00 0.00 4.48 57.02 
  
M5s 
10.94 1.12 5.64 0.82 56.60 3.29 
  Noi con l’Italia 
Udc 
14.59 1.74 19.87 3.45 6.94 30.88 
  Fi 3.86 0.39 61.33 7.75 5.28 7.95 
  Lega 3.95 0.31 44.46 11.40 8.08 4.76 
  FdI 4.20 0.42 48.53 6.13 3.83 17.30 
  Other  19.91 1.98 6.38 0.81 6.05 8.19 
  Don’t vote 12.93 1.29 1.70 0.21 4.82 3.87 
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Table 20 The “inbound votes” flow matrix (second part) of the 2018 Italian general 
elections (in base 100), showing inbound votes from the 2013 election parties, obtained 
from the new Mixture method; the 2013 columns include other parties. Data Source: 
(SWG, 2018); (IPSOS, 2018), my elaboration. 
 





































2018 Potere al Popolo 24.23 0.00 8.88 6.54 28.08 100.00 
  LeU 9.77 3.03 10.41 6.31 1.88 100.00 
  Pd 0.64 0.37 5.67 4.09 2.50 100.00 
  + Europa 2.05 1.18 13.54 8.02 8.29 100.00 
  
Insieme 
2.30 1.20 23.70 17.58 0.00 100.00 
  
Civica Popolare 
1.81 1.17 12.45 4.15 0.00 100.00 
  
M5s 
1.16 0.86 13.44 5.80 0.33 100.00 
  Noi con l’Italia 
Udc 
0.00 0.00 8.68 13.85 0.00 100.00 
  Fi 0.30 0.17 7.93 3.46 1.58 100.00 
  Lega 1.06 0.61 18.72 4.05 2.60 100.00 
  FdI 0.65 0.37 5.75 1.46 11.35 100.00 
  Other  12.29 7.06 9.08 0.94 27.31 100.00 




I comment that the M5S base of voters in 2018 is represented for 56.6% 
by its previous voters from 2013, for 13.44% by abstained voters from 
2013 and for 10.94% by former PD voters, also from 2013. Symmetrically, 
PD records the highest level of "electoral stillness" in 2018, with the 
highest percentage (59.39%) of voters coming from its previous voters 
from 2013 and, as second contributor, the former voters of Monti, with 
15.91%. 
 
It is also interesting to remark how the 2018 electoral composition of 
Lega only includes its own voters from 2013 for 11.4%, whilst the most 
significant component is represented by the former voters of the center-
right coalition (FI and FdI) with 44.46% and previously abstained voters 
with 18.72%. The former Monti voters represent the most significant 
component of Civica Popolare and Noi con l’Italia. The most significant 
component of FdI comes from former FI and FdI coalition voters with 
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48.53%, surprisingly followed by former Monti’s coalition voters with 
17.3%, and by minor parties (named as “Other parties” in the tables) with 
11,35%. Finally, the most significant component of new party Potere al 
Popolo comes mainly from minor parties with 28%, from RC with 24.23% 
and from PD with 15.4%. 
 
7.3. The correlation between the electoral flow matrix and 
the ideological positioning on the left-right axis 
 
I can now test the strong hypothesis that as voters move from one party 
to another, they retain an "average party ideological identity" that they 
carry with them when voting for another party at the next election. In 
other words, I want to ascertain whether electoral vote flows can be a 
proxy for ideological positioning movements. 
 
To test this hypothesis, I use the following operationalization: made 100 
the row margins of each party (relative to the next election), the 
summation by line of the products of the coefficients of this matrix and 
the values of the parties’ ideological positioning of the preceding 
elections (placed on the same column), must be equal to the ideological 
positioning of each party as recorded by the ITANES survey data (1948 
- 2013).  
 
I re-elaborated the data from the electoral vote flow matrices of the 
elections from 1994 to 2013 (Bartolini - Chiaramonte - D'alimonte, 2002) 
(Schaade - Segatti, 2003) (D'Alimonte R. - Chiaramonte A., 2010) (De Sio 
- Paparo, 2014), making the appropriate modification for row margins, 
and I subsequently crossed these with the ideological positioning 
estimated through the post-election survey data offered by ITANES 
(1948 - 2013) in the same period, multiplying the coefficients relating to 
the above ITANES data for the expected value grouped for each party. 
 
Table 21 summarizes the correlation between the real positional mean 
and the predicted one, obtained using the electoral flow data. 
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Table 21 The correlation between the electoral flow matrix and the ideological positioning 
on the left-right axis. The real positional mean is explained by the predicted positional 
mean 
 1 
VARIABLES Real Mean 
  
Predicted Mean  1.219 *** 
 (0.0757) 




𝑅& Adj  0.8716 
Prob > F Test 0.0000 
Observations 39 
Root MSE .0843 
Standard Errors in Parentheses 
p < 0.01, * * p < 0.05, * p < 0.1 
 
The regression confirms the hypothesis with a significant 𝑅j adj. of 87.2% 
and statistical significance of the coefficient and the constant greater than 
99%. The internal coherence of the model is at least 99.99% (F test). 
Finally, the Root MSE indicates an average standard error estimation of 
the ideological positioning for each party at only 8.43%, meaning that the 
estimation of the ideological positioning will be within the confidence 
interval of +-0.0843. 
 
Figure 47 provides the relative scatter plot of the correlation presented 















Figure 47 Scatter plot of the correlation between the electoral flow matrix and the 
ideological positioning on the left-right axis. The real positional mean is explained by the 
predicted positional mean (Epredy). 
 
A second regression is necessary in order to construct the Beta 
probability density function for each party. I follow the same testing 
process as above, using the statistical mode values instead of the 
expected value of parties’ ideological positioning of the preceding 
elections. Therefore, made 100 the row margins of each party (relative to 
the next election), I calculate the summation by line of the products of 
the coefficients of this matrix and the statistical mode values of the 
parties’ ideological positioning of the preceding elections (placed on the 
same column), using the same ITANES survey data as used previously. 
 
This will help me establish whether a correlation exists between moving 
voters and the average standard deviation of the Beta probability density 
function of the ideological positioning of each party. Table 22 







Table 22 The correlation between the electoral flow matrix and the ideological positioning 
on the left-right axis. The real positional mode is explained by the predicted positional 
mode 
 1 
VARIABLES Real Mode 
  






Adj 𝑅j      0.7478 
Prob > F Test 0.0000 
Observations 39 
Root MSE .1639 
Standard Errors in Parentheses 
p < 0.01, * * p < 0.05, * p < 0.1 
 
Again, I notice the strong correlation indicated by an 	
𝑅j adj. equal to 74.8%, a significance of the estimated values greater than 
99%. Unlike before, the significance of the constant is not greater than 
99%, however this can be ignored since the constant is close to zero, and 
therefore very sensitive even to infinitive fluctuations; this is irrelevant 
also from a logical and statistical perspective, since to a predicted median 
ideological positioning value equal to 0 corresponds on average an equal 
real value of 0; therefore, the same is valid for the previous expected 
values.  
 
Also in this case, the internal coherence of this models is above 99.99%. 
The Root MSE is certainly higher – 0.1639 – but mainly due to the 
minimum unit measure of the statistical mode measuring party 
ideological identification, which is on average equal to 0, 1/  (1/9), which 
directly impacts the model error. 
 
Figure 48 provides the relative scatter plot of the correlation presented 




Figure 48 Scatter plot of the correlation between the electoral flow matrix and the 
ideological positioning on the left-right axis. The real positional mode is explained by 
predicted positional mode (Modapredy). 
 
The final conclusion of this analysis is that about 20% of electors, which 
do not collocate themselves of the left-right continuum, as said in 
Chapter 5 – calculated as the average complement to the 𝑅js presented 
in tables 21 and 22 - generate some random movements among party 
votes which also imply some ideological noise. 
 
In conclusion, from the vote’s flow matrixes and the parties’ positioning 
in one election, I can summarize the most important sources of the bias 
of the whole model able to predict the beta functions of the party 
positioning for a following or previous election.  
 
In order to predict positional beta functions it has been necessary to 
predict both mean and mode values using two respective models. 
Statistically, the mean of these beta functions is in the “central” area of 
the left-right continuum, in particular, when the mode is greater than 0.5 
the mean is to the left of it, whereas if the mode is lower than 0.5 the 
mean is to the right of it.  
 
Theoretically, the fact that the predicted mean has a higher R squared 





that the final beta functions will have more solid anchor points in the 
central area of the left-right continuum, and a more unstable 
determination in the extreme points of the continuum. In particular, the 
standard error for the extreme points is about double of the central ones.   
 
The reasons for these characteristics have been identified mainly in the 
following reasons: 
 
1) The minimum unit measure of the statistical mode measuring 
party ideological identification is on average equal to 0, 1/  (1/9), 
which mostly impacts the mode’s standard error which is 0.1639. 
 
2) About 20% of electors do not collocate themselves on the left-
right continuum, as said in Chapter 5. 
 
 
Last but not least, the direction of the biases is also observable: in fact, it 
arises as the previous theory of party competition has shown in the 
previous chapter, confirming their validity. In particular, the presence of 
majoritarian electoral systems goes to increase the polarization towards 
the extreme ideological positions. Therefore, the more majoritarian the 
electoral system, the higher the standard error registered in 
correspondence of the modes - in correspondence of the external points 
of the left-right continuum - in particular, in this case, the predicted 
values tend to be more towards the center of the continuum compared 
to the real ones. 
 
The power of the model is noteworthy, given the strong simplified 
model that does not include the electoral system’s features as instead 
done in the previous chapter. A possible future perspective could – in 
addition to widening the sample size – include in both regression models 
(for mean and mode) the variable n which goes to synthetize the 
disproportionality of the electoral system, and a proxy of a 
comprehensive majoritarian degree of the electoral system in use.  
 
7.4. The construction of ideological positioning for 2018 
and 1992 
 
I can now move to define the ideological positioning of each party in 
2018 and 1992.  
 
Regards the 2018, the first step is to produce a flow matrix, with all row 
margins equal to 100, obtained dividing the values in the inbound vote 
matrix by their row margins, like done in tables 19 and 20.  
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Before doing this, I will have to clean the outbound vote matrix in Table 
18, excluding the 18-22 years column as this cannot be crossed with the 
survey data at our disposal. In order to exclude a row or column, the 
respective row or column margin must be equal to 100, such that it does 
not cross-influence the rows if you intervene on the columns – like in this 
case - and vice versa the columns if you intervene on the rows. Therefore, 
I can exclude the 18-22 years column in Table 18 since it is already in base 
100. Such exclusion will determine a standard error increase that will be 
simply recalculated as in tables 15 and 16, and equal to 0.81, which is 
only 0.19 percentage points higher than the original one (0.62), still 
acceptable.  
 
Tables 23 and 24 represents the inbound vote flows for each party, made 
100 the total votes obtained by each party in 2018.  
 
Table 23 Inbound vote flow matrix of the 2018 Italian general elections (in base 100), 
showing inbound votes from the 2013 election parties, obtained from the new Mixture 
method; the 2013 columns include other parties and exclude inbound votes from 18-22 
year voters. Data Source: (SWG, 2018); (IPSOS, 2018), my elaboration. 
 



























2018 Power to the People 22.81 2.72 1.61 0.28 15.79 
 
LeU 39.84 19.75 0.34 0.06 3.53 
 
Pd 60.92 6.07 2.73 0.34 2.58 
 
+ Europa 39.30 3.85 0.97 0.17 8.81 
 
Insieme 37.26 2.70 6.55 1.14 7.58 
 
Civica Popolare 16.30 2.62 0.00 0.00 4.48 
 
M5s 10.97 1.13 5.66 0.82 56.79 
 
Noi con l’Italia-UDC 14.59 1.74 19.87 3.45 6.94 
 
Fi 3.93 0.39 62.31 7.87 5.37 
 
Lega 4.06 0.31 45.65 11.70 8.30 
 
FdI 4.74 0.47 54.74 6.92 4.32 
 
Other parties 27.39 2.73 8.78 1.11 8.32 
 
Not Rating 13.09 1.30 1.72 0.22 4.88 
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Table 24 Inbound vote flow matrix (second part) of the 2018 Italian general elections (in 
base 100), showing inbound votes from the 2013 election parties, obtained from the new 
Mixture method; the 2013 columns include other parties and exclude inbound votes from 
18-22 year voters. Data Source: (SWG, 2018); (IPSOS, 2018), my elaboration. 
 





































2018 Power to the People 1.67 33.69 0.00 12.35 9.09 100 
 
LeU 6.38 9.96 3.09 10.61 6.43 100 
 
Pd 16.32 0.66 0.38 5.82 4.20 100 
 
+ Europa 19.88 2.24 1.28 14.77 8.74 100 
 
Insieme 0.00 2.30 1.20 23.70 17.58 100 
 
Civica Popolare 57.02 1.81 1.17 12.45 4.15 100 
 
M5s 3.30 1.17 0.86 13.49 5.82 100 
 
Noi con l’Italia-UDC 30.88 0.00 0.00 8.68 13.85 100 
 
Fi 8.08 0.30 0.17 8.06 3.52 100 
 
Lega 4.88 1.09 0.63 19.21 4.16 100 
 
FdI 19.51 0.73 0.42 6.49 1.65 100 
 
Other parties 11.27 16.90 9.71 12.50 1.29 100 
 
Not Rating 3.92 0.92 0.53 64.34 9.08 100 
 
I can now proceed to the last part of my analysis.  
 
Firstly, I select the data from the 2013 ITANES survey sample indicating 
the self-collocation on the left-right continuum of each elector, grouped 
by party. This data is defined in the interval [0,1], where 0 indicates a far-
left and 1 a far-right self-collocation. For ease, I display these values in 
the first row of table 25 below, labeled as “E”. 
 
Secondly, I multiply each coefficient in the previous tables 23 and 24 
matrix by the value in row E - of table 25 - relative to the same column 
and I divide by 100. In table 26, the column “E sum” represents the 
summation by row of the coefficients thus calculated in table 25, and 
column “E sum corrected” is the result of the application of the 
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regression coefficients referred to the expected values (predicted mean) 
of each party positioning in table 21 to the values in “E sum”. 
 
Hence, Table 26 shows the conclusive results of the predicted party 
collocations, obtained from the party positioning of the previous election 
(2013) by means of the inbound vote flow matrix. In fact, the parties’ 
ideological collocation in the 2013 elections “hooks” to the vote 
movements from the 2013 to the 2018 elections represented in the 
inbound vote flow matrix; it can then follow the movements of the votes, 
producing a final ideological collocation into the 2018 election, as 
empirically demonstrated before. 
 
Table 25 Predicted party placement - expected mean - in the 2018 Italian general 

























































2018 Potere al Popolo 0.05 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.06 0.01 0.07 0.00 0.07 0.04 
 
LeU 0.08 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.06 0.03 
 
Pd 0.12 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.08 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.02 
 
+ Europa 0.08 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.04 0.10 0.00 0.01 0.08 0.04 
 
Insieme 0.08 0.00 0.05 0.01 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.13 0.08 
 
Civica Popolare 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.29 0.00 0.01 0.07 0.02 
 
M5s 0.02 0.00 0.05 0.01 0.23 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.08 0.03 
 
Noi con l’Italia-UDC 0.03 0.00 0.16 0.03 0.03 0.16 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.06 
 
Fi 0.01 0.00 0.51 0.06 0.02 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.02 
 
Lega 0.01 0.00 0.38 0.09 0.03 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.11 0.02 
 
FdI 0.01 0.00 0.45 0.06 0.02 0.10 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.01 
 
Other parties 0.06 0.00 0.07 0.01 0.03 0.06 0.03 0.06 0.07 0.01 
 




Table 26 The totals of predicted party placement by 2018 parties - expected mean - from 
the 2013 election party positioning by means of the inbound vote flow matrix. 
 
 
Table 27 below follows the same methodology, using the statistical mode 
instead of the mean: row “E” in Table 25 becomes “Mode”, still defined 
in the interval [0,1]; in Table 28, column “E sum corrected” becomes 
“Mode sum corrected”, which is the result of the application of the 
regression coefficients referred to the predicted positional mode values 
of each party positioning in table 22.  
 
The values in columns “E sum corrected” and “Mode sum corrected” 
provide the coefficients useful to graphically represent the Beta functions 





















2018 Potere al Popolo 0.32 0.27 
 
LeU 0.29 0.24 
 
Pd 0.31 0.26 
 
+ Europa 0.37 0.33 
 
Insieme 0.40 0.37 
 
Civica Popolare 0.45 0.43 
 
M5s 0.43 0.41 
 
Noi con l’Italia-UDC 0.52 0.52 
 
Fi 0.71 0.75 
 
Lega 0.67 0.70 
 
FdI 0.68 0.72 
 
Other parties 0.40 0.37 
 
Not Rating 0.49 0.49 
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Table 27 Predicted party placement - expected mode - in the 2018 Italian general 



























































2018 Potere al Popolo 0.05 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.06 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.07 0.04 
 
LeU 0.08 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.03 0.00 0.02 0.06 0.03 
 
Pd 0.13 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.08 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.02 
 
+ Europa 0.08 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.04 0.10 0.00 0.01 0.08 0.04 
 
Insieme 0.08 0.00 0.06 0.01 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.13 0.08 
 
Civica Popolare 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.27 0.00 0.01 0.07 0.02 
 
M5s 0.02 0.00 0.05 0.01 0.23 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.07 0.03 
 
Noi con l’Italia-UDC 0.03 0.00 0.18 0.03 0.03 0.15 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.06 
 
Fi 0.01 0.00 0.55 0.07 0.02 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.02 
 
Lega 0.01 0.00 0.40 0.10 0.03 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.11 0.02 
 
FdI 0.01 0.00 0.48 0.06 0.02 0.09 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.01 
 
Other parties 0.06 0.00 0.08 0.01 0.03 0.05 0.01 0.05 0.07 0.01 
 




Table 28 The totals of predicted party placement by 2018 parties - expected mode - from 

























2018 Potere al Popolo 0.26 0.26 
 
LeU 0.25 0.25 
 
Pd 0.30 0.31 
 
+ Europa 0.35 0.37 
 
Insieme 0.40 0.42 
 
Civica Popolare 0.42 0.44 
 
M5s 0.43 0.45 
 
Noi con l’Italia-UDC 0.52 0.56 
 
Fi 0.75 0.82 
 
Lega 0.70 0.77 
 
FdI 0.71 0.78 
 
Other parties 0.37 0.39 
 
Not Rating 0.48 0.52 
 
Applying the same methodologies, I was also able to estimate the 
expected (table 30) and mode (table 31) values of ideological party 
positioning for each party for the 1992 elections using electoral flow and 
ideological positioning data from the 1994 elections. I sourced the 1994 
electoral flow data from the re-elaboration (table 29) of Diamanti and 
Mannheimer’s matrix of flow (Milano a Roma, 1994, p. 114), and the 1994 




Table 29 Inbound vote flow matrix of the 1992 Italian general elections (in base 100), 
showing inbound votes from the 1994 election parties. Source:  Diamanti - Mannheimer 
(1994, p. 114), my re-elaboration. 
 
1994 Progressives Patto Polo Others 
 
1992 RC 58 6 22 14 100 
 
PDS 74 4 15 7 100 
 
La Rete 46 15 28 11 100 
 
Verdi 26 21 41 12 100 
 
PSI 26 15 48 11 100 
 
PRI-PSDI-PLI 9 26 54 11 10083 
 
DC 3 61 30 6 100 
 
MSI 2 2 90 6 100 
 
Table 30 Predicted party placement - expected mean - in the 1992 Italian general 
elections, from the 1994 election party positioning by means of the inbound vote flow 
matrix. 
E (1992) 0.17 0.51 0.71 0.43 E E corrected 
 
1994 Progressisti Patto Polo Others 
  
1992 RC 
11.27 1.47 18.23 2.81 0.34 0.30  
PDS 
13.62 0.93 11.76 1.33 0.28 0.22  
La Rete 
9.27 3.80 24.06 2.29 0.39 0.37  
Verdi 
5.47 5.55 36.77 2.61 0.50 0.50  
PSI 
5.20 3.77 40.93 2.27 0.52 0.52  
PRI-PSDI-PLI 
1.96 7.15 49.30 2.43 0.61 0.63  
DC 
0.83 21.22 35.38 1.71 0.59 0.61  
MSI 




83 The value shown in the original source appears as 110. I therefore re-weighted 
for 100. 
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Table 31 Predicted party placement - expected mode - in the 1992 Italian general 
elections, from the 1994 election party positioning by means of the inbound vote flow 
matrix 
Mode (1992) 0.07 0.51 0.80 0.08 Mode  Mode Corrected 
 
1994 Progressisti Patto Polo Others 
  
1992 RC 4.45 1.48 20.49 0.54 0.27 0.27 
 
PDS 5.37 0.93 13.22 0.26 0.20 0.19 
 
La Rete 3.66 3.84 27.04 0.44 0.35 0.36 
 
Verdi 2.16 5.61 41.33 0.50 0.50 0.53 
 
PSI 2.05 3.81 46.01 0.44 0.52 0.56 
 
PRI-PSDI-PLI 0.77 7.22 55.42 0.47 0.64 0.69 
 
DC 0.33 21.44 39.77 0.33 0.62 0.67 
 
MSI 0.14 0.45 75.94 0.21 0.77 0.84 
 
In conclusion, with this chapter I have created tools to blend different 
vote flow matrices into an enhanced one, with better explicative powers 
and minimal error compared to the starting ones.  
 
Two dimensions were blended - the positional competition (in the 
expected and mode values) and the electoral flows - and their relation 
tested empirically and significatively.  
 
A concrete application was presented, estimating the expected and mode 
values for each party for the elections of 2018 and 1992. These estimates 
were also used in my analyses in chapter six.  
 
More in general, this methodology is extremely useful to estimate the 
ideological positioning for each party in a given election, starting only 

























This chapter aims to provide new tools for electoral system design, 
offering an unprecedented, more equal and respectful optimization of 
external and internal costs, introducing new variables in consideration of 
the much complex reality in which they are applied.  
 
New differential calculus optimizations are then solved, aiming to 
building more equal electoral systems. I considered conflict channels 
inside the assembly as well as related to the number of electors that each 
MP must represent (as done by Taagepera) and I also included variables 
M and N. I also considered two other conflicting cleavages: 1) the respect 
of the electors' preferences - the representation - and 2) the cabinet 
stability which, conversely, implies a dis-representation.  
 
In detail, I unparallelly cast into system the relations, and then the 
optimization, of extended equations using political and institutional 
variables P, S, M, N. This optimization will help determine the general 
features of an optimal electoral system and its institutional shapes (M and 
S), for a given country, with a particular population and party system (N). 
The resulting optimal value 𝑆∗ will be more accurate than in previous 
literature, and 𝑀∗ unprecedented. A star * after a variable’s name 
indicates the optimal value of the same variable. 
 
After these passages, I isolate the share of total dis-representation (𝐷j) 
attributable to the electoral system (𝐷$) and build a new conflict equation 
which considers these components as well as the dis-representation 
generated proportionally to the cabinet stability. In this way, 𝐷j and 𝐷$ 
will also be optimized. 
 
In more detail, this chapter calculates the optimal value of S more 
accurately than the simple relation P=𝑆 established by Taagepera (2007b, 
p. 199), and unparallelly it also formalizes the optimal value of M. 
Moreover, the second conflict equation introduces the original index 𝐷$, 
representing the dis-representation attributable to an electoral law and to 
the institutional shapes M and S (independent from N).  
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In order to minimize conflict channels – reported in the four pillars -, I 
propose two different methodologies, depending on the optimal variable 
I want to obtain. In the first methodology, I obtain the optimal values for 
S and M using differential calculus that minimizes the conflict channels 
produced by P, S and M, but also taking into consideration N merged 
with S, net of some parameters - as never done before -. In the second 
methodology, I obtain the optimal values for 𝐷j and 𝐷$ using 
maximization calculus between the cabinet duration and a new 
comprehensive representation index RE, which is equal to the 
complement of Gallagher’s index of dis-representation 𝐷j =
©0.5∑ 〖(𝑠] − 𝑣])j]
p#
]qZ 〗k.® (1991), such that 𝑅𝐸 = 1 − 𝐷j, which includes 𝐷$ 
and is standardized for the cabinet life (C) maximum duration. 
 
The only genuinely exogenous variable is P, whereas the other variables 
(M, S, 𝐷j and 𝐷$) are endogenous; N is to be considered a hybrid variable, 
since, in line with the above-mentioned time-series approach, it is 
assumed to be stable, on average, from one election to the other (as 
previously tested on a worldwide basis). All conflict channel formulas are 
derived for endogenous variables; the formulas are not derived for P or 
N, given their exogenous or hybrid nature. However, theoretically, it is 
possible to find the optimal value of N at the end of all optimization 
passages.  
 
As for the first methodology, in supporting the introduction of N into the 
grafting of the assembly size (S) optimization, I start considering that 
parties play as an essential role in parliamentary dynamics as outside, 
representing the electors of a district; in particular, parties have the 
function of grouping people with a relatively common political view, and 
represent the base of cleavage formation (Heath, 2005) (Lipset and 
Rokkan, 1967) (Rae - Taylor, 1970) and of politics issues (Taagepera and 
Grofman, 1985), reducing de facto these said issues, and consequentially 
the conflict channels, versus simply considering S.  
 
This reasoning is also applicable outside the chamber of representatives: 
candidates and their leadership for sure influence vote behavior; this 
behavior is also affected by common opinions among representatives on 
a program or ideology towards ideals and identity (Budge - Robertson - 
Hearl, 1987) (De Sio, 2011, p. 57-8), hence the parties. Notwithstanding 
knowing that parties can converge (more or less all representatives) on 
valence issues (Stokes, Spatial Models of Party Competition, 1963) 
(Lewin, 1935). This implies that not all MPs effectively represent an active 
part in the determination of a conflict channel, therefore the Effective S 
will be defined between S and N, hence requiring the application of the 
weighted geometric mean of these. 
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Operatively, this means setting the following expression: 𝑁(¯) ∗ 𝑆(Zu¯), 
with exponents e [0,1] and 1-e as weights, calculated in function of their 
respective average values N and S. In detail, the parameter e is a 
theoretical parameter calculable by substituting the empirical values P, S, 
N, in the formula of 𝑆∗, for as many countries as possible, considering the 
most recent values available, and finally applying the geometric mean to 
the numeric values of e obtained for all countries. Following the same 
methodology, it is possible to obtain 𝑀∗ by substitution of 𝑆∗. 
 
Moving to the second methodology of maximization of the cabinet 
duration and R, I start by noting the relation between Dj and the 





 (Shugart - 
Taagepera, 2017, p. 145-6). I can then substitute Nj in the function C =
 
¡-$
 with the geometric mean between: 1) Nj; 2) √M∗S∗
+ ;  3)  1/2D³ (by 
definition). In such a way, I have nested M∗ and S∗ inside the previous 
calculations. I proceed to calculate the RE index, simply applying the 
basics of the probability for independent events, standardized for C. 
Finally, I obtain Dj∗	probabilistically from D³∗. 
 
In conclusion, an innovative finding presented in this chapter is that the 
higher 𝑁m and/or M*S* product, the more 𝐷$∗ tends to 0; conversely, the 
lower 𝑁m and/or M*S* product – both tending to 1 -, the more 𝐷$∗ tends 
to 1, describing the correlations between 𝑁m and 𝐷$∗ and between M*S* 
and 𝐷$∗ as branches of the hyperbola. 
 
8.2. The conflict channels 
 
Current literature on optimisation in politics mainly focuses on assembly 
size S, obtained from the minimization of the conflict channels c 
(Taagepera R. , 2007b, p. 189-191), in its two components a) and b):  
 
a) how many citizens each MP must represent (j
z
), in a relation 
of reciprocal interaction (hence why the ratio P/S is multiplied 
by 2); 
 




is derived from the formula  𝒏(𝒏u𝟏)
𝟐























0 if P >1000 (Taagepera R. , 2007b, p. 198-9)  resulting in the optimal S, 
that I call 𝑆∗, equal to 𝑆∗ = √2𝑃+ .84 Taagepera continues imposing the 
assumption that the active population corresponds more or less to P/2, 
hence re-formulating the previous equation into 𝑆∗ ≅ √𝑃+  (Cfr. 
(Taagepera R. , 2007b, p. 199)). 
 
I am interested in adding some other political variables which I believe 
have an impact on the optimisation of the conflict channels mentioned 
above.  
 
Electors in the district will often refer to parties more than to their 
representatives, which they may not know in person. Therefore, as the 
optimization of S must consider the minimization of conflict channels of 
the representatives inside the assembly and the district, I will also 
consider parties both inside and outside the assembly. 
 
For all these reasons, I can picture a mesh of the parties’ components 
given by the effective number of parties in terms of seats85 Nj, - simply 













} = 0. 
In absence of other information, I have elevated the product between S 
and N to the power of 0.5, representing the geometric mean between the 
minimum (N) and the maximum (S) of the range (Cf. Taagepera (2008a, 
p. 120-129)).  
Finally, optimizing only for these variables, I obtain  𝑆∗ = 
$+
p
; for all 
passages see appendix 8.1. Nevertheless, the previous formula cannot be 
applied as is, as it would produce inconsistent results, due to the weights 
of N and S not always fixed at 0.5, as introduced in section 8.1 and 
mentioned above. Therefore, the weights of N and S will need to be 
parametrized. Moreover, it could be possible to obtain further 




84 Cfr. (Taagepera R. , 2015, p. 170-2). 
85 Which is known to be related to the political issues (Taagepera and Grofman, 
1985). 
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I proceed to formalize these improvements, starting with this latter point 
of quantifying the impact of dis-representation as the next step.   
  
8.3. The assembly size 
 
I must add some other political variables, such as the dis-representation 
(𝐷j): an increase of 𝐷j would mean a lack of “sincere” expression of 
electors’ preferences, implying that the SN product would be ineffective, 
inevitably producing a parliament with minor conflict channels, because 
the representatives will be more homogeneous. 
 
The limit point of maximum homogeneity of representatives is 𝐷j = 1, 
in which the strongest electoral law would fill all seats with one party, 
homologating the assembly, producing an effective SN product which 
would tend to S.  
 
Considering that a democratic regime could theoretically tend to 𝐷j =
0.5, where it is possible to imagine other dynamics in the formation of 
blocked lists which could anyway produce an SN product equal to 1. 
This would mean that something in the electoral system and/or parties’ 
strategies has intervened to nullify the impact of the effective number of 
parties and the members of the assembly, leading de facto to a 
dictatorship.  
 
The other limit case is for the SN product to be equal to itself, when 𝐷j is 
equal to 0, meaning that the political system is so representative that no 
effect on the conflict channels happened.  
Thus, I can write:  Ç
z





− 𝐷jÀ = 0. A further 
simplification can be performed substituting the variable d, such that  






all passages see appendix 8.2. Nevertheless, this formula is inapplicable 
as is, as it would produce inconsistent results, due to the weights of N 
and S not always fixed at 0.5, as said before. 
 
Is in fact possible to obtain further information regarding the political 
system, quantifying the impact of N, introducing the parameter “e” 
defined in the interval [0,1], which will be inversely proportional to the 
 
86 Several attempts have been made to linearize the impact of parameters d and 
e (soon introduced); nevertheless, the result would be inconsistent with the 
logical constraints and the existence domain. 
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impact of S (on the SN product), which has a parameter of (1-e). The final 
product will therefore be equal to: 𝑁(¯) ∗ 𝑆(Zu¯).  
 
The parameter e is a theoretical parameter calculable by substituting the 
empirical values P, S, N, in the formula of 𝑆∗, for as many countries as 
possible, considering the most recent values available, and finally 
applying the geometric mean to the numeric values of e obtained for all 
countries. This parameter, empirically evaluated, is fundamental to 
determining the final results of the proposed formulations which will 
follow; otherwise, if set arbitrarily, it will yield inconsistent final results.  
A further corrective is required such that the SN product (𝑁(¯)𝑆(Zu¯)) 
must fulfil the following conditions: 1) for e=0 it must be equal to S, and 
for e=1 it must be equal to N, 2) for e=0.5 the result must be equal to 
𝑆𝑁k.®.  
 




Nevertheless, this is an unfortunate formulation because an exponential 
of exponential appears, whose derivative produces a very complex and 
hard-to-manage expression, and as such it must be simplified. I know 
that, for differential calculus the assumption is valid that the simplest the 
conflict function to optimize, the simplest the result, particularly with 
regards to the exponent.  Hence, applying the criterium of the geometric 
mean, the final solution will be simply equal to the exponent 2.  
 
In fact, analysing the anchor points by e: for e=0 the SN product is equal 
to S, for e=1 the result is N, and for the mid-point e=0.5 the result would 
be (𝑆𝑁)k.® (exactly equal to the geometric mean between S and N) 
halving the whole SN’s exponent. Therefore, the final exponential 
corrective applied, equal to 2, allows to satisfy the above-mentioned 












2 = 0, 𝑏𝑒𝑖𝑛𝑔	𝑑, 𝑃, 𝑆, 𝑁, 𝑆, 𝑒 ≥ 0	87 
 
87 The equation obtained from this passage is equal to: 2(%,H)d(e −
1)N(,HI)S(H(I,%),%)D2HP − N(;HI)S*,;H(I,%).E = 0, which I then solved for S, 


















For all passages see appendix 8.3. It is important to highlight that the 
parameter e is a theoretical parameter calculable by substituting the 
empirical values P, S, N, in the formula of 𝑆∗, for as many countries as 
possible, considering the most recent values available, and finally 
applying the geometric mean to the numeric values of e obtained for all 
countries.  
 
The last formulation can be further simplified by factorizing e into 
numeric constants f and a as follows: 𝑓 = Z
(¯uZ)
 and 𝑎 = u¯
¯uZ
 . The fully 








  88 
 
The contour plots below explore the overall impact of the variables for 
parameter e equal to 0.02 (Figure 49) and 0.1 (Figure 50). 
 
 
88 Valid for P equal to active population and >1000.  
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In Figure 49 parameter e is imposed equal to 0.02. For example, 
substituting N=3 and P=1.25*10^8, the seats are 568.  













In Figure 50 the parameter e is imposed equal to 0.1. When compared to 
previous Figure 49, both graphs show that the lower N, the higher P, the 
higher S; conversely, the higher N, the lower P, the more S tends to 0. It 
is also possible to observe that ceteris paribus an increase of the 
parameter e goes to produce a reduction of S.  
 
These results show that the higher e, the higher 𝑆∗; this means that the 
higher the weight of N on S, the more the parliament’s homologation: 
representatives are not independent from their belonging party and they 
are flattened on the political lines of their respective parties. The higher 
the e, the more an increase of the S is opportune to rebalance this 
flattening, hoping that more representatives could have some 
independence to propose more policies and therefore more issues in 
parliament. The higher N, the lower S because there are enough policies 
and issues brought by many effective numbers of parties in parliament, 
and many MPs would be plethoric.  
 
Lastly, I also confirm the original relation that sees the cube root of the 
population variable as proxy of S: in fact, the more numerous the 
population, the more numerous representation it requires, following a 





Given these considerations, I can confirm that the results obtained for 𝑆∗ 
through differential calculus are also logically reasonable. 
 
8.4.  The magnitude of the district (deputies by district) 
 
The optimization of M is also possible using the mother relation Nj =
	Nkj = (𝑀 ∗ 𝑆)
!
$  89 . Considering Nj = (𝑀 ∗ 𝑆)
!
, , I simply substitute N 
with (𝑀 ∗ 𝑆)
!
, in the previous differential equation, and derive it by M 
(instead of S), thus obtaining the optimal M – which will be 𝑀∗-. In 











2 = 0, 𝑏𝑒𝑖𝑛𝑔	𝑑, 𝑃, 𝑆, 𝑁, 𝑆, 𝑒 ≥ 0  90 
 
𝑀∗ = 2(j/¯)𝑆∗(®uÖ/¯)𝑃gj/(¯)h 
 
For all passages see appendix 8.4. From here, the optimisation 
calculations must substitute and use the equation 𝐷j =
k.®
p$
 (Shugart - 










As done before, this last formulation can be further simplified by 
factorizing e into numeric constants b and c as follows: 𝑏 = j
¯
 and 𝑐 =
−(5 − Ö
¯








Following previous considerations, the more numerous the population, 
the more numerous representation it requires, the higher M must be 
because the higher the probability of dis-representing many people in a 
 
89 For an in-depth treatise see the introduction and (Taagepera R. , 2007b, p. 97; 
154-156; 226). 
90 The equation obtained from this passage will be equal to:  	
1/3DeM(,(JI)/:,%)S*%/:J(KI,:).D0.5JM*(JI)/&.S*J(;,(KI)/&). − PE = 0 which, after 
being solved for S, will take to the next step. 
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small district (as in FPTP) (Fisichella, 2009, p. 283) (Taagepera R. , 2007b, 
p. 206-211).  
 
As for the relation between N and M, the more effective number of 
parties, the lower M, allowing the party system to rebalance the 
fragmentation dynamics; conversely, the lower N, the higher M, since 
like in a monetary policy, this could be seen as an injection of liquidity, 
hence a stimulus to the party system to generate more politics and issues 
(through new parties).  
 
In politics, this is enunciated by Colomer in the micromega rule «The 
small prefer the large, and the large prefer the small» (2004, p. 3) with 
reference to parties on one side and S and M on the other side of the 
enunciation. Duverger capitalizes on this rule in his “first law”, which is 
applied to the parties and M (and not S), such that: a majoritarian 
electoral system is going to produce a bi-polar competition (1951; 1954, 
pp. pp. 247, 269; 1955, p. p. 113). 
 
Finally, in relation to the impact of 𝑆∗ on 𝑀∗, knowing that the constant 
𝑐 > 1,91 the higher S, the lower M, following the exact same dynamic as 
above: the more plethoric the assembly size S, the narrower the district 
magnitude M must be to contrast this. In conclusion, the results obtained 
through the differential calculus seem to be logically reasonable also for 
𝑀∗. 
 
8.5. The dis-representation due to the electoral systems 
 
I now introduce another measure to be optimized - 𝐷$ -, which consists 
of the portion of dis-representation 𝐷j produced by electoral laws, 
logically defined in the interval [0,0.5] like 𝐷j. This index will measure 
the aggregated effects of: the introduction of the threshold of 
representation, majority premiums, and the intrinsic mechanics of the 
logics of allotment of seats from votes.  
 
I can simply consider the dis-representation index of Gallagher 𝐷j,92 as 
formed jointly by three independent components: 1) 𝐷$, which is the dis-
representation produced by the electoral system; 2) k.®
p$
 , which is the dis-
representation produced by the party system, as introduced previously; 
 
91 Since for 𝑒 = 0	 ⟹ 𝑐 = ∞, and for 𝑒 = 1	 ⟹ 𝑐 = 1. 








, which is the dis-representation produced by the institutional 
variables M and S (Shugart - Taagepera, 2017, p. 144-6).  
 
As these three components (events) are independent, and in absence of 
a statistical formula for 3 factors, I can hypothesize that the interaction 
produced in order to subtract their summations (necessary to aggregate 
independent probabilities) could be the geometric mean of the 
components. In fact, if one component was 0, and the other two were 
equal to 0.5 and 0.5, 𝐷j would be equal to 1, which would be out of the 
possible empirical limit [0,0.5]; instead, with the geometric mean – in 
case one component was 0 –  ordering the elements (in this case, the 
components) by their size such that 𝑎Z < 𝑎j < 𝑎, I can substitute 𝑎Z in 
function of 𝑎j and 𝑎 using the formula 𝑎Z =
X$$
X+
 (Taagepera R. , 2015, p. 
212-3), and solving for the previous scenario, I would obtain 𝐷j = 0.5, 
which is within the empirical limit [0,0.5], as logically required.  
Hence the formula for 𝐷j composed by the three factors is: 
 











It is possible to logically validate this formula by studying its anchor 
points: 1) for all factors equal to 0, 𝐷j = 0; 2) for all factors equal to 0.5, 
𝐷j = 0.5.   
 
Looking at the latter anchor point, 0.5 is fixed as the empirical limit for 
electoral democracies: in fact, a dis-representation higher than 0.5 would 
mean that more than 50% of votes would be mis-represented, thus also 
breaking the basic rules of representation. Simplifying, if a 2 party 
system registered a 𝐷j > 0.5, we would be in presence of a dis-
representative scenario where, at minimum: party A which has 0 votes 
takes at least 50% of seats, and conversely party B with 100% of votes 
would surely take less than 50% of seats, then completely meaningless 
for a democratic legitimation of a parliament.  
 
8.6. The overall dis-representation 
 
The question is now how to optimize 𝐷$. I consider the idea that two 
opposite interests exist: on one hand the Cabinet duration, on the other 
the representativeness. These work in opposite ways because an electoral 
law can increase the Cabinet duration, minimizing the party 
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fragmentation (Taylor H.M.- Herman V.M., (March)1971), but in doing 
so the representation would deteriorate.  
 
Therefore, I must maximize: 1) the cabinet duration; 2) the degree of 
representation produced by the electoral law – inversely proportional to 
𝐷$ - and which derives from the institutional shape – also inversely 
proportional to M and S.  
 
With regards to the operationalization of the cabinet duration, I can 
consider the equation 𝐶 = N
¡E$
	(Taagepera - Shugart R.-M. , 1989, p. 99-
101), where k is a constant and Nm is the effective number of parties 
calculated on seats. Taagepera’s most recent empirical evaluation of k 
was performed on 26 democracies, obtaining k=42 (Taagepera R. a., 2007, 
p. 168-9).  
 
With regards to the degree of representation, I can consider the previous 
𝐷j equality, with some adjustments. First of all, I define the 
representation index – RE - logically defined in [0,1], as the complement 
of 𝐷j such that: 𝑅𝐸 = 1 − 𝐷j; I then need to isolate the portion of dis-
representation 𝐷j produced by the electoral law and derived from the 
institutional shape: using the classical probability of independent events 







I must fulfil two final conditions: 1) capitalize the impact on 
representation of the effective number of parties, calculated on votes 𝑁c; 
2) RE could empirically assume the value of 0. For 𝑁c 	= 1,	the impact on 
representation of 𝐷$ and 𝑀∗𝑆∗ would tend to 0 because electors have 
decided – before the electoral and institutional shape – that they need 
only one effective party, therefore RE will tend to 1 (this scenario is only 
a logical anchor point, nevertheless unrealistic among democracies); 
when 𝑁c tends to infinitive, the disproportional impact of 𝐷$ and 𝑀∗𝑆∗ 
will be outclassed, therefore producing an overall RE tending to 0.  
 










, in which each of the three components 
of 𝐷j has been multiplied by two so to fulfil the condition of a domain 
included in the interval [0,1].   
 
 
93 For a statistical explanation see (Espa - Micciolo, 2008, p. 51). 
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Finally, to obtain a maximisation of equal entities, I must define the 
second term of the differential calculus in the same interval’s existence:  
being N
¡E$
 defined ∀	𝑘 > 0; C ∈ [0, k]	and RE ∈ [0,1], it will be sufficient to 



















It is now sufficient to derive the formula above by 𝐷$ and set it equal to 
















6Á = 0 
 
A consequence of this differential calculus is that the argument –	𝐷$ - 
will disappear, because it does not occur in both terms of the differential 
calculus; for all passages see appendix 8.5. However, we must not 
despair as MS, N and 𝐷$ occur to determine 𝐷j through the previous 
equivalences of 𝑁j = √MS+ = Zj0$; knowing that 𝐷$ and 𝐷j exist in the 
same domain, and that 𝐷$ is an independent probabilistic factor of 𝐷j, I 





Applying the geometric mean (because all factors are integer and >1) and 


















































This is the comprehensive formula to calculate 𝐷$∗, which returns the 
most accurate results; for all passages see appendix 8.6. However, in 
order to proceed with further analysis, I propose to simplify this formula, 
rewriting the second term of the differential equation in a way that still 
respects the inverse correlation between RE and N, but is less 
prescriptive over the noteworthy points: in my proposal, RE tends to 1 
for smaller and smaller values of 𝑁c tending to 1 – without becoming 
equal to 1 for 𝑁c =1 -, and RE tends to zero for higher and higher values 
of 𝑁c → ∞ - without becoming equal to zero for 𝑁c → ∞	-.  
 
I also consider the dis-representation generated by the electoral systems 
(by M, S and 𝐷$) net of that generated by the effective number of parties 
(calculated on votes) resulting in k.®
p`$	
, plus a corrective to guarantee the 






































For all passages see appendix 8.7. Figure 51 below shows the contour 









Figure 51 Contour plot of the dis-representation produced by the electoral system 𝐷N∗, 
in function of 𝑁mand M*S* product. 
 
 
The higher Nm and/or M*S* product, the more 𝐷$∗ tends to 0; conversely, 
the lower Nm and/or M*S* product, the more 𝐷$∗ tends to 1. 
 
Figure 52 below shows the inverseley proportional relation between 


















Figure 52 The 2D graph of 𝐷N∗on 𝑁m; imposing M*S*= 600. 
 
 
Assigning a numerical value to M*S*, in this case 600, I can see how 𝐷$∗ 
is inversely proportional – more than proportional - to Nm, tending to 0 
for Nm → ∞ whereas, for Nm tending to 1, 𝐷$∗ would tend to ∞ because 
the function is a branch of the hyperbola. Nevertheless, recalling the 
previously stated optimization condition P>1000, this goes to reduce the 
value of 𝐷$∗ to the limit of 1 for Nm tending to 1, and/or for values of 
M*S* tending to 1, with reference to the insights provided by figure 51. 
A noteworthy point could be Nm=2, which corresponds to a pure bi-party 
competition; in this point, 𝐷$∗ is about 0.055.  
 
Going back to the first definition of 𝐷j, I can substitute all optimized 
elements such that I obtain:  
 











In conclusion, with the assumption of P, e, 𝑁c (and 𝑁m	if I wanted to be 
more precise) as endogenous variables, and obtaining 𝑀∗, 𝑆∗, 
𝐷j∗	𝑎𝑛𝑑	𝐷$∗, I have all the tools necessary to project an electoral system. 
Using the existing tools presented in the available literature (Taagepera 
R. , 2007b); (Shugart - Taagepera, 2017) and some of the formulas that I 
obtain in this dissertation, it is possible to evaluate the impact on the 











premia, PR rules, and also to recalculate their impact on the effective 
number of parties. 
 
These models offer some directional and quantitative relations between 
institutional and political variables. In order to determine the exact value 
of S and M it is necessary to calculate the value of e, as shown above. 
Furthermore, in order to validate the optimized values for S, M and 𝐷j it 
will be necessary to empirically test their correlation with their 
respective actual values, using again the dataset of Struthers - Li - 











This chapter wants to determine an equilibrium between parties’ and 
voters’ “electoral utility”. This kind of equilibrium represents a pivotal 
point in building in details the electoral systems. In fact, an electoral 
system generates some dis-representation, which will benefit some 
groups and disadvantage others. The “electoral utility” is the quantity of 
dis-representation which benefits a group of parties and voters in the 
system, producing disutility for the others. With greater dis-
representation, major parties tend to maximize their utility by approving 
electoral laws capable of maximizing their seats; conversely, some voters 
see a decline of their utility as they are prompted to express an insincere 
vote when they would have not voted such parties as their first 
preference.    
 
The previous chapter has undoubtedly laid the foundations of an 
optimal electoral system in general terms, through an optimization of 
institutional and dis-representation variables; this chapter complements 
such view by also taking into consideration some features of electoral 
laws, such as the FPTP system, thresholds and majority premiums 
(MJPs). I leverage LQMs, in much simplified forms, by connecting them 
in a primary game theory approach and find a theoretical equilibrium, 
driven by the political theory axiom of different social sciences interests 
(of electors and parties) founded on the "Maximin" Rawlsian theory 
(1971). 
  
In this chapter I follow a normative approach to further specify the role 
of electoral system correctives in function of strategic vote and the more 
theoretical Rawlsian criterion mentioned above. 
 
As with previous considerations, the law of minority attrition provides 
an excellent starting point due to its very versatile applications, from 
proportionality to FPTP and all shades in between. In this case, I have 
reshaped its bottom left corner to take into account the impact of the block 
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threshold in that part: the threshold, if present, impacts the number of 
seats allocated in correspondence of the votes received up to its limit, 
determining a snapped curve in its correspondence and zero seats before. 
Specularly, in presence of a majority premium, the curve of the law of 
minority attrition can be reshaped in the top right corner, to reflect a jump 
because a majority premium creates a net upgrade of seats. This approach 
allows multiple scenarios possible thanks to the consideration of the 
variating nature of institutional and/or political variables: as an example, 
in consideration of the fact that there exist infinite combinations of para-
institutional variables T and MJP, these could be reduced by substitution 
of the optimized variables S and M from chapter 8, to re-determine N and 
G.  
 
Finally, using the optimal values found before – or not - and some other 
tools already available (R. Taagepera 2007b) (Shugart - Taagepera 2017), 
this chapter provides: 1) a set of tools to determine party and elector 
equilibrium strategies; 2) a simulation and design of electoral systems, 
evaluating how seats’ allotment varies with a change in electoral rules 
and then strategic votes in relation to threshold, majority premiums, but 
also any other corrective and proportional rule characteristic; 3) electoral 
projections through survey data, creating forecasts to understand, for 
example, if the mix of a specific electoral system with a specific political 
system goes to generate a majority in the assembly on not. 
9.2 The puzzle 
The concepts formalized so far are not just useful for the description of a 
party system, but also for the detection of strategic vote, which I define 
as follows: 
Strategic vote is the vote given by electors to a party which does not 
coincide with their first preference in their conceptual order of party 
preference, because of the major probability of success that they attribute 
to the voted party. The probability of success of a party could be 
conceptually represented – for now - by its seats on votes ratio. 
Therefore, a strategic vote is logically expected when there is some dis-
proportionality between votes and seats during the electoral process, 
from the expression of the vote to seats allocation. 
Strategic vote cannot simply be linked to the second preference in an 
elector’s conceptual order of party preference. In fact, the elector could 
change their preference several times before expressing their vote: 
particularly, it could happen that some i-th parties are preferred before 
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that which is voted, being those without chances of victory, or simply 
because they are valuated with an inferior cost-benefit.  
Strategic vote would not be triggered in an ideally perfectly proportional 
system, but rather in presence of some dis-representative elements, that 
would materialize even in proportional electoral formulas and more 
significantly in clearly majoritarian systems. 
Practically, the measurement of the strategic vote is not a simple issue. 
Given the first law of Duverger (1951; 1954), which says that a plurality 
system (as well as majoritarian) is going to produce a bipolar 
competition, I would logically expect that the higher the votes received 
by a party, the more than proportional the seats given to it compared to 
the minor ones.  
An example is the single-member district with a single winner (FPTP) as 
compared to the opposite proportional system, not based on the 
previous dynamics. In a single-member district electors are aware of the 
weight of their own vote (which will results in relatively more seats for 
the most voted parties respect the lesser), respecting the relation of seats 
allocated in function of votes received, traced by the law of minority 
attrition (Taagepera R. , 2007b, p. 208). The majoritarian dynamics will 
also emerge in proportional systems in presence of correctives such as 
the explicit block threshold, majority premium or any other dis-
representative mix of allocations of votes in seats.  
More widely, a party concentration dynamic is ontologically present in 
all electoral systems in form of the implicit block threshold T that is 
inversely proportional to the number of constituencies E and to the 
average size of the constituency M, in line with all vote dynamics 
mentioned so far; formally: 𝑇 =	 @®%({tZ)√$ (p. Id., 247).  
The function implies that the maximum value of block threshold 





;	for all other values of M, T will be lower. Taagepera combined this 
formula with the nominal number of parties relation, obtaining: 𝑁k =
Î@,®%
A
 for the plurality system and 𝑁k = Î
@®%
A
 for the proportional 
system (Id. (p. 249)), which confirms that, ceteris-paribus T, the plurality 
system has a lower number of parties. 
I can only deduce that given a same party system with the same electors, 
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the plurality electoral system will have an ideal-typical party dimension 
HH greater in the plurality system than in the proportional one. Given 
the possibility for voters to express a double preference (one for a party 
and one for a candidate for FPTP) during the Italian elections from 1994 
to 2001, I have a potential opportunity to calculate the strategic vote, as 
graphically represented in Figure 53 below. 
 
Figure 53 Strategic vote as difference of the ideal-typical party shares. Italian general 
elections 1994-2001. 
 
The blue line indicates the spurious strategic vote, obtained simply 
summing the absolute values of the differences of each party share 
between the proportional and majoritarian electoral sheets, also 
including the strategic supply of the parties which tend to coalize in 
order to maximize their electoral profit.  
It is the electoral engineering itself that determines the exigence of new 
measurement tools able to provide an exact measure and answer the 
following research questions: 




















plurality ideal-tipical party share
proportional ideal-tipical party share
parties' spurious strategic vote
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2) calculate the counter strategies of candidates and electors; 
 
3) calculate the exact strategic vote: 
3.1) what is the exact dimension of a party share for which it is 
neither advantaged nor disadvantaged? 
3.2) what is the strategic vote for HH, minor parties and the 
dominant party? 
 
4) calculate an equilibrium able to consider all these strategies in 
function of the institutional set up and the electoral law. 
 
9.3 The generalized utility function of the party 
systems. Strategies of candidates and electors  
To understand the existence of electoral strategies, I start from the FPTP 
system, as it is very dis-representative, and subsequently widen to a 
general function which can describe the proportional systems as well; I 
can then graft other dis-representative options on this generalized 
model.  
I recall my re-elaboration of the law of minority attrition (Cfr. (Taagepera 
R. , 2007b, p. 207-209)), done in chapter two: 
s = 	
v½
v½ + (N − 1)Zu½(1 − v)½ 
As Taagepera states that the 2 opponents must obtain “exactly the same 
vote shares” (ibid. p. 209), it is the case to apply a corrective to (𝑁 − 1) 
which considers G, that measures exactly how party shares are 
distributed (independently from the share size): 
s = 	
v½
v½ + [(N − 1)(1 − 𝐺)]Zu½(1 − v)½ 
I also recall the following formula for n obtained in chapter two: 
𝑛 = ¾1 +
2
0,5	 ¿1 − 𝑃 − 𝑆












This allows to supply tools for politicians to design strategies and 
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counter strategies, considering the institutional and political variables 
and the shape of party share distribution, as well as tools for electors to 
estimate their voting strategies. The inflection point of the law of 
minority attrition will determine the party share for which it is neither 
advantaged nor disadvantaged, and therefore the strategic vote will be 
to the advantage of the parties on the right of such inflection point, and 
likewise to the disadvantage of those on the left. 
In presence of a threshold T, existing in [0,1], three break functions are 
identified:  
1) the effect is s=0 for any party share 𝑣 < 	𝑇. 
2) Being xlim the limit of influence of the probability curve which 
describes the overtaking of the threshold, following the law of minority 
attrition within the domain of v [T, xlim], I must blend two curves: one 
is the law of minority attrition determined by the threshold with domain 
in [0, xlim] (posing T< xlim), and the other is the general law of minority 
attrition, before analyzed, for each party system [0,1].  
 
Figure 54 Law of minority attrition seats (s (%)) on votes (v (%)), corrected by a 
threshold T. 
 
Figure 54 shows that the law of minority attrition, corrected by a 




anchor point (1,1). The maximum point in T is strategically explained by 
the minority parties’ behavior as they will act to coalize with existing 
parties to try and achieve an aggregate share at least greater or equal to 
T, creating a sort of accumulation point exactly in T. The minimum point 
in xlim can be identified through a simple proportion: 
[(𝑁)(1 − 𝐺)]uZ:1 = 𝑇: 𝑥𝑙𝑖𝑚 ⟹ 𝑥𝑙𝑖𝑚 =
𝑇
[(𝑁)(1 − 𝐺)]uZ 
[(N)(1 − 𝐺)]uZ represents the index HH of the general law of minority 
attrition net of the corrective effective G and is here related to the general 
party system domain (which is 1), like T represents the HH of the 
“minor” law of minority attrition and is here related to its domain xlim. 
I can now write the blended function defined in [T, xlim]: 
s = 	
v½
v½ + [(N − 1)(1 − 𝐺)]Zu½(1 − v)½ ∗ Â
𝑣 − 𝑇
𝑥𝑙𝑖𝑚 − 𝑇Ã + 𝑥𝑙𝑖𝑚 Â
𝑥𝑙𝑖𝑚 − 𝑣
𝑥𝑙𝑖𝑚 Ã 
The weights of the laws of minority attrition are indicated in square 
brackets: the more v moves towards xlim, the more the weight of the 
general law of minority attrition moves from 0 and tends to 1, in an 
inversely proportional relation to the incidence of 𝑥𝑙𝑖𝑚 (function-value), 
with weight 1 when v=0 and 0 when v=xlim. 
3) For v > xlim, the general law of minority attrition is applicable. 
Moving now to measuring the impact of T on the number of parties, I 
can use the Taageperian formula which links the number of parties with 














In line with my previous re-elaboration work, I can refine this formula 
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introducing the exponent zu{
z{uZ
, which allows to define the range94 of M 
















At this point - in presence of a threshold - I must recalculate N with the 
above formula. Firstly, I must substitute: N calculated on the electoral 
parties, T=0, S known, and M to be determined - also because, as shown 
by Taagepera, the effective M could be different from the theoretical one 
(ibid. (ch.11)) -. Once M effective has been calculated, I substitute the 
value of T in the same last formula, to find the new N’ which will be used 
to recalculate the general law of minority attrition. 
The research question is to determine the probability of the impact of the 
electoral law correctives, which corresponds to the area subtended by 
the law of minority attrition.  
We can start by looking at the impact of the threshold on electoral 
supply. As all variables are now known, I can calculate the best electoral 
strategy in terms of party alliances on a territorial basis, represented by 
G, particularly calculating an equilibrium point G on the party supply 
side. This can be determined using integral calculus requiring 
integrating n itself, which would lead to complex formulations. 
Therefore, I propose to take a simplified approach by defining a model 
of correlation between n and G. 
To define the correlation between n and G, I consider the direction of the 
Gini index, particularly whether party or parties, receiving a number of 
votes below the threshold, are excluded from seat allotment – on average 
– as the parties with votes above T benefit from this dis-proportionality: 
in this case, I hypothesize a decrease of G. Following my approach in 
previous models, I must estimate the overall size of the parties which 
could potentially be excluded. It is possible to use the previously re-
adapted law of minority attrition as a cumulative probability 
distribution function of the overall system party shares s, which will be 
called f(scum)D. Particularly, n expressed just in terms of G, will be equal 
to the inverse of G itself, because the lower the G, the more equal the 
probability to win in each district, hence the more n. Therefore, the 
 
94 as defined by Taagepera (ibid. (p. 220,248)). 
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general cumulative distribution function expressed in terms of v, N and 















I can substitute N with N’ (if known, otherwise I can just use N), and v 
with T, as I am determining how many parties could potentially be 
excluded in the interval between 0 to T. Using the same logic set 
previously, I can write a simple proportion to find G’, to then recalculate 
the general law of minority attrition - in presence of a threshold - with 
this new G’. 
𝐺 ∶ 1 = 𝐺á ∶ 1 − 𝑓(𝑠𝑐𝑢𝑚)A ⟹	𝐺á = 𝐺(1 − 𝑓(𝑠𝑐𝑢𝑚)A) 
I now look at the majority premium, which is another corrective 
appearing in some electoral systems. In order to formalize the impact of 
majority premium on electoral supply, I need to identify 𝑠Z, the biggest 
party-coalition which will benefit from the majority premium. In order 
to do so, I recall the formula developed in chapter three, which best 
explains 𝑠Z in function of the number of parties – effective and not -: 











Following the same logic used to formalize the impact of the threshold 
on electoral supply, I include considerations for G, as it is specular to the 
elector strategic vote, in this case measuring the strategic alliances of 
parties on a territorial basis: in an extreme case, when parties in the 
system all present the same share, G would be 0 and sZ would be equal 
to the number of parties; in the opposite case, in presence of just one 
party, G would be 1 and sZ would be equal to 1. 
This theoretical approach needs to be balanced with empirical 
considerations. As sZ|(Nj, Nk) presents exponents for each element of the 
equation, I can apply the geometric mean to each exponent and the G 








I can now enrich this approach, including the coefficient of dis-
proportionality n (rearranged in the domain [0,1]), to also consider the 
other institutional components - P, S, M and 𝐺 –. Looking at the extreme 
cases, N and G are the sole variables which determine 𝑠Z for the 
minimum value of n equal to 1, because being the system perfectly 
proportional, P, S, M and 𝐺 do not impact in any known form; for the 
maximum value of 𝑛 = ∞, the biggest party will obtain 100% of votes 
(equal to 1) because the dis-proportionality due to the electoral system is 
maximum. Lastly, I need to subtract the term of the interaction among 
each other (because N and G are already into n), always remaining in 
domain [0,1] as required: 
𝑠Z = 𝑠Z,F + ¿1 −
1
𝑛À − 𝑠Z,F ¿1 −
1
𝑛À 
At this point, I can calculate the net majority premium ∆𝑃𝑀 awarded to 
the biggest party, defined as the difference between the maximum share 
of seats (MJP, expressed from 0 to 1) awarded to the winner by the 
electoral law, and what would be attributed to biggest party share (𝑠Z) 
without the majority premium.  
∆𝑃𝑀 = 𝑀𝐽𝑃 − Â𝑠Z,F + ¿1 −
1
𝑛À − 𝑠Z,F ¿1 −
1
𝑛ÀÃ 
For a more precise calculus I could apply the previous utility curve 
posing the derivative equal to 1 and selecting the maximum solution. 
These solutions are exchangeable. This is another useful estimate tool to 
calculate strategies before the elections and to do electoral engineering.  
As there is a strategic element influencing voting outcomes, the gap 
between votes obtained by the biggest party (𝑣Z) and majority premium 
determines the probability of obtaining such premium: the smaller the 
gap between 𝑣Z and MJP, the higher the probability for the biggest party 
to be awarded the majority premium. In terms of electoral utility, this 
follows the opposite logic: the smaller the gap – then the smaller the 
potential electoral gain of 𝑣Z – the smaller the utility for the biggest party. 
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Having formalized MJP, I can now proceed to calculate the probability 
that this is realized, based on the number of votes. I can identify three 
components: 
1) in a scenario where all parties present the same gap between their 𝑣 
and MJP, electoral utility would decrease, being all parties potential 
competitors for the same premium. Then, the probability to win the MJP 
depends only on the dispersion of party shares caught by the Effective 
Gini index: for instance, if G is equal to 0, then all parties are equal, and 
the probability to win the MJP tends to zero; likewise, for G equal to 1 
the majority premium would be meaningless because one party already 
has all votes and therefore all seats.  
2) The degree of dis-proportionality n of the utility curve also plays a 
part in determining the probability of winning the MJP: in fact, the 
minimum value n=1 determines a pure proportional electoral system 
which would result in a minimal gain for 𝑣Z (and no other party), 
whereas in the opposite case, 𝑛 = ∞ determines a highly dis-
proportional system which would result in a maximum gain for 𝑣Z 
potentially equal to 1.  
3) A majority premium has a minimum threshold to activate itself - minp 
- and a maximum value after which it stops to produce effects - maxp -. 
Hence, I can define MJP’s barycenter as 𝐵 = Xö\t]T\
j
. Applying a 
generalized probability density Beta function P(Beta) =
c@%!(Zuc)d%!
∫ c@%!(Zuc)d%!	c	!#
 , I know that the maximum of this function corresponds 
to the mean point 𝑣 = Ü
Üt'
, as well as that the higher the coefficients, the 












At this point I can formulate a comprehensive probability function that 
considers all these components, having a domain [0,1]. Being this a pure 
statistical function in which all components have the same impact, I sum 
all of them; moreover, in order to maintain a domain [0,1] for each v, I 
include the subtraction of the product of these three components 
multiplied by two, obtaining: 
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𝑃(∆PM) = 4𝐺(1 − 𝐺) + B1 −
1
𝑛C + 𝑃




To know whether the introduction of an MJP is beneficial, considering 
the variables here discussed, I need to formulate an inequality imposing 
that the ∆𝑃𝑀 for its probability to be attributed to the winning party 
must be greater than or equal to the ∆𝑃𝑀 in the complementary case in 
which the other parties take the MJP which is therefore equally 
distributed among the other parties. This is a purely theoretical 
consideration as, in case of a loss for the biggest party, the MJP would 
practically be assigned to the second party; however, it is necessary to 
capitalize the interests of all other parties in the system. 
Practically, I start from Taagepera’s formula to quantify the remaining 
parties (2007b, p. 156) and I re-elaborate the average of the remaining 







Therefore, in order to calculate ∆PM using the formula defined above, in 
function of 𝑠Z,F, I can better express ∆PM in function of a refined variable 







Hence, the inequality expressed above, will be formulated as: 
∆PM ∗ P(∆PM) ≥ ∆PMmf%E!,e,e[1 − P(∆PM)] 
 
9.4.  Squaring the circle: the party, the electors 
and the electoral general equilibrium 
 
At this point, I have all the tools to calculate the electoral general 
equilibrium for any generalized electoral competition. This equilibrium 
point is determined by the crossing of the electoral supply conditions 
formalized in the previous sections with voters’ electoral demand 
explored below. 
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All the tools provided so far can support the biggest party in maximizing 
its own electoral profit, for example, by evaluating: the opportunity of 
proposing a certain electoral reform (determining the width of districts 
M, a hypothetical majority premium MJP, a certain T) and/or an 
electoral alliance (modifying 𝐺, impacting on n and changing the curve 
of utility - the law of minority attrition -).  
After considering all these strategies and counter-strategies, the gain to 
𝑠Z can generally be calculated, knowing 𝑣Z, using the previous relation 
𝑠Z = 𝑠Z,F + |1 −
Z
T
} − 𝑠Z,F |1 −
Z
T
} and the formula relative to the MJP – if 
needed -. However, a more precise theoretic generalized calculus can be 
produced from the above cumulative party function. I impose the 
derivative equal to 1 and select the maximum solution of s, since from 
this point any marginal increase 𝜀 of v would reduce the gain (𝑠Z − vZ) 
for any v + 𝜀 . Substituting the indexes G and N with G’ and N’ – 
previously used – to represent the final function after any eventual 
changes, I obtain: 
	













ý = 1L = max[dLMA = 1] 
The formula above means that even the largest party has an interest in 
optimizing the votes obtained, and not just simply getting the maximum 
votes possible (at least in a democratic and competitive system). With 
reference to the graph in figure 54, when the derivative is equal to 1, it 
means that in that point the infinitesimal of the delta seats (ds) is equal 
to the delta votes (dv). In this case dv represents the marginal costs, and 
ds the marginal utilities. Having defined for simplicity the derivative of 
the modified law of minority attrition as dLMA - it follows that: 
𝑚𝑎𝑥	[𝑑𝐿𝑀𝐴	 = 	1] ⟹ 	𝑑𝑣	 = 	𝑑𝑠 
Note that max has been entered for dLMA in order to select the greater 
solution between the two existing ones. In economic terms, a party ranks 
in max [dLMA = 1] rather than equal to 0, due to its particular form 
deriving from the utility function. In fact, in this point, any action aimed 
at increasing votes would be inefficient as the party would already hold 
an absolute majority of seats and benefited from the entire LMA segment 
- where 𝑑𝑠 > 	𝑑𝑣, which starts from the inflection point at the abscissa 
𝑣	 = 	 Z
p
, and arrives precisely at max (dLMA = 1), since	(𝑚𝑎𝑥	[𝑑𝐿𝑀𝐴	 =
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	1]) < 𝑣	 < 1 ⟹ 	𝑑𝑣	 < 𝑑𝑠. 
The next step is to substitute 𝑣Z as found in the general utility function, 
obtaining 𝑠Z. However, the previous formula (in n, N and G) could be a 
good approximation, as a handy trade off which could well estimate the 
value 𝑠Z. In presence of the MJP, it would be better to use the sum of the 
two members of the MJP equilibrium equation, obtaining the expected 
value of 𝑠Z = ∆PM ∗ P(∆PM) + ∆PMmf%E!,e,e[1 − P(∆PM)]. 
Hence, having the value of 𝑠Z for any case, I can finally consider the 
probability of the biggest party benefiting from any of the above-
mentioned electoral correctives – also jointly – using the same set of 
formulas used for the MJP, then: 





[1 − P(𝑣Z)] 
This formula represents just the opportunity cost for parties; I now need 
the same for electors. The opportunity cost for electors can be represented 
by the strategic vote, as this means the insincere preference expressed by 
electors, as I have previously introduced. It is proportional to the dis-
proportionality generated by the system, which can be simplified as 
|1 − Z
T
}, in the domain [0,1], because electors have the propensity to more 
likely change their preference if they know that voting for a bigger party 
implies a heavier weight of their vote.  
This concept is however conditional to the fact that the party system has a 
particular concentration. Firstly, I assume the possibility to measure the G 
index for the “as sincere as possible” vote preferences (𝐺m). These could be 
expressed when surveying electors on their propensity to vote parties, to 
obtain a simultaneous estimate of an expression of both a pure 
proportional vote and a general majoritarian one, as done for the Italian 
general elections (from 1994  to 2001) in Figure 53, or for the more recent 
local elections (Gschwend Stoiber, 2014).  
More in detail, for 𝐺m equal to 0 electors would have 0 interest in changing 
their preference because no party is a favorite winner and all parties 
compete starting with the same expectation to be the winner; likewise, on 
the opposite case, for 𝐺m equal to 1, electors would not change their 
preference because one party has all the consensus and it is guaranteed to 
win. Between these two extremes, voters get the maximum utility from 
supporting a candidate which they expect to win (the electoral demand), 
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instead of another party which is the most preferred but with less chances 
to win.  
Nevertheless, the utility value must be net of electoral supply, particularly 
if the party concentration in the districts-colleges is very high: the high 
concentration could happen either because parties decided to coalize or 
simply because a party’s or coalition’s dominant position exists on 
average, or both; these would determine the inability for voters to change 
the results by changing their preferences, since the final outcomes would 
be already determined.  
Therefore, the proxy for the electoral demand is given by the difference 1- 
(𝐺 − 𝐺); I subtract G because I consider electoral demand net of parties’ 
strategies at the national level. 
 
SV = ¿1 −
1
𝑛À ∗ g4𝐺m
(1 − 𝐺m)h ∗ g1 − (𝐺 − 𝐺)h 
 
I am now able to build the general equilibrium, putting to system two 
inequalities and one equation: 
 
1) the first inequality represents the electoral supply, which is the 
final formulation obtained from the law of minority attrition in 
consideration of all correctives and conditions examined in 
sections 9.2 and 9.3; this inequality sets the gain for the biggest 
party or coalition and the probability to become the winner, 
greater than or equal to the eventual cost of being one of the 
losers. 
 
2) The second inequality sets the gain for the biggest party or 
coalition and the probability to become the winner, less than or 
equal to the strategic vote; in fact, the latter represents a counter-
strategy, or a cost that electors bear to compensate electoral 
system and party strategies overall. This inequality links 
electoral supply and demand. 
 
3) The equation represents the degree of democracy of the political 
system, inversely proportional to R, in [0,1]. This equation links 
strategic vote with the votes gained by the biggest party, in 
function of the ideology applied. 
 
There is an ideological component to consider when looking to optimize 
an entire political system. On one hand, utilitarians will not consider a 
dis-representation factor because they believe that the dis-representation 
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produced in disfavor of the remaining parties - equal to (𝑠Z − vZ) - has 
been compensated by the gain of “governability” by the first party; in 
this case, the dummy variable R in the model below would be equal to 
0. On the other hand, the Rawlsian theory (1971) considers (𝑠Z − vZ) 
costs. In fact, because of the veil of ignorance, electors of a small party 
might be damaged (if not now, in the future); along the same lines, 
Popper considers minority protection a warranty for democracy (1996); 
therefore, the R considering this Rawlsian “Maximin“ theory would be 
equal to 1.  
 
In reality, except for R equal to 0, electors will always be subject to a 
“voter paradox”, representing the impossibility of maximization of 
electors’ utility overall, as Arrow theorized (1951). Therefore, in order to 
make democracy work, I select a value for R in the middle of its domain, 
for example using the “quadratic social welfare function”, in this case 
equal to 𝑅 = 	𝑆𝑉 ∗ (𝑠Z − vZ): this would give more weight to Rawls’ 
principle, if strategic vote happens jointly with the dis-proportionality in 
function of the biggest party.  
 
The extreme case presents (𝑠Z − vZ)=1 and 𝑆𝑉 = 1, meaning that no 
elector voted sincerely and the biggest party won all seats with almost 
zero votes: this surely does not represent a democratic system, and for 
this reason the minority warranty element will become top priority – 
assert which all can agree on, if a democratic system is to be guaranteed 
- then the Rawls’ criterion assumes 100% of importance, implying an 
R=1.  
 
In all other combinations, the model operates in a more or less 
democratic system, until R reaches 0, where all electors either express 
totally sincere preferences or we are in a perfectly proportional system, 
with no strategic vote, or both, and where Rawls’ criterion of justice 
would be meaningless since the system is already perfectly equalitarian. 
A representation of the pay offs of the “quadratic social welfare 





Table 32 Pay offs of the “quadratic social welfare function”	𝑅 = 	𝑆𝑉 ∗ (𝑠Z − 𝑣Z). 
𝒔𝟏 − 𝐯𝟏 SV Pay offs 
0 0 
(0,0) system perfect 
egalitarian-> win 
utilitarianism 
0 1 (0,1) 
1 0 (1,0) 
1 1 
(1,1) Rawls wins: 
not democratic regime 
 
Here is the representation of the general equilibrium system with the two 







(𝒔𝟏 − 𝐯𝟏)[𝟏 − 𝐏(𝒗𝟏)] ≤ (𝒔𝟏 − 𝐯𝟏)𝐏(𝒗𝟏)	
(𝒔𝟏 − 𝐯𝟏) ≥ 𝑺𝑽+ (𝒔𝟏 − 𝐯𝟏)𝑹− 𝑺𝑽(𝒔𝟏 − 𝐯𝟏)𝑹







10. Conclusions and Discussion 
 
In this last chapter, I would like to show an overview of all the new tools 
and knowledge, their reciprocal links, their use and their added value.  
 
This thesis offers a wide variety of tools from extremely specific to more 
theoretical, respectively allowing the possibility to find quick and 
concrete solutions to political sciences problems and providing general 
tools to widely extend this new knowledge to all social sciences. As 
Antiseri remarks, basic research is vital in itself	(2007) bringing to 
unintentional consequences in the knowledge. This is the base for new 
theories. Nevertheless, even the more theoretical approach shown can be 
easily applied to concrete scenarios simply by substitution of the 
formulas here presented; in fact, sometimes, simplified formulations are 
presented, such as in chapter eight and nine, allowing for a flexible 
application in function of the contexts, as I will recap below.  
 
I could summarize that the final aim of this thesis is the normative 
building of an optimal electoral system, which can warrant both logical 
coherence and social equity as categorized by Arrow (1951). The electoral 
system represents - in fact - the more quickly modifiable part of political 
systems, in function of the given – endogenous - political and cultural 
variables, such as Nj, Nk, G, SV, R, but also of the unmodifiable 
institutional variable P.  
 
Therefore, for each given political system, optimizations can be 
performed by embracing the so-called “gradualistic engineering” 
approach, as a trial-by-error process that must follow the democracy, as  
it happens in a pure science (Id. (2007, p. 520-1)). In concrete, an optimal 
electoral reform, applied in a context of political culture in a time t, will 
produce some rebalancing of itself in the time t+1, simply because society 
changed over time; for these reasons, the electoral system should be 
adaptive. Then, politics follow a trial-by-error process trying to find their 
stabilization, as a one-shot solution does not exist that is always valid, 
also according to Hayek's principle of exploration of the unknown and 
error correction (1982). The parallelism is similar to Dahl's reasoning - 
given by the homonymous "Dahl's box" - regarding the transition of 
political regimes, which must be gradual for a durable democratic 
transaction (1971). 
 
Then, applying interdisciplinary knowledge from political science, 
probability, mathematics, physics and economics, it will be possible to 
find the general electoral equilibrium, as shown in chapter nine, taking 
into account 𝑠Zand 𝑣Z, SV, R and the correctives of electoral systems 
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(block threshold and majority premium). Like a waterfall, all chapters 
are connected using substitutions, allowing "the connection among 
connections" (Taagepera R. , 2015, p. 89-95). 
 
In particular, in chapter nine, SV is obtained as a function of G and n; in 
turn, it is possible to derive n by N, P, S, M, T, MJP and G, as shown in 
chapter two; furthermore, M and S are optimized in chapter eight thanks 
to differential calculus; the leftovers (N and P) – as said – are 
endogenous. Moreover, chapter two has deeply analyzed the majority 
premium, thresholds and the other majority correctives, then going to 
precociously expand the expression P(𝑣Z) necessary to optimize the final 
equations of chapter nine, which also considers the other variables 𝑠Z, 𝑣Z, 
SV, and R. I am going to explain these connections, step by step. 
 
Concerning 𝑠Z used in chapter nine, chapter three can be applied, mainly 
if the aim is to evaluate the impact of any new electoral rule applied in a 
specific context or "created in a laboratory". 𝑣Z can also be derived 
starting from 𝑠Z predicted in chapter two, by means of the relations 
formalized by Taagepera and Shugart (2017, p. 144, formula 9.1). In this 
case, and more in general, this thesis is integrable for any possible 
substitution, firstly with the most recent publication Votes from Seats 
(Shugart - Taagepera, 2017) and secondly with the Predicting Party Sizes 
(Taagepera R. , 2007b). 
 
Continuing the links among the thesis, I review another important 
optimization at the level of ideological competition. This is a crucial 
cleavage that determines electoral dynamics and competition among 
parties. The strategic vote introduced in chapter nine has revealed that it 
modifies votes for all parties, following this logic: the more the presence 
of majoritarian correctives in the electoral system to the advantage of the 
biggest party, the more n - and the more dis-representation -, the more 
SV in favor of the biggest party. 
 
Chapter six goes to create a simplified final three-variate model able to 
connect the positional competition (the summation of the ideological 
areas occupied exclusively by one party) with N and n. It allows to 
recreate the ideological Beta functions for each ideal-typical N party in 
the system in a probabilistic way. By substituting another relation also 
found in chapter six, it connects N, positional competition, n and the px 
dimension (average ideological distance among the parties). Chapter 
five is indispensable to chapter six because of the Beta functions, chapter 
six is linked to chapter two through the n calculus, and to chapter seven 
because the latter allows expanding the dataset by means of predictions 
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of the positional data and the electoral flows of the swing votes from an 
election to the next one.  
 
Then, the theoretical models of chapter eight could be applied on an 
empirical basis to find optimal n values and their relative optimal 
positional party competition. In the same way, chapter nine can take 
advantage of the same application, to find, for example, the optimal SV, 
which implies the optimal R, allowing to measure the equity degree of a 
specific democratic system, given a particular party system. 
Even though until now N is assumed as endogenous, it could also be 
optimized, if required, as shown in chapter eight, or by means of the 
relation "best fit" of 𝐷j expressed in terms of (𝑠Z − 𝑣Z) given by Shugart 
and Taagepera (2017, p. 143)95, depending on the situation.  
 
Chapter four (the multi-pick – up to three maximums - probability 
density function) could be applied for an in-depth calculus of the 
analysis in both chapter two and chapter nine, also taking advantage of 
chapter three formulas by substitution; in this way, the party system can 
be described with more precision. A multi-pick function will certainly 
better measure the effects of electoral correctives such as majority 
premiums, threshold and others, not only because of the multi-pick but 
also because the feature of this function is probabilistic.  A perspective 
application of this function could be to estimate the allocation of seats in 
the districts on a nationwide basis, by means of the function’s cumulative 
side, in which the values of 𝑁k and 𝑁j will be manipulated in function of 
the differentials that they present from nationwide to 
district/circumscriptional level.  
 
Here I use the methodology “connection among connection”, able to 
minimize the error  (Taagepera R. , 2015, p. 89-95; 215-219), because I am 
using a chain of several variables interlocked, but also because the most 
advanced statistical function used is able to catch up to three picks - 
concerning the frequency - of the party distribution. In this way, this new 
function presents many other potential applications, for example, for 
electoral simulations at national level, but also applicable to the district 
one. In this case, this new function uses N and 𝑁k with reference to the 
district, to predict how the national level determines the seats allotment 
in each district/circumscription. Thus, this application could enrich the 
current approach (Cfr. (Shugart - Taagepera, 2017, p. 236-258)) that 
focuses on the correlation between the (effective or nominal) number of 
parties at district/circumscription level with M. 
 
95 which has an 𝑅& = 91.3%. 
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Another frontier for the thesis’ application could be represented by an 
implemented Cabinet Life estimation. A measuring of the parties’ 
blackmail and/or coalition power could be introduced, generally coming 
from small parties (Downs, 1957); (Fisichella, 2009, p. 241). This can be 
done operationally, introducing variables that modify the exponent of N, 
which is currently equal to two in the formula of cabinet duration, and 
finally resulting in a more comprehensive model of cabinet duration. I 
capitalize on important information about the whole party distribution, 
considering the standardized measure of skewness [0,1], calculated in 
chapter four and for which it is useful to consider: 1) the Feld and 
Grofman’s variance (2007), 2) the prediction of each party share - from N 
- given by Taagepera (Taagepera R. , 2007, p. 156-7), which I integrate 
through some adjustments that come from the impact of 𝑁j, M and S on 
𝑠Z, and 3) the effective Gini index. 
In conclusion, I passionately believe that all the tools introduced in this 
thesis can form a broad and interdisciplinary platform of contents and 
methodologies that can expand the knowledge in political science and 
generally in social sciences. For example, a vital but underestimated 
powerful tool in political and social sciences is given by the application 
of LQMs to political economy estimates (Taagepera R. , 2015, p. 224-8) 
and in particular by time series, even though, for instance, Bernhard and 
Leblang (2006) have offered a hybrid approach between politics, finance 
and the use of time series. Social and more political scientists rarely apply 
nonlinear LQMs to predict future trends, unlike done by Taagepera in 
an elaborated way regarding a demographic model (Id. (p.222-3)). 
Lastly, unfortunately in political sciences the differential calculus (Id. 
(p.167-79)) used, in this dissertation, in a comprehensive multivariate 
model (chapter eight) is less diffused, even if it is widely diffused in 
physics and economics.  
 





Appendix chapter 4 
 
Here are all the passages of the derivative calculus of the law of minority 




Appendixes chapter 6 
 
As already introduced in chapter six, the appendixes of this chapter, 
even though based on a small sample (16 cases), can be interpreted as 
provisional directional correlations, and useful to draft a comprehensive 
model which grafts the political and institutional variables. 
 
Appendix 6.1 
The correlation between weighted ideological distance (px) and 
weighted Effective Number of Parties (𝑁\w) is shown below. The 
regression has a significance of at least 99% for both the variable and the 
constant, the 𝑅j𝑎𝑑𝑗. is 63.3% and the estimation error (Root MSE) is only 
5%, as shown in Table 33 below. 
 
Table 33 Correlation between weighted ideological distance (px) and the weighted 






𝑁-F 0.0478 *** 
 (0.00922) 






Prob > F test 0.000 
Root MSE 0.0502 
Standard Errors in Parentheses 






Table 34 Correlations of the n expressed by positional (px), positional on weighted N 
(px/𝑁-F) and weighted positional competition (pxq) 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
VARIABLES px/𝑁\w px pxq 
    
n -0.0179 -0.0494 -0.0443 
 (0.0208) (0.0408) (0.0472) 
Constant 0.189 *** 0.641 *** 0.592*** 
 (0.0347) (0.0683) (0.0790) 
    
Observations 16 16 16 
𝑅j 0.051 0.095 0.059 
𝑅j Adj. -0.017 0.030 -0.008 
Prob > F test 0.403 0.247 0.364 
Standard Errors in Parentheses 






Table 35 below presents the combinations of the previous variables in 
function of n as dependent variable. 
 
Table 35 Correlation models expressing n in terms of positional competition variables 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Beta 
VARIABLES n n n n n n n n  
          
px -2.550  -3.028 * -4.085 **    -9.008*** 17,90% 
 (7.225)  (1.598) (1.566)    (2.577)  
px/𝑁!"  5.750     30.29***   
  (18.69)     (9.418)   
Quadratic Prox. 
(pxq) 
    -3.047* -7.638***    
     (1.467) (2.500)    
pos. comp./𝑁!"    -3,736 ** -3.402** -17.42** 19.53** -21.55** 47,06% 
    (1.425) (1.513) (6.665) (6.418) (8.155)  
px*pos. 
comp./𝑁!" 
 -12.28 -7.021     32.26** 35,04% 
  (29.99) (5.405)     (14.66)  
pos. comp. -1.231 1.098 0.290       
 (7.020) (4.663) (1.177)       
px*pos. comp. 0.375         
 (12.53)         
px*pos. 
comp./	𝑁!"# 
      -139.2***   
       (39.80)   
pxq*pos. 
comp./	𝑁!" 
     26.60*    
      (12.38)    
Constant 3.610 1.198 3.785 *** 4.533 *** 3.770*** 6.300*** -2.387* 7.368***  
 (4.086) (2.823) (0.986) (1.035) (0.933) (1.439) (1.294) (1.546)  
          
Observations 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16  
𝑅# 0.248 0.144 0.338 0.408 0.323 0.511 0.552 0.583  
𝑅# Adj. 0.060 -0.071 0.173 0.317 0.219 0.388 0.440 0.479  
Prob > F test 0.315 0.586 0.161 0.033 0.080 0.031 0.019 0.012  
Root MSE 0.5116 0.5458 0.4697 0.4269 0.4565 0.4038 0.3947 0.3808  
Standard Errors in Parentheses 




Table 36 n expressed in function of the best model’s predicted values, coming from: 
weighted ideological distance (px), positional party competition (pos. comp.) and the 
weighted Effective number of parties (𝑁-F). 
 












𝑅& Adj. 0.553 
Prob > F test 0.001 
Root MSE 0.2692 
Standard Errors in Parentheses 




Appendixes chapter 8 
 
Below is the derivative calculus of the differential equations created in 





Knowing that the derivative must be equal to 0, I can write the last 




; solving by S, the real optimized result 












Knowing that the derivative must be equal to 0, I can write the last 





; solving by S, the real optimized 













Knowing that the derivative must be equal to 0, I can write the last 





; solving by S the real 











Below I show the derivative calculus to find the optimal M. 𝑆∗appears 
simply as S just aiming to simply the notation. 
 
 
Knowing that the derivative must be equal to 0, I can write the last 










W; solving by M the real 





Below I show the derivative calculus to find the optimal 𝐷$ in its first 










Below I show the derivative calculus to find the optimal 𝐷$ in its second 




Knowing that the derivative must be equal to 0, I can write the last 













; solving by 𝐷$, and 
knowing that k is theoretically higher than 0 - therefore simplifiable - the 













Below I show the derivative calculus to find the optimal 𝐷$ in its last 
formulation. 𝑆∗and 𝑀∗appear simply as S and M, just aiming to simply 
the notations. 
 
Knowing that the derivative must be equal to 0, I can write the last 









− 1); solving by 𝐷$, and 
knowing that k is theoretically higher than 0 - therefore simplifiable - the 
real optimized result will be equal to: 𝐷$∗ =
Î$+ √{
∗z∗+
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